Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Поиск
Вход Регистрация
MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Сбор информации об атакуемых пользователях
EN
Риски
Каталоги
MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Сбор информации об атакуемых п...
Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
Подробнее
Наш канал

Сбор информации об атакуемых пользователях

ID Name
.001 Учетные данные
.002 Адреса эл. почты
.003 Имена сотрудников

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. Active Scanning) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).

ID: T1589
Суб-техники:  .001 .002 .003
Тактика(-и): Reconnaissance
Платформы: PRE
Источники данных: Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Версия: 1.3
Дата создания: 02 Oct 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
APT32

APT32 has conducted targeted surveillance against activists and bloggers.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
HEXANE

HEXANE has identified specific potential victims at targeted organizations.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)
Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has gathered victim identify information during pre-compromise reconnaissance. (Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)
FIN13

FIN13 has researched employees to target for social engineering attacks.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations.(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)
Star Blizzard

Star Blizzard has identified ways to engage targets by researching potential victims' interests and social or professional contacts.(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)
LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed information of target employees to enhance their social engineering lures.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Pre-compromise

Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct successful operations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Limit Information Exposure: - Regularly audit and sanitize publicly available data, including job posts, websites, and social media. - Use tools like OSINT monitoring platforms (e.g., SpiderFoot, Recon-ng) to identify leaked information. Protect Domain and DNS Infrastructure: - Enable DNSSEC and use WHOIS privacy protection. - Monitor for domain hijacking or lookalike domains using services like RiskIQ or DomainTools. External Monitoring: - Use tools like Shodan, Censys to monitor your external attack surface. - Deploy external vulnerability scanners to proactively address weaknesses. Threat Intelligence: - Leverage platforms like MISP, Recorded Future, or Anomali to track adversarial infrastructure, tools, and activity. Content and Email Protections: - Use email security solutions like Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, or Mimecast. - Enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC policies to protect against email spoofing. Training and Awareness: - Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, securing their social media, and avoiding information leaks.

Обнаружение

Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.

Ссылки

  1. GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021.
  2. Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  3. Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  4. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  5. Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
  6. ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.
  7. Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  8. Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
  9. Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
  10. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
  11. Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  12. Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
  13. CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  14. McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  15. CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
  16. Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  17. Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  18. Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
  19. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
Навигация

Мы используем cookie-файлы, чтобы получить статистику, которая помогает нам улучшить сервис для вас с целью персонализации сервисов и предложений. Вы может прочитать подробнее о cookie-файлах или изменить настройки браузера. Продолжая пользоваться сайтом, вы даёте согласие на использование ваших cookie-файлов и соглашаетесь с Политикой обработки персональных данных.