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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Подписка на события WMI
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Подписка на события WMI
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Event Triggered Execution:  Подписка на события WMI

ID Название
.001 Замена ПО по умолчанию для запуска файла
.002 Экранная заставка
.003 Подписка на события WMI
.004 .bash_profile и .bashrc
.005 Команда trap
.006 Добавление LC_LOAD_DYLIB
.007 DLL-библиотеки загружаемые с помощью Netsh
.008 Специальные возможности
.009 DLL-библиотеки AppCert
.010 DLL-библиотеки AppInit
.011 Оболочка совместимости приложений
.012 Изменение IFEO
.013 Профиль PowerShell
.014 Демон мониторинга событий emond
.015 Перехват COM-объектов
.016 Установщики
.017 Udev Rules

Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. WMI can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time, user login, or the computer's uptime.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015) Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system.(Citation: FireEye WMI SANS 2015)(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) Adversaries may also compile WMI scripts – using `mofcomp.exe` –into Windows Management Object (MOF) files (.mof extension) that can be used to create a malicious subscription.(Citation: Dell WMI Persistence)(Citation: Microsoft MOF May 2018) WMI subscription execution is proxied by the WMI Provider Host process (WmiPrvSe.exe) and thus may result in elevated SYSTEM privileges.

ID: T1546.003
Относится к технике:  T1546
Тактика(-и): Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, WMI: WMI Creation
Версия: 1.5
Дата создания: 24 Jan 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Sardonic

Sardonic can use a WMI event filter to invoke a command-line event consumer to gain persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender Sardonic Aug 2021)
adbupd

adbupd can use a WMI script to achieve persistence.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)
SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can create a WMI Event to execute a payload for persistence.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)
BADHATCH

BADHATCH can use WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: BitDefender BADHATCH Mar 2021)
HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT can use WMI event subscriptions to create persistence.(Citation: US-CERT HOPLIGHT Apr 2019)
RegDuke

RegDuke can persist using a WMI consumer that is launched every time a process named WINWORD.EXE is started.(Citation: ESET Dukes October 2019)
PoshC2

PoshC2 has the ability to persist on a system using WMI events.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2)
POSHSPY

POSHSPY uses a WMI event subscription to establish persistence.(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)
SeaDuke

SeaDuke uses an event filter in WMI code to execute a previously dropped executable shortly after system startup.(Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
TrailBlazer

TrailBlazer has the ability to use WMI for persistence.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)
metaMain

metaMain registered a WMI event subscription consumer called "hard_disk_stat" to establish persistence.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)
Kevin

Kevin can compile randomly-generated MOF files into the WMI repository to persistently run malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
POWERTON

POWERTON can use WMI for persistence.(Citation: FireEye APT33 Guardrail)
Turla

Turla has used WMI event filters and consumers to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
APT33

APT33 has attempted to use WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence on compromised hosts.(Citation: Microsoft Holmium June 2020)
APT29

APT29 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Mandiant No Easy Breach)
Leviathan

Leviathan has used WMI for persistence.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Metador

Metador has established persistence through the use of a WMI event subscription combined with unusual living-off-the-land binaries such as `cdb.exe`.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)
HEXANE

HEXANE has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Kaspersky Lyceum October 2021)
Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda's custom ORat tool uses a WMI event consumer to maintain persistence.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)
Blue Mockingbird

Blue Mockingbird has used mofcomp.exe to establish WMI Event Subscription persistence mechanisms configured from a *.mof file.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)
UNC2452

UNC2452 used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
FIN8

FIN8 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)
Rancor

Rancor has complied VBScript-generated MOF files into WMI event subscriptions for persistence.(Citation: Rancor WMI)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Suspicious Process Behavior: - Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts. - Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action. Unauthorized File Access: - Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization. - Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it. Abnormal API Calls: - Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities. - Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like `OpenProcess` and `WriteProcessMemory` and terminates the offending process. Exploit Prevention: - Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access. - Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.

Обнаружение

Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence.(Citation: TechNet Autoruns)(Citation: Medium Detecting WMI Persistence) Monitor for the creation of new WMI EventFilter, EventConsumer, and FilterToConsumerBinding events. Event ID 5861 is logged on Windows 10 systems when new EventFilterToConsumerBinding events are created.(Citation: Elastic - Hunting for Persistence Part 1) Monitor processes and command-line arguments that can be used to register WMI persistence, such as the Register-WmiEvent PowerShell cmdlet, as well as those that result from the execution of subscriptions (i.e. spawning from the WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host process).(Citation: Microsoft Register-WmiEvent)

Ссылки

  1. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  2. Mandiant. (2015, February 24). M-Trends 2015: A View from the Front Lines. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  3. Satran, M. (2018, May 30). Managed Object Format (MOF). Retrieved January 24, 2020.
  4. Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
  5. Microsoft. (2021, July 2). Use attack surface reduction rules to prevent malware infection. Retrieved June 24, 2021.
  6. Ehrlich, A., et al. (2022, September). THE MYSTERY OF METADOR | AN UNATTRIBUTED THREAT HIDING IN TELCOS, ISPS, AND UNIVERSITIES. Retrieved January 23, 2023.
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  8. FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  9. Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017.
  10. Lambert, T. (2020, May 7). Introducing Blue Mockingbird. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
  11. Faou, M., Tartare, M., Dupuy, T. (2019, October). OPERATION GHOST. Retrieved September 23, 2020.
  12. Devon Kerr. (2015). There's Something About WMI. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  13. CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
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  22. Vrabie, V., et al. (2021, March 10). FIN8 Returns with Improved BADHATCH Toolkit. Retrieved September 8, 2021.
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