Impair Defenses: Отключение журналирования событий Windows
Other sub-techniques of Impair Defenses (9)
Adversaries may disable Windows event logging to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Windows event logs record user and system activity such as login attempts, process creation, and much more.(Citation: Windows Log Events) This data is used by security tools and analysts to generate detections.
The EventLog service maintains event logs from various system components and applications.(Citation: EventLog_Core_Technologies) By default, the service automatically starts when a system powers on. An audit policy, maintained by the Local Security Policy (secpol.msc), defines which system events the EventLog service logs. Security audit policy settings can be changed by running secpol.msc, then navigating to Security Settings\Local Policies\Audit Policy for basic audit policy settings or Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration for advanced audit policy settings.(Citation: Audit_Policy_Microsoft)(Citation: Advanced_sec_audit_policy_settings) auditpol.exe may also be used to set audit policies.(Citation: auditpol)
Adversaries may target system-wide logging or just that of a particular application. For example, the EventLog service may be disabled using the following PowerShell line: Stop-Service -Name EventLog.(Citation: Disable_Win_Event_Logging) Additionally, adversaries may use auditpol and its sub-commands in a command prompt to disable auditing or clear the audit policy. To enable or disable a specified setting or audit category, adversaries may use the /success or /failure parameters. For example, auditpol /set /category:”Account Logon” /success:disable /failure:disable turns off auditing for the Account Logon category.(Citation: auditpol.exe_STRONTIC)(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco) To clear the audit policy, adversaries may run the following lines: auditpol /clear /y or auditpol /remove /allusers.(Citation: T1562.002_redcanaryco)
By disabling Windows event logging, adversaries can operate while leaving less evidence of a compromise behind.
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| Wevtutil |
Wevtutil can be used to disable specific event logs on the system.(Citation: Wevtutil Microsoft Documentation) |
| Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 has used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017) |
| APT29 |
APT29 used |
| Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has disabled event logging on compromised systems.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018) |
| UNC2452 |
UNC2452 used |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Restrict File and Directory Permissions |
Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts. |
| Restrict Registry Permissions |
Restrict the ability to modify certain hives or keys in the Windows Registry. |
| Audit |
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. |
| User Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. |
Обнаружение
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for commands that can be used to disable logging. For example, Wevtutil, `auditpol`, `sc stop EventLog`, and offensive tooling (such as Mimikatz and `Invoke-Phant0m`) may be used to clear logs.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)(Citation: evt_log_tampering) In Event Viewer, Event ID 1102 under the “Security” Windows Log and Event ID 104 under the “System” Windows Log both indicate logs have been cleared.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging) `Service Control Manager Event ID 7035` in Event Viewer may indicate the termination of the EventLog service.(Citation: evt_log_tampering) Additionally, gaps in the logs, e.g. non-sequential Event Record IDs, may indicate that the logs may have been tampered. Monitor the addition of the MiniNT registry key in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control`, which may disable Event Viewer.(Citation: def_ev_win_event_logging)
Ссылки
- svch0st. (2020, September 30). Event Log Tampering Part 1: Disrupting the EventLog Service. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
- Chandel, R. (2021, April 22). Defense Evasion: Windows Event Logging (T1562.002). Retrieved September 14, 2021.
- redcanaryco. (2021, September 3). T1562.002 - Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 13, 2021.
- STRONTIC. (n.d.). auditpol.exe. Retrieved September 9, 2021.
- dmcxblue. (n.d.). Disable Windows Event Logging. Retrieved September 10, 2021.
- Jason Gerend, et al. (2017, October 16). auditpol. Retrieved September 1, 2021.
- Simpson, D. et al. (2017, April 19). Advanced security audit policy settings. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
- Daniel Simpson. (2017, April 19). Audit Policy. Retrieved September 13, 2021.
- Core Technologies. (2021, May 24). Essential Windows Services: EventLog / Windows Event Log. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
- Franklin Smith. (n.d.). Windows Security Log Events. Retrieved February 21, 2020.
- MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
- Forensics Wiki. (2021, June 19). Windows XML Event Log (EVTX). Retrieved September 13, 2021.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). wevtutil. Retrieved September 14, 2021.
- Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
- Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.