Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Gather Victim Identity Information
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Gather Victim Identity Informa...
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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
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Gather Victim Identity Information

ID Name
.001 Credentials
.002 Email Addresses
.003 Employee Names

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. Active Scanning) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames.(Citation: GrimBlog UsernameEnum)(Citation: Obsidian SSPR Abuse 2023) Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).(Citation: OPM Leak)(Citation: Register Deloitte)(Citation: Register Uber)(Citation: Detectify Slack Tokens)(Citation: Forbes GitHub Creds)(Citation: GitHub truffleHog)(Citation: GitHub Gitrob)(Citation: CNET Leaks) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).

ID: T1589
Sub-techniques:  .001 .002 .003
Tactic(s): Reconnaissance
Platforms: PRE
Data Sources: Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Version: 1.3
Created: 02 Oct 2020
Last Modified: 16 Sep 2024

Procedure Examples
Name Description
LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed information of target employees to enhance their social engineering lures.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)
HEXANE

HEXANE has identified specific potential victims at targeted organizations.(Citation: ClearSky Siamesekitten August 2021)
FIN13

FIN13 has researched employees to target for social engineering attacks.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted extensive reconnaissance research on potential targets.(Citation: ClearSky Lazarus Aug 2020)
APT32

APT32 has conducted targeted surveillance against activists and bloggers.(Citation: Amnesty Intl. Ocean Lotus February 2021)
Star Blizzard

Star Blizzard has identified ways to engage targets by researching potential victims' interests and social or professional contacts.(Citation: CISA Star Blizzard Advisory December 2023)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors targeted people based on their organizational roles and privileges.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations.(Citation: Proofpoint TA453 July2021)
Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has gathered victim identify information during pre-compromise reconnaissance. (Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Pre-compromise

This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques.

Detection

Monitor for suspicious network traffic that could be indicative of probing for user information, such as large/iterative quantities of authentication requests originating from a single source (especially if the source is known to be associated with an adversary/botnet). Analyzing web metadata may also reveal artifacts that can be attributed to potentially malicious activity, such as referer or user-agent string HTTP/S fields. Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.

References

  1. Thomson, I. (2017, September 26). Deloitte is a sitting duck: Key systems with RDP open, VPN and proxy 'login details leaked'. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  2. Sandvik, R. (2014, January 14). Attackers Scrape GitHub For Cloud Service Credentials, Hijack Account To Mine Virtual Currency. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  3. Noah Corradin and Shuyang Wang. (2023, August 1). Behind The Breach: Self-Service Password Reset (SSPR) Abuse in Azure AD. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
  4. Ng, A. (2019, January 17). Massive breach leaks 773 million email addresses, 21 million passwords. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
  5. Michael Henriksen. (2018, June 9). Gitrob: Putting the Open Source in OSINT. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  6. McCarthy, K. (2015, February 28). FORK ME! Uber hauls GitHub into court to find who hacked database of 50,000 drivers. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  7. GrimHacker. (2017, July 24). Office365 ActiveSync Username Enumeration. Retrieved December 9, 2021.
  8. Dylan Ayrey. (2016, December 31). truffleHog. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  9. Detectify. (2016, April 28). Slack bot token leakage exposing business critical information. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
  10. Cybersecurity Resource Center. (n.d.). CYBERSECURITY INCIDENTS. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
  11. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
  12. ClearSky Cyber Security . (2021, August). New Iranian Espionage Campaign By “Siamesekitten” - Lyceum. Retrieved June 6, 2022.
  13. Ta, V., et al. (2022, August 8). FIN13: A Cybercriminal Threat Actor Focused on Mexico. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
  14. ClearSky Research Team. (2020, August 13). Operation 'Dream Job' Widespread North Korean Espionage Campaign. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  15. Amnesty International. (2021, February 24). Vietnamese activists targeted by notorious hacking group. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  16. CISA, et al. (2023, December 7). Russian FSB Cyber Actor Star Blizzard Continues Worldwide Spear-phishing Campaigns. Retrieved June 13, 2024.
  17. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  18. Miller, J. et al. (2021, July 13). Operation SpoofedScholars: A Conversation with TA453. Retrieved August 18, 2021.
  19. CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
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