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MITRE ATT&CK - Техника Утилита msiexec
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MITRE ATT&CK
Техника
Утилита msiexec
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System Binary Proxy Execution:  Утилита msiexec

ID Название
.001 CHM-файл
.002 Панель управления
.003 Установщик профилей диспетчера подключений (CMSTP)
.004 Утилита InstallUtil
.005 Утилита mshta
.007 Утилита msiexec
.008 Утилита odbcconf
.009 Утилиты Regsvcs и Regasm
.010 Утилита Regsvr32
.011 Rundll32
.012 Verclsid
.013 Mavinject
.014 MMC
.015 Electron Applications

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi).(Citation: Microsoft msiexec) The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft. Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to launch local or network accessible MSI files. Msiexec.exe can also execute DLLs.(Citation: LOLBAS Msiexec)(Citation: TrendMicro Msiexec Feb 2018) Since it may be signed and native on Windows systems, msiexec.exe can be used to bypass application control solutions that do not account for its potential abuse. Msiexec.exe execution may also be elevated to SYSTEM privileges if the AlwaysInstallElevated policy is enabled.(Citation: Microsoft AlwaysInstallElevated 2018)

ID: T1218.007
Относится к технике:  T1218
Тактика(-и): Defense Evasion
Платформы: Windows
Источники данных: Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Process: Process Creation
Версия: 2.1
Дата создания: 24 Jan 2020
Последнее изменение: 16 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур
Название Описание
RCSession

RCSession has the ability to execute inside the msiexec.exe process.(Citation: Profero APT27 December 2020)
RemoteUtilities

RemoteUtilities can use Msiexec to install a service.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)
FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy has been installed via `msiexec.exe`.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)

Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin uses msiexec.exe for post-installation communication to command and control infrastructure.(Citation: RedCanary RaspberryRobin 2022) Msiexec.exe is executed referencing a remote resource for second-stage payload retrieval and execution.(Citation: TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022)
Mispadu

Mispadu has been installed via MSI installer.(Citation: SCILabs Malteiro 2021)(Citation: ESET Security Mispadu Facebook Ads 2019)
IcedID

IcedID can inject itself into a suspended msiexec.exe process to send beacons to C2 while appearing as a normal msi application. (Citation: Juniper IcedID June 2020) IcedID has also used msiexec.exe to deploy the IcedID loader.(Citation: Trendmicro_IcedID)
Ragnar Locker

Ragnar Locker has been delivered as an unsigned MSI package that was executed with msiexec.exe.(Citation: Sophos Ragnar May 2020)
Javali

Javali has used the MSI installer to download and execute malicious payloads.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
Duqu

Duqu has used msiexec to execute malicious Windows Installer packages. Additionally, a PROPERTY=VALUE pair containing a 56-bit encryption key has been used to decrypt the main payload from the installer packages.(Citation: Kaspersky Duqu 2.0)
Latrodectus

Latrodectus has called `msiexec` to install remotely-hosted MSI files.(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Latrodectus April 2024)
Chaes

Chaes has used .MSI files as an initial way to start the infection chain.(Citation: Cybereason Chaes Nov 2020)
Metamorfo

Metamorfo has used MsiExec.exe to automatically execute files.(Citation: Fortinet Metamorfo Feb 2020)(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019)

Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro can use MSI files to execute DLLs.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
DEADEYE

DEADEYE can use `msiexec.exe` for execution of malicious DLL.(Citation: Mandiant APT41)
Clop

Clop can use msiexec.exe to disable security tools on the system.(Citation: Cybereason Clop Dec 2020)

Melcoz

Melcoz can use MSI files with embedded VBScript for execution.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)
Maze

Maze has delivered components for its ransomware attacks using MSI files, some of which have been executed from the command-line using msiexec.(Citation: Sophos Maze VM September 2020)
AppleJeus

AppleJeus has been installed via MSI installer.(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)
QakBot

QakBot can use MSIExec to spawn multiple cmd.exe processes.(Citation: Crowdstrike Qakbot October 2020)
LoudMiner

LoudMiner used an MSI installer to install the virtualization software.(Citation: ESET LoudMiner June 2019)

APT38

APT38 has used `msiexec.exe` to execute malicious files.(Citation: 1 - appv)

Machete

Machete has used msiexec to install the Machete malware.(Citation: 360 Machete Sep 2020)
ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has used the msiexec.exe command-line utility to download and execute malicious MSI files.(Citation: Zscaler APT31 Covid-19 October 2020)
Molerats

Molerats has used msiexec.exe to execute an MSI payload.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

TA505

TA505 has used msiexec to download and execute malicious Windows Installer files.(Citation: Cybereason TA505 April 2019)(Citation: Deep Instinct TA505 Apr 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro TA505 June 2019)
Rancor

Rancor has used msiexec to download and execute malicious installer files over HTTP.(Citation: Rancor Unit42 June 2018)

