APT42
Associated Group Descriptions |
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Name | Description |
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Techniques Used |
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Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1087 | .001 | Account Discovery: Local Account |
APT42 has used the PowerShell-based POWERPOST script to collect local account names from the victim machine.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Enterprise | T1583 | .001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains |
APT42 has registered domains, several of which masqueraded as news outlets and login services, for use in operations.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms)(Citation: TAG APT42) |
.003 | Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server |
APT42 has used anonymized infrastructure and Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to interact with the victim’s environment.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms)(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
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Enterprise | T1071 | .001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols |
APT42 has used tools such as NICECURL with command and control communication taking place over HTTPS.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
APT42 has downloaded and executed PowerShell payloads.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
APT42 has used a VBScript to query anti-virus products.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
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Enterprise | T1555 | .003 | Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers |
APT42 has used custom malware to steal credentials.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Enterprise | T1132 | .001 | Data Encoding: Standard Encoding |
APT42 has encoded C2 traffic with Base64.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
Enterprise | T1573 | .002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
APT42 has used tools such as NICECURL with command and control communication taking place over HTTPS.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
Enterprise | T1585 | .002 | Establish Accounts: Email Accounts |
APT42 has created email accounts to use in spearphishing operations.(Citation: TAG APT42) |
Enterprise | T1070 | .008 | Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data |
APT42 has deleted login notification emails and has cleared the Sent folder to cover their tracks.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | Input Capture: Keylogging |
APT42 has used custom malware to log keystrokes.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location |
APT42 has masqueraded the VINETHORN payload as a VPN application.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
APT42 has used built-in features in the Microsoft 365 environment and publicly available tools to avoid detection.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
Enterprise | T1566 | .002 | Phishing: Spearphishing Link |
APT42 has sent spearphishing emails containing malicious links.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms)(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling)(Citation: TAG APT42) |
Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
APT42 has used scheduled tasks for persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Enterprise | T1518 | .001 | Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery |
APT42 has used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to check for anti-virus products.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) |
Enterprise | T1608 | .001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
APT42 has used its infrastructure for C2 and for staging the VINETHORN payload, which masqueraded as a VPN application.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms) |
Software |
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ID | Name | References | Techniques |
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S1192 | NICECURL | (Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) | File Deletion, Command and Scripting Interpreter, Asymmetric Cryptography, Ingress Tool Transfer, Web Protocols |
S1193 | TAMECAT | (Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling) | Windows Command Shell, Ingress Tool Transfer, Visual Basic, Standard Encoding, Windows Management Instrumentation, Symmetric Cryptography, Security Software Discovery, PowerShell, Web Protocols |
References
- Mandiant. (n.d.). APT42: Crooked Charms, Cons and Compromises. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
- Rozmann, O., et al. (2024, May 1). Uncharmed: Untangling Iran's APT42 Operations. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
- Google Threat Analysis Group. (2024, August 14). Iranian backed group steps up phishing campaigns against Israel, U.S.. Retrieved October 9, 2024.
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