Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Brute Force:  Распыление пароля

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying) Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.

ID: T1110.003
Относится к технике:  T1110
Тактика(-и): Credential Access
Платформы: Containers, ESXi, IaaS, Identity Provider, Linux, Network Devices, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: Application Log: Application Log Content, User Account: User Account Authentication
Версия: 1.7
Дата создания: 11 Feb 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Linux Rabbit

Linux Rabbit brute forces SSH passwords in order to attempt to gain access and install its malware onto the server. (Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit’s infpub.dat file uses NTLM login credentials to brute force Windows machines.(Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)

MailSniper

MailSniper can be used for password spraying against Exchange and Office 365.(Citation: GitHub MailSniper)

CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can brute force credential authentication by using a supplied list of usernames and a single password.(Citation: CME Github September 2018)

APT28

APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in password-spraying mode it conducted approximately four authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several days or weeks.(Citation: Microsoft STRONTIUM New Patterns Cred Harvesting Sept 2020)(Citation: Microsoft Targeting Elections September 2020) APT28 has also used a Kubernetes cluster to conduct distributed, large-scale password spray attacks.(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)

APT33

APT33 has used password spraying to gain access to target systems.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)

Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)

APT29

APT29 has conducted brute force password spray attacks.(Citation: MSRC Nobelium June 2021)(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021)(Citation: NCSC et al APT29 2024)

Chimera

Chimera has used multiple password spraying attacks against victim's remote services to obtain valid user and administrator accounts.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)

HEXANE

HEXANE has used password spraying attacks to obtain valid credentials.(Citation: SecureWorks August 2019)

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used a script to attempt RPC authentication against a number of hosts.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2018)

Ember Bear

Ember Bear has conducted password spraying against Outlook Web Access (OWA) infrastructure to identify valid user names and passwords.(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)

Leafminer

Leafminer used a tool called Total SMB BruteForcer to perform internal password spraying.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)

Silent Librarian

Silent Librarian has used collected lists of names and e-mail accounts to use in password spraying attacks against private sector targets.(Citation: DOJ Iran Indictments March 2018)

Agrius

Agrius engaged in password spraying via SMB in victim environments.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)

HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM has gained initial access through password spray attacks.(Citation: Microsoft Silk Typhoon MAR 2025)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
Multi-factor Authentication

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). - Enable Conditional Access policies to only allow logins from trusted devices, such as those enrolled in Intune or joined via Hybrid/Entra. Authentication Tools and Methods: - Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications. Secure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. Monitoring and Alerting: - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations. Training and Policy Enforcement: - Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications.

Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Windows Systems: - Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure: - Minimum password length (e.g., 12+ characters). - Password complexity requirements. - Password history (e.g., disallow last 24 passwords). - Account lockout duration and thresholds. Linux Systems: - Configure Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): - Use `pam_pwquality` to enforce complexity and length requirements. - Implement `pam_tally2` or `pam_faillock` for account lockouts. - Use `pwunconv` to disable password reuse. Password Managers: - Enforce usage of enterprise password managers (e.g., Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) to generate and store strong passwords. Password Blacklisting: - Use tools like Have I Been Pwned password checks or NIST-based blacklist solutions to prevent users from setting compromised passwords. Regular Auditing: - Periodically audit password policies and account configurations to ensure compliance using tools like LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) and vulnerability scanners. *Tools for Implementation* Windows: - Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce password policies. - Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS): Enforce random, unique admin passwords. Linux/macOS: - PAM Modules (pam_pwquality, pam_tally2, pam_faillock): Enforce password rules. - Lynis: Audit password policies and system configurations. Cross-Platform: - Password Managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass): Manage and enforce strong passwords. - Have I Been Pwned API: Prevent the use of breached passwords. - NIST SP 800-63B compliant tools: Enforce password guidelines and blacklisting.

