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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Демон запуска
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MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Демон запуска
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Create or Modify System Process:  Демон запуска

ID Название
.001 Агент запуска
.002 Служба systemd
.003 Служба Windows
.004 Демон запуска
.005 Container Service

Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence)(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists) Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.(Citation: WireLurker)(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.(Citation: LaunchDaemon Hijacking)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019)

ID: T1543.004
Относится к технике:  T1543
Тактика(-и): Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Платформы: macOS
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Service: Service Creation, Service: Service Modification
Версия: 1.3
Дата создания: 17 Jan 2020
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
COATHANGER

COATHANGER will create a daemon for timed check-ins with command and control infrastructure.(Citation: NCSC-NL COATHANGER Feb 2024)
Dacls

Dacls can establish persistence via a Launch Daemon.(Citation: SentinelOne Lazarus macOS July 2020)(Citation: TrendMicro macOS Dacls May 2020)
Green Lambert

Green Lambert can add a plist file in the `Library/LaunchDaemons` to establish persistence.(Citation: Objective See Green Lambert for OSX Oct 2021)(Citation: Glitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021)

ThiefQuest

When running with root privileges after a Launch Agent is installed, ThiefQuest installs a plist file to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder with the RunAtLoad key set to true establishing persistence as a Launch Daemon. (Citation: wardle evilquest parti)
Bundlore

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchDaemon.(Citation: MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019)
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D

If running with root permissions, OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D can create a persistence file in the folder /Library/LaunchDaemons.(Citation: TrendMicro MacOS April 2018)(Citation: sentinelone apt32 macOS backdoor 2020)
XCSSET

XCSSET uses the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges, bypass system controls, and enable remote access to the victim.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)
AppleJeus

AppleJeus has placed a plist file within the LaunchDaemons folder and launched it manually.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)(Citation: ObjectiveSee AppleJeus 2019)
LoudMiner

LoudMiner adds plist files with the naming format com.[random_name].plist in the /Library/LaunchDaemons folder with the RunAtLoad and KeepAlive keys set to true.(Citation: ESET LoudMiner June 2019)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.
Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks. Permission Audits: - Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions. Software Audits: - Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives. Configuration Audits: - Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems. Network Audits: - Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

Обнаружение

Monitor for new files added to the /Library/LaunchDaemons/ folder. The System LaunchDaemons are protected by SIP. Some legitimate LaunchDaemons point to unsigned code that could be exploited. For Launch Daemons with the RunAtLoad parameter set to true, ensure the Program parameter points to signed code or executables are in alignment with enterprise policy. Some parameters are interchangeable with others, such as Program and ProgramArguments parameters but one must be present.(Citation: launchd Keywords for plists)

Ссылки

  1. Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
  2. Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.
  3. Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  4. Sushko, O. (2019, April 17). macOS Bundlore: Mac Virus Bypassing macOS Security Features. Retrieved June 30, 2020.
  5. Mabutas, G. (2020, May 11). New MacOS Dacls RAT Backdoor Shows Lazarus’ Multi-Platform Attack Capability. Retrieved August 10, 2020.
  6. Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 18). Green Lambert and ATT&CK. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  7. Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.
  8. Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.
  9. Mac Threat Response, Mobile Research Team. (2020, August 13). The XCSSET Malware: Inserts Malicious Code Into Xcode Projects, Performs UXSS Backdoor Planting in Safari, and Leverages Two Zero-day Exploits. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
  10. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  11. Patrick Wardle. (2020, June 29). OSX.EvilQuest Uncovered part i: infection, persistence, and more!. Retrieved March 18, 2021.
  12. Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.
  13. Malik, M. (2019, June 20). LoudMiner: Cross-platform mining in cracked VST software. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
  14. Patrick Wardle. (2019, October 12). Pass the AppleJeus. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  15. Horejsi, J. (2018, April 04). New MacOS Backdoor Linked to OceanLotus Found. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
  16. Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.
  17. Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 1). Made In America: Green Lambert for OS X. Retrieved March 21, 2022.
  18. Phil Stokes. (2020, December 2). APT32 Multi-stage macOS Trojan Innovates on Crimeware Scripting Technique. Retrieved September 13, 2021.
  19. Stokes, P. (2020, July 27). Four Distinct Families of Lazarus Malware Target Apple’s macOS Platform. Retrieved August 7, 2020.
  20. Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) & Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). (2024, February 6). Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands uncovers COATHANGER, a stealthy Chinese FortiGate RAT. Retrieved February 7, 2024.
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