Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Внешние службы удаленного доступа

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)

ID: T1133
Тактика(-и): Initial Access, Persistence
Платформы: Containers, Linux, macOS, Windows
Источники данных: Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Версия: 2.4
Дата создания: 31 May 2017
Последнее изменение: 16 Jun 2022

Примеры процедур

Название Описание

TeamTNT has used open-source tools such as Weave Scope to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access to victim environments.(Citation: Intezer TeamTNT September 2020)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group) TeamTNT has also targeted exposed kubelets for Kubernetes environments.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: `cscript //nologo "C:\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs" set winrm/config/service@{EnableCompatibilityHttpsListener="true"}`.(Citation: Cybereason OperationCuckooBees May 2022)

Linux Rabbit

Linux Rabbit attempts to gain access to the server via SSH.(Citation: Anomali Linux Rabbit 2018)

During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)


APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.(Citation: RSA2017 Detect and Respond Adair)


TEMP.Veles has used a VPN to persist in the victim environment.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)

Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used Dropbear SSH with a hardcoded backdoor password to maintain persistence within the target network. Sandworm Team has also used VPN tunnels established in legitimate software company infrastructure to gain access to internal networks of that software company's users.(Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)

Night Dragon

Night Dragon has used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)


Hildegard was executed through an unsecure kubelet that allowed anonymous access to the victim environment.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)


APT41 compromised an online billing/payment service using VPN access between a third-party service provider and the targeted payment service.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)


LAPSUS$ has gained access to internet-facing systems and applications, including virtual private network (VPN), remote desktop protocol (RDP), and virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) including Citrix. (Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)


OilRig uses remote services such as VPN, Citrix, or OWA to persist in an environment.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)


GALLIUM has used VPN services, including SoftEther VPN, to access and maintain persistence in victim environments.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)


Ke3chang has gained access through VPNs including with compromised accounts and stolen VPN certificates.(Citation: NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong)(Citation: Microsoft NICKEL December 2021)

Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has accessed victim networks by using stolen credentials to access the corporate VPN infrastructure.(Citation: FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020)


APT29 has used compromised identities to access networks via SSH, VPNs, and other remote access tools.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)(Citation: NCSC APT29 July 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote tunneling using an SSH tool to maintain access to a compromised environment.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)


Kimsuky has used RDP to establish persistence.(Citation: CISA AA20-301A Kimsuky)


FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.(Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)(Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016)

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services.(Citation: Dell TG-3390) Threat Group-3390 has also obtained OWA account credentials during intrusions that it subsequently used to attempt to regain access when evicted from a victim network.(Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)


Kinsing was executed in an Ubuntu container deployed via an open Docker daemon API.(Citation: Aqua Kinsing April 2020)


GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used publicly-accessible RDP and remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers to gain access to victim machines.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)


Chimera has used legitimate credentials to login to an external VPN, Citrix, SSH, and other remote services.(Citation: Cycraft Chimera April 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)


Dragonfly has used VPNs and Outlook Web Access (OWA) to maintain access to victim networks.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: CISA AA20-296A Berserk Bear December 2020)


UNC2452 has used compromised identities to access VPNs and remote access tools.(Citation: MSTIC NOBELIUM Mar 2021)


APT28 has used Tor and a variety of commercial VPN services to route brute force authentication attempts.(Citation: Cybersecurity Advisory GRU Brute Force Campaign July 2021)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors used stolen credentials to connect to the victim's network via VPN.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)

Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used stolen credentials to connect to the victim's network via VPN.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)

Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 used VPNs and Outlook Web Access (OWA) to maintain access to victim networks.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: US-CERT APT Energy Oct 2017)


Doki was executed through an open Docker daemon API port.(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)


Leviathan has used external remote services such as virtual private networks (VPN) to gain initial access.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)


Контрмера Описание
Network Segmentation

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.

Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.

Limit Access to Resource Over Network

Prevent access to file shares, remote access to systems, unnecessary services. Mechanisms to limit access may include use of network concentrators, RDP gateways, etc.

External Remote Services Mitigation

Limit access to remote services through centrally managed concentrators such as VPNs and other managed remote access systems. Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. Disable or block remotely available services such as Windows Remote Management. Use strong two-factor or multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of Multi-Factor Authentication Interception techniques for some two-factor authentication implementations.

Multi-factor Authentication

Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.


Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours. When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application.


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