MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Удаление индикаторов компрометации из вредоносных инструментов

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Obfuscated Files or Information: Удаление индикаторов компрометации из вредоносных инструментов

Other sub-techniques of Obfuscated Files or Information (9)

ID	Название
.001	Добавление в бинарный файл незначащих данных
.002	Упаковка ПО
.003	Стеганография
.004	Компиляция после доставки
.005	Удаление индикаторов компрометации из вредоносных инструментов
.006	Скрытая передача через HTML
.007	Динамическое разрешение API
.008	Перевод полезных нагрузок в трудночитаемый формат
.009	Встроенные полезные нагрузки

Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems. A good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may modify the file to explicitly avoid that signature, and then re-use the malware.

ID: T1027.005

Относится к технике: T1027

Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion

Платформы: Linux, macOS, Windows

Источники данных: Application Log: Application Log Content

Версия: 1.1

Дата создания: 19 Mar 2020

Последнее изменение: 28 Apr 2022

Название	Описание
Примеры процедур
GravityRAT	The author of GravityRAT submitted samples to VirusTotal for testing, showing that the author modified the code to try to hide the DDE object in a different part of the document.(Citation: Talos GravityRAT)
Operation Wocao	Operation Wocao has edited variable names within the Impacket suite to avoid automated detection.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Cobalt Strike	Cobalt Strike includes a capability to modify the Beacon payload to eliminate known signatures or unpacking methods.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
Patchwork	Patchwork apparently altered NDiskMonitor samples by adding four bytes of random letters in a likely attempt to change the file hashes.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)
PowerSploit	PowerSploit's `Find-AVSignature` AntivirusBypass module can be used to locate single byte anti-virus signatures.(Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012)(Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)
Deep Panda	Deep Panda has updated and modified its malware, resulting in different hash values that evade detection.(Citation: Symantec Black Vine)
TEMP.Veles	TEMP.Veles has modified files based on the open-source project cryptcat in an apparent attempt to decrease AV detection rates.(Citation: FireEye TEMP.Veles 2018)
GALLIUM	GALLIUM ensured each payload had a unique hash, including by using different types of packers.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)
Penquin	Penquin can remove strings from binaries.(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)
	During Operation Wocao, threat actors edited variable names within the Impacket suite to avoid automated detection.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
QakBot	QakBot can make small changes to itself in order to change its checksum and hash value.(Citation: Crowdstrike Qakbot October 2020)(Citation: Cyberint Qakbot May 2021)
Cobalt Strike	Cobalt Strike includes a capability to modify the "beacon" payload to eliminate known signatures or unpacking methods.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
Waterbear	Waterbear can scramble functions not to be executed again with random values.(Citation: Trend Micro Waterbear December 2019)
Daserf	Analysis of Daserf has shown that it regularly undergoes technical improvements to evade anti-virus detection.(Citation: Trend Micro Daserf Nov 2017)
SUNBURST	SUNBURST source code used generic variable names and pre-obfuscated strings, and was likely sanitized of developer comments before being added to SUNSPOT.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
InvisiMole	InvisiMole has undergone regular technical improvements in an attempt to evade detection.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
OilRig	OilRig has tested malware samples to determine AV detection and subsequently modified the samples to ensure AV evasion.(Citation: Palo Alto OilRig April 2017)(Citation: Unit42 OilRig Nov 2018)
Turla	Based on comparison of Gazer versions, Turla made an effort to obfuscate strings in the malware that could be used as IoCs, including the mutex name and named pipe.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)
APT3	APT3 has been known to remove indicators of compromise from tools.(Citation: APT3 Adversary Emulation Plan)

Обнаружение

The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.

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