Gather Victim Org Information
Sub-techniques (4)
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's organization that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization may include a variety of details, including the names of divisions/departments, specifics of business operations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of key employees. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about an organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Phishing for Information or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Establish Accounts or Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Trusted Relationship).
Procedure Examples |
|
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021) |
| Moonstone Sleet |
Moonstone Sleet has gathered information on victim organizations through email and social media interaction.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024) |
|
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020) |
|
| Kimsuky |
Kimsuky has collected victim organization information including but not limited to organization hierarchy, functions, press releases, and others.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi) |
| Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has conducted extensive reconnaissance pre-compromise to gain information about the targeted organization.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024) |
Mitigations |
|
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Pre-compromise |
This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques. |
Detection
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
References
- U.S. SEC. (n.d.). EDGAR - Search and Access. Retrieved August 27, 2021.
- Seals, T. (2020, October 15). Broadvoice Leak Exposes 350M Records, Personal Voicemail Transcripts. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
- Vyacheslav Kopeytsev and Seongsu Park. (2021, February 25). Lazarus targets defense industry with ThreatNeedle. Retrieved October 27, 2021.
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, May 28). Moonstone Sleet emerges as new North Korean threat actor with new bag of tricks. Retrieved August 26, 2024.
- ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
- KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.
- CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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