Account Use Policies

Account Use Policies help mitigate unauthorized access by configuring and enforcing rules that govern how and when accounts can be used. These policies include enforcing account lockout mechanisms, restricting login times, and setting inactivity timeouts. Proper configuration of these policies reduces the risk of brute-force attacks, credential theft, and unauthorized access by limiting the opportunities for malicious actors to exploit accounts. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Lockout Policies: - Implementation: Configure account lockout settings so that after a defined number of failed login attempts (e.g., 3-5 attempts), the account is locked for a specific time period (e.g., 15 minutes) or requires an administrator to unlock it. - Use Case: This prevents brute-force attacks by limiting how many incorrect password attempts can be made before the account is temporarily disabled, reducing the likelihood of an attacker successfully guessing a password. Login Time Restrictions: - Implementation: Set up login time policies to restrict when users or groups can log into systems. For example, only allowing login during standard business hours (e.g., 8 AM to 6 PM) for non-administrative accounts. - Use Case: This prevents unauthorized access outside of approved working hours, where login attempts might be more suspicious or harder to monitor. For example, if an account that is only supposed to be active during the day logs in at 2 AM, it should raise an alert or be blocked. Inactivity Timeout and Session Termination: - Implementation: Enforce session timeouts after a period of inactivity (e.g., 10-15 minutes) and require users to re-authenticate if they wish to resume the session. - Use Case: This policy prevents attackers from hijacking active sessions left unattended. For example, if an employee walks away from their computer without locking it, an attacker with physical access to the system would be unable to exploit the session. Password Aging Policies: - Implementation: Enforce password aging rules, requiring users to change their passwords after a defined period (e.g., 90 days) and ensure passwords are not reused by maintaining a password history. - Use Case: This limits the risk of compromised passwords being used indefinitely. Regular password changes make it more difficult for attackers to reuse stolen credentials. Account Expiration and Deactivation: - Implementation: Configure user accounts, especially for temporary or contract workers, to automatically expire after a set date or event. Accounts that remain unused for a specific period should be deactivated automatically. - Use Case: This prevents dormant accounts from becoming an attack vector. For example, an attacker can exploit unused accounts if they are not properly monitored or deactivated. **Tools for Implementation**: - Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Windows: To enforce account lockout thresholds, login time restrictions, session timeouts, and password policies. - Identity and Access Management (IAM) solutions: For centralized management of user accounts, session policies, and automated deactivation of accounts. - Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms: To monitor and alert on unusual login activity, such as failed logins or out-of-hours access attempts. - Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Tools: To further enforce secure login attempts, preventing brute-force or credential stuffing attacks.

Обнаружение

Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. Consider the following event IDs:(Citation: Trimarc Detecting Password Spraying) * Domain Controllers: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625. * Domain Controllers: "Audit Kerberos Authentication Service" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771. * All systems: "Audit Logon" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.

