Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Domain or Tenant Policy Modification:  Изменение групповой политики

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\SYSVOL\\Policies\`.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain. Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as Scheduled Task/Job, Disable or Modify Tools, Ingress Tool Transfer, Create Account, Service Execution, and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs) For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious Scheduled Task/Job by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)

ID: T1484.001
Относится к технике:  T1484
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Command: Command Execution
Версия: 1.1
Дата создания: 28 Dec 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Prestige

Prestige has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)

LockBit 3.0

LockBit 3.0 can enable options for propogation through Group Policy Objects.(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory LockBit 3.0 MAR 2023)

HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper has the ability to deploy through an infected system's default domain policy.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)

Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has used Group Policy to deploy batch scripts for ransomware deployment.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)

Empire

Empire can use New-GPOImmediateTask to modify a GPO that will install and execute a malicious Scheduled Task/Job.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)

APT41

APT41 used scheduled tasks created via Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy ransomware.(Citation: apt41_mandiant)

LockBit 2.0

LockBit 2.0 can modify Group Policy to disable Windows Defender and to automatically infect devices in Windows domains.(Citation: FBI Lockbit 2.0 FEB 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Lockbit 2.0 JUN 2022)

Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has used Group Policy Objects to deploy batch scripts.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)

Egregor

Egregor can modify the GPO to evade detection.(Citation: Cybereason Egregor Nov 2020) (Citation: Intrinsec Egregor Nov 2020)

Meteor

Meteor can use group policy to push a scheduled task from the AD to all network machines.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021)

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy and execute malware.(Citation: Mandiant-Sandworm-Ukraine-2022)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks. Permission Audits: - Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions. Software Audits: - Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives. Configuration Audits: - Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems. Network Audits: - Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Обнаружение

It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created * Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted * Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved * Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as Scheduled Task/Job, which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).

Ссылки

  1. srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  2. Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
  3. Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
  4. Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  5. Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  6. Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  7. Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  8. MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New “Prestige” ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.
  9. FBI et al. (2023, March 16). #StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0. Retrieved February 5, 2025.
  10. Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  11. ESET. (2022, March 1). IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targetingUkraine. Retrieved April 10, 2022.
  12. Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
  13. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  14. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
  15. Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Filtering the Scope of a GPO. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
  16. Microsoft. (2008, September 11). Fun with WMI Filters in Group Policy. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
  17. FBI. (2022, February 4). Indicators of Compromise Associated with LockBit 2.0 Ransomware. Retrieved January 24, 2025.
  18. Elsad, A. et al. (2022, June 9). LockBit 2.0: How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It. Retrieved January 24, 2025.
  19. Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024.
  20. Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  21. Bichet, J. (2020, November 12). Egregor – Prolock: Fraternal Twins ?. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  22. Rochberger, L. (2020, November 26). Cybereason vs. Egregor Ransomware. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  23. Check Point Research Team. (2021, August 14). Indra - Hackers Behind Recent Attacks on Iran. Retrieved February 17, 2022.
  24. Ken Proska, John Wolfram, Jared Wilson, Dan Black, Keith Lunden, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Nathan Brubaker, Tyler Mclellan, Chris Sistrunk. (2023, November 9). Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology. Retrieved March 28, 2024.

Связанные риски

Ничего не найдено

Каталоги

Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.