Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Ограничения на исполнение
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MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Ограничения на исполнение
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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
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Ограничения на исполнение

ID Name
.001 Использование ключей на основе окружения
.002 Mutual Exclusion

Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign.(Citation: FireEye Kevin Mandia Guardrails) Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.(Citation: FireEye Outlook Dec 2019) Guardrails can be used to prevent exposure of capabilities in environments that are not intended to be compromised or operated within. This use of guardrails is distinct from typical Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion. While use of Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion may involve checking for known sandbox values and continuing with execution only if there is no match, the use of guardrails will involve checking for an expected target-specific value and only continuing with execution if there is such a match. Adversaries may identify and block certain user-agents to evade defenses and narrow the scope of their attack to victims and platforms on which it will be most effective. A user-agent self-identifies data such as a user's software application, operating system, vendor, and version. Adversaries may check user-agents for operating system identification and then only serve malware for the exploitable software while ignoring all other operating systems.(Citation: Trellix-Qakbot)

ID: T1480
Суб-техники:  .001 .002
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion
Платформы: ESXi, Linux, Windows, macOS
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation
Версия: 1.3
Дата создания: 31 Jan 2019
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
Torisma

Torisma is only delivered to a compromised host if the victim's IP address is on an allow-list.(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Nov 2020)
Stuxnet

Stuxnet checks for specific operating systems on 32-bit machines, Registry keys, and dates for vulnerabilities, and will exit execution if the values are not met.(Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien February 2011)
RansomHub

RansomHub will terminate without proceeding to encryption if the infected machine is on a list of allowlisted machines specified in its configuration.(Citation: Group-IB RansomHub FEB 2025)
EnvyScout

EnvyScout can call window.location.pathname to ensure that embedded files are being executed from the C: drive, and will terminate if they are not.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
BOLDMOVE

BOLDMOVE verifies it is executing from a specific path during execution.(Citation: Google Cloud BOLDMOVE 2023)
ShrinkLocker

ShrinkLocker will exit its "main" function if the victim domain name does not match provided criteria.(Citation: Splunk ShrinkLocker 2024)
Apostle

Apostle's ransomware variant requires that a base64-encoded argument is passed when executed, that is used as the Public Key for subsequent encryption operations. If Apostle is executed without this argument, it automatically runs a self-delete function.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)
Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin will check for the presence of several security products on victim machines and will avoid UAC bypass mechanisms if they are identified.(Citation: TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022) Raspberry Robin can use specific cookie values in HTTP requests to command and control infrastructure to validate that requests for second stage payloads originate from the initial downloader script.(Citation: HP RaspberryRobin 2024)
CHIMNEYSWEEP

CHIMNEYSWEEP can execute a task which leads to execution if it finds a process name containing “creensaver.”(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)
LightSpy

On macOS, LightSpy checks the existence of a process identification number (PID) file, `/Users/Shared/irc.pid`, to verify if LightSpy is currently running.(Citation: Huntress LightSpy macOS 2024)
Anchor

Anchor can terminate itself if specific execution flags are not present.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
Exbyte

Exbyte checks for the presence of a configuration file before completing execution.(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023)
LunarLoader

LunarLoader can use the DNS domain name of a compromised host to create a decryption key to ensure a malicious payload can only execute against the intended targets.(Citation: ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024)
DarkGate

DarkGate uses per-victim links for hosting malicious archives, such as ZIP files, in services such as SharePoint to prevent other entities from retrieving them.(Citation: Trellix Darkgate 2023)
LockBit 3.0

LockBit 3.0 can make execution dependent on specific parameters including a unique passphrase and the system language of the targeted host not being found on a set exclusion list. (Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory LockBit JUN 2023)(Citation: Sentinel Labs LockBit 3.0 JUL 2022)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory LockBit 3.0 MAR 2023)
Sagerunex

Sagerunex uses a "servicemain" function to verify its environment to ensure it can only be executed as a service, as well as the existence of a configuration file in a specified directory.(Citation: Cisco LotusBlossom 2025)
BPFDoor

BPFDoor creates a zero byte PID file at `/var/run/haldrund.pid`. BPFDoor uses this file to determine if it is already running on a system to ensure only one instance is executing at a time.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)

Akira _v2

Akira _v2 will fail to execute if the targeted `/vmfs/volumes/` path does not exist or is not defined.(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)
BlackByte Ransomware

BlackByte Ransomware creates a mutex value with a hard-coded name, and terminates if that mutex already exists on the victim system. BlackByte Ransomware checks the system language to see if it matches one of a list of hard-coded values; if a match is found, the malware will terminate.(Citation: Trustwave BlackByte 2021)
StrelaStealer

StrelaStealer variants only execute if the keyboard layout or language matches a set list of variables.(Citation: Fortgale StrelaStealer 2023)(Citation: IBM StrelaStealer 2024)
VaporRage