Ссылки

  1. Mamedov, O. Sinitsyn, F. Ivanov, A.. (2017, October 24). Bad Rabbit ransomware. Retrieved January 28, 2021.
  2. Grassi, P., et al. (2017, December 1). SP 800-63-3, Digital Identity Guidelines. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
  3. Anomali Labs. (2018, December 6). Pulling Linux Rabbit/Rabbot Malware Out of a Hat. Retrieved March 4, 2019.
  4. Burt, T. (2020, September 10). New cyberattacks targeting U.S. elections. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
  5. byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
  6. Or Chechik, Tom Fakterman, Daniel Frank & Assaf Dahan. (2023, November 6). Agonizing Serpens (Aka Agrius) Targeting the Israeli Higher Education and Tech Sectors. Retrieved May 22, 2024.
  7. MSRC. (2021, June 25). New Nobelium activity. Retrieved August 4, 2021.
  8. SecureWorks 2019, August 27 LYCEUM Takes Center Stage in Middle East Campaign Retrieved. 2019/11/19
  9. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center. (2021, October 25). NOBELIUM targeting delegated administrative privileges to facilitate broader attacks. Retrieved March 25, 2022.
  10. UK National Cyber Security Center et al. (2024, February). SVR cyber actors adapt tactics for initial cloud access. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
  11. Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  12. Koessel, Sean. Adair, Steven. Lancaster, Tom. (2024, November 22). The Nearest Neighbor Attack: How A Russian APT Weaponized Nearby Wi-Fi Networks for Covert Access. Retrieved February 25, 2025.
  13. DOJ. (2018, March 23). U.S. v. Rafatnejad et al . Retrieved February 3, 2021.
  14. Joe Slowik. (2018, October 12). Anatomy of an Attack: Detecting and Defeating CRASHOVERRIDE. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
  15. Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC). (2020, September 10). STRONTIUM: Detecting new patterns in credential harvesting. Retrieved September 11, 2020.
  16. Thyer, J. (2015, October 30). Password Spraying & Other Fun with RPCCLIENT. Retrieved April 25, 2017.
  17. Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.
  18. US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.
  19. Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.
  20. NSA, CISA, FBI, NCSC. (2021, July). Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
  21. Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Unraveling the Long Thread of the Sony Attack. Retrieved February 25, 2016.
  22. Metcalf, S. (2018, May 6). Trimarc Research: Detecting Password Spraying with Security Event Auditing. Retrieved January 16, 2019.
  23. US Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency et al. (2024, September 5). Russian Military Cyber Actors Target U.S. and Global Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved September 6, 2024.
  24. Bullock, B., . (2018, November 20). MailSniper. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
  25. Moussa Diallo and Brett Winterford. (2024, April 26). How to Block Anonymizing Services using Okta. Retrieved May 28, 2024.
  26. Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  27. Symantec Security Response. (2018, July 25). Leafminer: New Espionage Campaigns Targeting Middle Eastern Regions. Retrieved August 28, 2018.
  28. Novetta Threat Research Group. (2016, February 24). Operation Blockbuster: Remote Administration Tools & Content Staging Malware Report. Retrieved March 16, 2016.
  29. Pany, D. & Hanley, C. (2023, May 3). Cloudy with a Chance of Bad Logs: Cloud Platform Log Configurations to Consider in Investigations. Retrieved October 16, 2023.
  30. Microsoft. (2022, December 14). Conditional Access templates. Retrieved February 21, 2023.

Связанные риски

Риск Связи
Раскрытие ключей (паролей) доступа из-за подбора (восстановление) аутентификационной информации в операционной системе
Конфиденциальность Повышение привилегий Раскрытие информации Подмена пользователя
Угроза отказа в обслуживании из-за перебора паролей к учетной записи в средстве защиты информации
Доступность Отказ в обслуживании УБИ.1.17.1 УБИ.1.17.2 УБИ.1.17.3
2
Угроза несанкционированного доступа из-за перебора паролей к учетной записи в средстве защиты информации
Конфиденциальность Раскрытие информации НСД УБИ.2.17.1 УБИ.2.17.2 УБИ.2.17.3
2
Угроза несанкционированной модификации (искажения) из-за перебора паролей к учетной записи в средстве защиты информации
Конфиденциальность Раскрытие информации УБИ.3.17.1 УБИ.3.17.2 УБИ.3.17.3 УБИ.4.17.1 УБИ.4.17.2 ...
2
Угроза утечки информации из-за перебора паролей к учетной записи в средстве защиты информации
Конфиденциальность Раскрытие информации УБИ.1.17.1 УБИ.1.17.2 УБИ.1.17.3
2
Угроза несанкционированного доступа из-за перебора паролей к учетной записи в микропрограммном обеспечении
Конфиденциальность Раскрытие информации НСД УБИ.2.17.1 УБИ.2.17.2 УБИ.2.17.3
2

Каталоги

БДУ ФСТЭК:
УБИ.008 Угроза восстановления и/или повторного использования аутентификационной информации
Угроза заключается в возможности доступа к данным пользователя в результате подбора (например, путём полного перебора или перебо...
УБИ.074 Угроза несанкционированного доступа к аутентификационной информации
Угроза заключается в возможности извлечения паролей, имён пользователей или других учётных данных из оперативной памяти компьюте...
УБИ.123 Угроза подбора пароля BIOS
Угроза заключается в возможности осуществления нарушителем несанкционированного доступа к настройкам BIOS/UEFI путём входа в кон...
Новая БДУ ФСТЭК Способы реализации:

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