Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Вход Регистрация
MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Изменение групповой политики
Сертификаты СЗИ
CVE уязвимости
БДУ ФСТЭК уязвимости
НКЦКИ уязвимости
MITRE ATT&CK
БДУ ФСТЭК
Новая БДУ ФСТЭК
EN
Риски
Каталоги
MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Изменение групповой политики
Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
Подробнее
Наш канал

Domain or Tenant Policy Modification:  Изменение групповой политики

ID Название
.001 Изменение групповой политики
.002 Trust Modification

Adversaries may modify Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to subvert the intended discretionary access controls for a domain, usually with the intention of escalating privileges on the domain. Group policy allows for centralized management of user and computer settings in Active Directory (AD). GPOs are containers for group policy settings made up of files stored within a predictable network path `\\SYSVOL\\Policies\`.(Citation: TechNet Group Policy Basics)(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016) Like other objects in AD, GPOs have access controls associated with them. By default all user accounts in the domain have permission to read GPOs. It is possible to delegate GPO access control permissions, e.g. write access, to specific users or groups in the domain. Malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors such as Scheduled Task/Job, Disable or Modify Tools, Ingress Tool Transfer, Create Account, Service Execution, and more.(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions)(Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Hacking Team Breach) Since GPOs can control so many user and machine settings in the AD environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this GPO abuse.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs) For example, publicly available scripts such as New-GPOImmediateTask can be leveraged to automate the creation of a malicious Scheduled Task/Job by modifying GPO settings, in this case modifying <GPO_PATH>\Machine\Preferences\ScheduledTasks\ScheduledTasks.xml.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) In some cases an adversary might modify specific user rights like SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, set in <GPO_PATH>\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf, to achieve a subtle AD backdoor with complete control of the domain because the user account under the adversary's control would then be able to modify GPOs.(Citation: Harmj0y SeEnableDelegationPrivilege Right)

ID: T1484.001
Относится к технике:  T1484
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Windows
Требуемые разрешения: Administrator, User
Источники данных: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Command: Command Execution
Версия: 1.0
Дата создания: 28 Dec 2020
Последнее изменение: 23 Sep 2024

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Prestige

Prestige has been deployed using the Default Domain Group Policy Object from an Active Directory Domain Controller.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)
HermeticWiper

HermeticWiper has the ability to deploy through an infected system's default domain policy.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)
Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has used Group Policy to deploy batch scripts for ransomware deployment.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)
Empire

Empire can use New-GPOImmediateTask to modify a GPO that will install and execute a malicious Scheduled Task/Job.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
APT41

APT41 used scheduled tasks created via Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy ransomware.(Citation: apt41_mandiant)
Indrik Spider

Indrik Spider has used Group Policy Objects to deploy batch scripts.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Mandiant_UNC2165)
Egregor

Egregor can modify the GPO to evade detection.(Citation: Cybereason Egregor Nov 2020) (Citation: Intrinsec Egregor Nov 2020)
Meteor

Meteor can use group policy to push a scheduled task from the AD to all network machines.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021)

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Group Policy Objects (GPOs) to deploy and execute malware.(Citation: Mandiant-Sandworm-Ukraine-2022)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Audit

Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.
User Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.

Обнаружение

It is possible to detect GPO modifications by monitoring directory service changes using Windows event logs. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications, including: * Event ID 5136 - A directory service object was modified * Event ID 5137 - A directory service object was created * Event ID 5138 - A directory service object was undeleted * Event ID 5139 - A directory service object was moved * Event ID 5141 - A directory service object was deleted GPO abuse will often be accompanied by some other behavior such as Scheduled Task/Job, which will have events associated with it to detect. Subsequent permission value modifications, like those to SeEnableDelegationPrivilege, can also be searched for in events associated with privileges assigned to new logons (Event ID 4672) and assignment of user rights (Event ID 4704).

Ссылки

  1. srachui. (2012, February 13). Group Policy Basics – Part 1: Understanding the Structure of a Group Policy Object. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  2. Schroeder, W. (2017, January 10). The Most Dangerous User Right You (Probably) Have Never Heard Of. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
  3. Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
  4. Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  5. Microsoft Secure Team. (2016, June 1). Hacking Team Breach: A Cyber Jurassic Park. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  6. Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  7. Mandiant. (2016, February 25). Mandiant M-Trends 2016. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  8. MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New “Prestige” ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.
  9. Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  10. ESET. (2022, March 1). IsaacWiper and HermeticWizard: New wiper and worm targetingUkraine. Retrieved April 10, 2022.
  11. Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
  12. Schroeder, W., Warner, J., Nelson, M. (n.d.). Github PowerShellEmpire. Retrieved April 28, 2016.
  13. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT41, A DUAL ESPIONAGE AND CYBER CRIME OPERATION. Retrieved June 11, 2024.
  14. Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Filtering the Scope of a GPO. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
  15. Microsoft. (2008, September 11). Fun with WMI Filters in Group Policy. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
  16. Mandiant Intelligence. (2022, June 2). To HADES and Back: UNC2165 Shifts to LOCKBIT to Evade Sanctions. Retrieved July 29, 2024.
  17. Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  18. Bichet, J. (2020, November 12). Egregor – Prolock: Fraternal Twins ?. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  19. Rochberger, L. (2020, November 26). Cybereason vs. Egregor Ransomware. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  20. Check Point Research Team. (2021, August 14). Indra - Hackers Behind Recent Attacks on Iran. Retrieved February 17, 2022.
  21. Ken Proska, John Wolfram, Jared Wilson, Dan Black, Keith Lunden, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Nathan Brubaker, Tyler Mclellan, Chris Sistrunk. (2023, November 9). Sandworm Disrupts Power in Ukraine Using a Novel Attack Against Operational Technology. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
Навигация

Связанные риски

Ничего не найдено

Каталоги

Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.