VaporRage has the ability to check for the presence of a specific DLL and terminate if it is not found.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
LockBit 2.0

LockBit 2.0 will not execute on hosts where the system language is set to a language spoken in the Commonwealth of Independent States region.(Citation: FBI Lockbit 2.0 FEB 2022)(Citation: Palo Alto Lockbit 2.0 JUN 2022)
NativeZone

NativeZone can check for the presence of KM.EkeyAlmaz1C.dll and will halt execution unless it is in the same directory as the rest of the malware's components.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne NobleBaron June 2021)
ROADSWEEP

ROADSWEEP requires four command line arguments to execute correctly, otherwise it will produce a message box and halt execution.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)

SUNSPOT

SUNSPOT only replaces SolarWinds Orion source code if the MD5 checksums of both the original source code file and backdoored replacement source code match hardcoded values.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)

BoomBox

BoomBox can check its current working directory and for the presence of a specific file and terminate if specific values are not found.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Toolset May 2021)
DEADEYE

DEADEYE can ensure it executes only on intended systems by identifying the victim's volume serial number, hostname, and/or DNS domain.(Citation: Mandiant APT41)
StealBit

StealBit will execute an empty infinite loop if it detects it is being run in the context of a debugger.(Citation: Cybereason StealBit Exfiltration Tool)
BitPaymer

BitPaymer compares file names and paths to a list of excluded names and directory names during encryption.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)
Small Sieve

Small Sieve can only execute correctly if the word `Platypus` is passed to it on the command line.(Citation: NCSC GCHQ Small Sieve Jan 2022)
Gamaredon Group

Gamaredon Group has used geoblocking to limit downloads of the malicious file to specific geographic locations.(Citation: unit42_gamaredon_dec2022)

BlackByte

BlackByte stopped execution if identified language settings on victim machines was Russian or one of several language associated with former Soviet republics.(Citation: Picus BlackByte 2022) BlackByte has used ransomware variants requiring a key passed on the command line for the malware to execute.(Citation: Cisco BlackByte 2024)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Do Not Mitigate

The Do Not Mitigate category highlights scenarios where attempting to mitigate a specific technique may inadvertently increase the organization's security risk or operational instability. This could happen due to the complexity of the system, the integration of critical processes, or the potential for introducing new vulnerabilities. Instead of direct mitigation, these situations may call for alternative strategies such as detection, monitoring, or response. The Do Not Mitigate category underscores the importance of assessing the trade-offs between mitigation efforts and overall system integrity. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Complex Systems Where Mitigation is Risky: - Interpretation: In certain systems, direct mitigation could introduce new risks, especially if the system is highly interconnected or complex, such as in legacy industrial control systems (ICS). Patching or modifying these systems could result in unplanned downtime, disruptions, or even safety risks. - Use Case: In a power grid control system, attempting to patch or disable certain services related to device communications might disrupt critical operations, leading to unintended service outages. Risk of Reducing Security Coverage: - Interpretation: In some cases, mitigating a technique might reduce the visibility or effectiveness of other security controls, limiting an organization’s ability to detect broader attacks. - Use Case: Disabling script execution on a web server to mitigate potential PowerShell-based attacks could interfere with legitimate administrative operations that rely on scripting, while attackers may still find alternate ways to execute code. Introduction of New Vulnerabilities: - Interpretation: In highly sensitive or tightly controlled environments, implementing certain mitigations might create vulnerabilities in other parts of the system. For instance, disabling default security mechanisms in an attempt to resolve compatibility issues may open the system to exploitation. - Use Case: Disabling certificate validation to resolve internal communication issues in a secure environment could lead to man-in-the-middle attacks, creating a greater vulnerability than the original problem. Negative Impact on Performance and Availability: - Interpretation: Mitigations that involve removing or restricting system functionalities can have unintended consequences for system performance and availability. Some mitigations, while effective at blocking certain attacks, may introduce performance bottlenecks or compromise essential operations. - Use Case: Implementing high levels of encryption to mitigate data theft might result in significant performance degradation in systems handling large volumes of real-time transactions.
Environmental Keying Mitigation

This technique likely should not be mitigated with preventative controls because it may protect unintended targets from being compromised. If targeted, efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on identifying subsequent malicious behavior if compromised.

Обнаружение

Detecting the use of guardrails may be difficult depending on the implementation. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.

