Search Open Technical Databases: Общедоступные БД с результатами сканирований
Other sub-techniques of Search Open Technical Databases (5)
Adversaries may search within public scan databases for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Various online services continuously publish the results of Internet scans/surveys, often harvesting information such as active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, certificates, and even server banners.(Citation: Shodan) Adversaries may search scan databases to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information from these services. Adversaries may seek information about their already identified targets, or use these datasets to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Active Scanning or Search Open Websites/Domains), establishing operational resources (ex: Develop Capabilities or Obtain Capabilities), and/or initial access (ex: External Remote Services or Exploit Public-Facing Application).
Примеры процедур |
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| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| APT41 |
APT41 uses the Chinese website fofa.su, similar to the Shodan scanning service, for passive scanning of victims.(Citation: Rostovcev APT41 2021) |
|
APT41 DUST used internet scan data for target development.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024) |
|
| Volt Typhoon |
Volt Typhoon has used FOFA, Shodan, and Censys to search for exposed victim infrastructure.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Pre-compromise |
This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques. |
Обнаружение
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access.
Ссылки
- Shodan. (n.d.). Shodan. Retrieved October 20, 2020.
- Nikita Rostovcev. (2022, August 18). APT41 World Tour 2021 on a tight schedule. Retrieved February 22, 2024.
- Mike Stokkel et al. (2024, July 18). APT41 Has Arisen From the DUST. Retrieved September 16, 2024.
- CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
Связанные риски
| Риск | Связи | |
|---|---|---|
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Раскрытие информации о работниках организации
из-за
публикации информации в открытых источниках
в интернете
Конфиденциальность
Раскрытие информации
НСД
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Раскрытие информации об ИТ инфраструктуре
из-за
публикации информации в открытых источниках
в интернете
Конфиденциальность
Раскрытие информации
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