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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Перехват двухфакторной аутентификации
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Перехват двухфакторной аутенти...
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Перехват двухфакторной аутентификации

Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms. If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011) Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011) Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)

ID: T1111
Тактика(-и): Credential Access
Платформы: Linux, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: Driver: Driver Load, Process: OS API Execution, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Версия: 2.1
Дата создания: 31 May 2017
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Sykipot

Sykipot is known to contain functionality that enables targeting of smart card technologies to proxy authentication for connections to restricted network resources using detected hardware tokens.(Citation: Alienvault Sykipot DOD Smart Cards)
SLOWPULSE

SLOWPULSE can log credentials on compromised Pulse Secure VPNs during the `DSAuth::AceAuthServer::checkUsernamePassword`ACE-2FA authentication procedure.(Citation: Mandiant Pulse Secure Zero-Day April 2021)
Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has used a custom collection method to intercept two-factor authentication soft tokens.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
Chimera

Chimera has registered alternate phone numbers for compromised users to intercept 2FA codes sent via SMS.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)
Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)
APT42

APT42 has intercepted SMS-based one-time passwords and has set up two-factor authentication.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) Additionally, APT42 has used cloned or fake websites to capture MFA tokens.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling)

LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ has replayed stolen session token and passwords to trigger simple-approval MFA prompts in hope of the legitimate user will grant necessary approval.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Two-Factor Authentication Interception Mitigation

Remove smart cards when not in use. Protect devices and services used to transmit and receive out-of-band codes. Identify and block potentially malicious software that may be used to intercept 2FA credentials on a system by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
User Training

User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques. Comprehensive training programs create a human firewall by empowering users to be an active component of the organization's cybersecurity defenses. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Create Comprehensive Training Programs: - Design training modules tailored to the organization's risk profile, covering topics such as phishing, password management, and incident reporting. - Provide role-specific training for high-risk employees, such as helpdesk staff or executives. Use Simulated Exercises: - Conduct phishing simulations to measure user susceptibility and provide targeted follow-up training. - Run social engineering drills to evaluate employee responses and reinforce protocols. Leverage Gamification and Engagement: - Introduce interactive learning methods such as quizzes, gamified challenges, and rewards for successful detection and reporting of threats. Incorporate Security Policies into Onboarding: - Include cybersecurity training as part of the onboarding process for new employees. - Provide easy-to-understand materials outlining acceptable use policies and reporting procedures. Regular Refresher Courses: - Update training materials to include emerging threats and techniques used by adversaries. - Ensure all employees complete periodic refresher courses to stay informed. Emphasize Real-World Scenarios: - Use case studies of recent attacks to demonstrate the consequences of successful phishing or social engineering. - Discuss how specific employee actions can prevent or mitigate such attacks.

Обнаружение

Detecting use of proxied smart card connections by an adversary may be difficult because it requires the token to be inserted into a system; thus it is more likely to be in use by a legitimate user and blend in with other network behavior. Similar to Input Capture, keylogging activity can take various forms but can may be detected via installation of a driver, setting a hook, or usage of particular API calls associated with polling to intercept keystrokes.

Ссылки

  1. Perez, D. et al. (2021, April 20). Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day. Retrieved February 5, 2024.
  2. KISA. (2021). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 8, 2024.
  3. Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  4. Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.
  5. MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
  6. Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
  7. CISA et al. (2024, July 8). People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of State Security APT40 Tradecraft in Action. Retrieved February 3, 2025.
  8. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromises. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
  9. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  10. Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.
  11. Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  12. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  13. Blasco, J. (2012, January 12). Sykipot variant hijacks DOD and Windows smart cards. Retrieved January 10, 2016.
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