Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Event Triggered Execution:  Подписка на события WMI

Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user loging, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.

ID: T1546.003
Относится к технике:  T1546
Тактика(-и): Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Windows
Требуемые разрешения: Administrator, SYSTEM
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, WMI: WMI Creation
Версия: 1.2
Дата создания: 24 Jan 2020
Последнее изменение: 20 Apr 2022

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used mofcomp.exe to establish WMI Event Subscription persistence mechanisms configured from a *.mof file.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)

UNC2452

UNC2452 used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

APT29

APT29 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

FIN8

FIN8 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)

RegDuke

RegDuke can persist using a WMI consumer that is launched every time a process named WINWORD.EXE is started.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)

SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can create a WMI Event to execute a payload for persistence.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)

Leviathan

Leviathan has used WMI for persistence.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)

Turla

Turla has used WMI event filters and consumers to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)

APT33

APT33 has attempted to use WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence on compromised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)

Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda's custom ORat tool uses a WMI event consumer to maintain persistence.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)

adbupd

adbupd can use a WMI script to achieve persistence.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)

SeaDuke

SeaDuke uses an event filter in WMI code to execute a previously dropped executable shortly after system startup.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)

POSHSPY

POSHSPY uses a WMI event subscription to establish persistence.(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)

PoshC2

PoshC2 has the ability to persist on a system using WMI events.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2)

TrailBlazer

TrailBlazer has the ability to use WMI for persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

POWERTON

POWERTON can use WMI for persistence.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
User Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.

Privileged Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Use capabilities to prevent suspicious behavior patterns from occurring on endpoint systems. This could include suspicious process, file, API call, etc. behavior.

Обнаружение

Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent PowerShell cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent)

Ссылки

  1. Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
  2. Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.
  3. Microsoft. (n.d.). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
  4. Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
  5. French, D., Murphy, B. (2020, March 24). Adversary tradecraft 101: Hunting for persistence using Elastic Security (Part 1). Retrieved December 21, 2020.
  6. French, D. (2018, October 9). Detecting & Removing an Attacker’s WMI Persistence. Retrieved October 11, 2019.
  7. Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved May 4, 2020.
  8. Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit™ (CTU) Research Team. (2016, March 28). A Novel WMI Persistence Implementation. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
  9. Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.
  10. Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
  11. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  12. Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
  13. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  14. Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  15. Martin Zugec. (2021, July 27). Deep Dive Into a FIN8 Attack - A Forensic Investigation. Retrieved September 1, 2021.
  16. Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
  17. Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022.
  18. Nettitude. (2018, July 23). Python Server for PoshC2. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  19. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  20. Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.
  21. Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team. (2020, June 18). Inside Microsoft Threat Protection: Mapping attack chains from cloud to endpoint. Retrieved June 22, 2020.
  22. Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
  23. Windows Defender Advanced Threat Hunting Team. (2016, April 29). PLATINUM: Targeted attacks in South and Southeast Asia. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
  24. Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
  25. CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
  26. Dunwoody, M. and Carr, N.. (2016, September 27). No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016. Retrieved October 4, 2016.

Каталоги

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