Ссылки

  1. Patrick Schläpfer . (2024, April 10). Raspberry Robin Now Spreading Through Windows Script Files. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  2. Insikt Group. (2025, January 9). Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain. Retrieved January 14, 2025.
  3. Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  4. Guerrero-Saade, J. (2021, June 1). NobleBaron | New Poisoned Installers Could Be Used In Supply Chain Attacks. Retrieved August 4, 2021.
  5. Golo Mühr, Joe Fasulo & Charlotte Hammond, IBM X-Force. (2024, November 12). Strela Stealer: Today’s invoice is tomorrow’s phish. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
  6. The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.
  7. Stuart Ashenbrenner, Alden Schmidt. (2024, April 25). LightSpy Malware Variant Targeting macOS. Retrieved January 3, 2025.
  8. Scott Henderson, Cristiana Kittner, Sarah Hawley & Mark Lechtik, Google Cloud. (2023, January 19). Suspected Chinese Threat Actors Exploiting FortiOS Vulnerability (CVE-2022-42475). Retrieved December 31, 2024.
  9. Splunk Threat Research Team , Teoderick Contreras. (2024, September 5). ShrinkLocker Malware: Abusing BitLocker to Lock Your Data. Retrieved December 7, 2024.
  10. Cybereason Global SOC Team. (n.d.). THREAT ANALYSIS REPORT: Inside the LockBit Arsenal - The StealBit Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved January 29, 2025.
  11. McWhirt, M., Carr, N., Bienstock, D. (2019, December 4). Breaking the Rules: A Tough Outlook for Home Page Attacks (CVE-2017-11774). Retrieved June 23, 2020.
  12. Fortgale. (2023, September 18). StrelaStealer Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 31, 2024.
  13. MSTIC. (2022, September 8). Microsoft investigates Iranian attacks against the Albanian government. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  14. CISA et al. (2023, June 14). UNDERSTANDING RANSOMWARE THREAT ACTORS: LOCKBIT. Retrieved February 5, 2025.
  15. Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022.
  16. Walter, J. (2022, July 21). LockBit 3.0 Update | Unpicking the Ransomware’s Latest Anti-Analysis and Evasion Techniques. Retrieved February 5, 2025.
  17. Beek, C. (2020, November 5). Operation North Star: Behind The Scenes. Retrieved December 20, 2021.
  18. Unit 42. (2022, December 20). Russia’s Trident Ursa (aka Gamaredon APT) Cyber Conflict Operations Unwavering Since Invasion of Ukraine. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  19. Joey Chen, Cisco Talos. (2025, February 27). Lotus Blossom espionage group targets multiple industries with different versions of Sagerunex and hacking tools. Retrieved March 15, 2025.
  20. FBI. (2022, February 4). Indicators of Compromise Associated with LockBit 2.0 Ransomware. Retrieved January 24, 2025.
  21. Pham Duy Phuc, John Fokker J.E., Alejandro Houspanossian and Mathanraj Thangaraju. (2023, March 7). Qakbot Evolves to OneNote Malware Distribution. Retrieved June 7, 2024.
  22. Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
  23. Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.
  24. Alfano, V. et al. (2025, February 12). RansomHub Never Sleeps Episode 1: The evolution of modern ransomware. Retrieved March 17, 2025.
  25. Shoorbajee, Z. (2018, June 1). Playing nice? FireEye CEO says U.S. malware is more restrained than adversaries'. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  26. CISA. (2022, September 23). AA22-264A Iranian State Actors Conduct Cyber Operations Against the Government of Albania. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
  27. CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
  28. NCSC GCHQ. (2022, January 27). Small Sieve Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved August 22, 2022.
  29. FBI et al. (2023, March 16). #StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0. Retrieved February 5, 2025.
  30. Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
  31. MSTIC. (2021, May 28). Breaking down NOBELIUM’s latest early-stage toolset. Retrieved August 4, 2021.
  32. Huseyin Can Yuceel. (2022, February 21). TTPs used by BlackByte Ransomware Targeting Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
  33. Elsad, A. et al. (2022, June 9). LockBit 2.0: How This RaaS Operates and How to Protect Against It. Retrieved January 24, 2025.
  34. Frankoff, S., Hartley, B. (2018, November 14). Big Game Hunting: The Evolution of INDRIK SPIDER From Dridex Wire Fraud to BitPaymer Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  35. Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu, Eric Chien 2011, February W32.Stuxnet Dossier (Version 1.4) Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  36. Ernesto Fernández Provecho, Pham Duy Phuc, Ciana Driscoll & Vinoo Thomas. (2023, November 21). The Continued Evolution of the DarkGate Malware-as-a-Service. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  37. Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  38. Nutland, J. and Szeliga, M. (2024, October 21). Akira ransomware continues to evolve. Retrieved December 10, 2024.
  39. James Nutland, Craig Jackson, Terryn Valikodath, & Brennan Evans. (2024, August 28). BlackByte blends tried-and-true tradecraft with newly disclosed vulnerabilities to support ongoing attacks. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
  40. Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
  41. Rodel Mendrez & Lloyd Macrohon. (2021, October 15). BlackByte Ransomware – Pt. 1 In-depth Analysis. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
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