Контрмеры
Контрмера Описание
Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable or remove unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software, features, or services to reduce the attack surface and prevent abuse by adversaries. This involves identifying software or features that are no longer needed or that could be exploited and ensuring they are either removed or properly disabled. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Remove Legacy Software: - Use Case: Disable or remove older versions of software that no longer receive updates or security patches (e.g., legacy Java, Adobe Flash). - Implementation: A company removes Flash Player from all employee systems after it has reached its end-of-life date. Disable Unused Features: - Use Case: Turn off unnecessary operating system features like SMBv1, Telnet, or RDP if they are not required. - Implementation: Disable SMBv1 in a Windows environment to mitigate vulnerabilities like EternalBlue. Control Applications Installed by Users: - Use Case: Prevent users from installing unauthorized software via group policies or other management tools. - Implementation: Block user installations of unauthorized file-sharing applications (e.g., BitTorrent clients) in an enterprise environment. Remove Unnecessary Services: - Use Case: Identify and disable unnecessary default services running on endpoints, servers, or network devices. - Implementation: Disable unused administrative shares (e.g., C$, ADMIN$) on workstations. Restrict Add-ons and Plugins: - Use Case: Remove or disable browser plugins and add-ons that are not needed for business purposes. - Implementation: Disable Java and ActiveX plugins in web browsers to prevent drive-by attacks.

Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Обнаружение

Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of msiexec.exe. Compare recent invocations of msiexec.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed MSI files or DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the invocation of msiexec.exe may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the MSI files or DLLs being executed.

Ссылки

  1. Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.
  2. ESET Security. (2019, November 19). Mispadu: Advertisement for a discounted Unhappy Meal. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
  3. Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
  4. Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
  5. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2020, December 23). Cybereason vs. Clop Ransomware. Retrieved May 11, 2021.
  6. GReAT. (2020, July 14). The Tetrade: Brazilian banking malware goes global. Retrieved November 9, 2020.
  7. Insikt Group. (2025, January 9). Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain. Retrieved January 14, 2025.
  8. Brandt, A., Mackenzie, P.. (2020, September 17). Maze Attackers Adopt Ragnar Locker Virtual Machine Technique. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
  9. Kaspersky Lab. (2015, June 11). The Duqu 2.0. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
  10. Co, M. and Sison, G. (2018, February 8). Attack Using Windows Installer msiexec.exe leads to LokiBot. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
  11. Salem, E. (2020, November 17). CHAES: Novel Malware Targeting Latin American E-Commerce. Retrieved June 30, 2021.
  12. Microsoft. (2017, October 15). msiexec. Retrieved January 24, 2020.
  13. Microsoft. (2018, May 31). AlwaysInstallElevated. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  14. SCILabs. (2021, December 23). Cyber Threat Profile Malteiro. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
  15. Salem, E. (2019, April 25). Threat Actor TA505 Targets Financial Enterprises Using LOLBins and a New Backdoor Malware. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
  16. Rufus Brown, Van Ta, Douglas Bienstock, Geoff Ackerman, John Wolfram. (2022, March 8). Does This Look Infected? A Summary of APT41 Targeting U.S. State Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2022.
  17. Proofpoint Threat Research and Team Cymru S2 Threat Research. (2024, April 4). Latrodectus: This Spider Bytes Like Ice . Retrieved May 31, 2024.
  18. Lauren Podber and Stef Rand. (2022, May 5). Raspberry Robin gets the worm early. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  19. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
  20. Abrams, L. (2024, April 30). New Latrodectus malware attacks use Microsoft, Cloudflare themes. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  21. Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  22. Vilkomir-Preisman, S. (2019, April 2). New ServHelper Variant Employs Excel 4.0 Macro to Drop Signed Payload. Retrieved September 16, 2024..
  23. Kenefick , I. (2022, December 23). IcedID Botnet Distributors Abuse Google PPC to Distribute Malware. Retrieved July 24, 2024.
  24. kate. (2020, September 25). APT-C-43 steals Venezuelan military secrets to provide intelligence support for the reactionaries — HpReact campaign. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
  25. LOLBAS. (n.d.). Msiexec.exe. Retrieved April 18, 2019.
  26. Singh, S. and Antil, S. (2020, October 27). APT-31 Leverages COVID-19 Vaccine Theme and Abuses Legitimate Online Services. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
  27. SophosLabs. (2020, May 21). Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security. Retrieved June 29, 2020.
  28. Kimayong, P. (2020, June 18). COVID-19 and FMLA Campaigns used to install new IcedID banking malware. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
  29. Zhang, X. (2020, February 4). Another Metamorfo Variant Targeting Customers of Financial Institutions in More Countries. Retrieved July 30, 2020.
  30. ESET Research. (2019, October 3). Casbaneiro: peculiarities of this banking Trojan that affects Brazil and Mexico. Retrieved September 23, 2021.
  31. CS. (2020, October 7). Duck Hunting with Falcon Complete: A Fowl Banking Trojan Evolves, Part 2. Retrieved September 27, 2021.
  32. Malik, M. (2019, June 20). LoudMiner: Cross-platform mining in cracked VST software. Retrieved May 18, 2020.
  33. Global Threat Center, Intelligence Team. (2020, December). APT27 Turns to Ransomware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
  34. Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  35. Ash, B., et al. (2018, June 26). RANCOR: Targeted Attacks in South East Asia Using PLAINTEE and DDKONG Malware Families. Retrieved July 2, 2018.
  36. SEONGSU PARK. (2022, December 27). BlueNoroff introduces new methods bypassing MoTW. Retrieved February 6, 2024.
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