Сбор бизнес-информации об организации
Sub-techniques (4)
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Trusted Relationship).
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| APT28 |
APT28 has used large language models (LLMs) to gather information about satellite capabilities.(Citation: MSFT-AI)(Citation: OpenAI-CTI) |
| Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) |
| Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet has gathered information on victim organizations through email and social media interaction.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024) |
|
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020) |
|
| Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi) Kimsuky has also used large language models (LLMs) to gather information about potential targets of interest.(Citation: MSFT-AI) |
| Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive reconnaissance pre-compromise to gain information about the targeted organization.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Pre-compromise |
Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct successful operations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Limit Information Exposure: - Regularly audit and sanitize publicly available data, including job posts, websites, and social media. - Use tools like OSINT monitoring platforms (e.g., SpiderFoot, Recon-ng) to identify leaked information. Protect Domain and DNS Infrastructure: - Enable DNSSEC and use WHOIS privacy protection. - Monitor for domain hijacking or lookalike domains using services like RiskIQ or DomainTools. External Monitoring: - Use tools like Shodan, Censys to monitor your external attack surface. - Deploy external vulnerability scanners to proactively address weaknesses. Threat Intelligence: - Leverage platforms like MISP, Recorded Future, or Anomali to track adversarial infrastructure, tools, and activity. Content and Email Protections: - Use email security solutions like Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, or Mimecast. - Enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC policies to protect against email spoofing. Training and Awareness: - Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, securing their social media, and avoiding information leaks. |
Обнаружение
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Ссылки
- U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
- OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, February 14). Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI. Retrieved March 11, 2024.
- Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.
- ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.
- CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.