Stage Capabilities: Развертывание средства для Drive-by
Other sub-techniques of Stage Capabilities (6)
Adversaries may prepare an operational environment to infect systems that visit a website over the normal course of browsing. Endpoint systems may be compromised through browsing to adversary controlled sites, as in Drive-by Compromise. In such cases, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation (often not requiring any extra user interaction once landing on the site), but adversaries may also set up websites for non-exploitation behavior such as Application Access Token. Prior to Drive-by Compromise, adversaries must stage resources needed to deliver that exploit to users who browse to an adversary controlled site. Drive-by content can be staged on adversary controlled infrastructure that has been acquired (Acquire Infrastructure) or previously compromised (Compromise Infrastructure). Adversaries may upload or inject malicious web content, such as JavaScript, into websites.(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: Gallagher 2015) This may be done in a number of ways, including: * Inserting malicious scripts into web pages or other user controllable web content such as forum posts * Modifying script files served to websites from publicly writeable cloud storage buckets * Crafting malicious web advertisements and purchasing ad space on a website through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising) In addition to staging content to exploit a user's web browser, adversaries may also stage scripting content to profile the user's browser (as in Gather Victim Host Information) to ensure it is vulnerable prior to attempting exploitation.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Websites compromised by an adversary and used to stage a drive-by may be ones visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. Adversaries may purchase domains similar to legitimate domains (ex: homoglyphs, typosquatting, different top-level domain, etc.) during acquisition of infrastructure (Domains) to help facilitate Drive-by Compromise.
Примеры процедур |
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Название | Описание |
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Transparent Tribe |
Transparent Tribe has set up websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021) |
LuminousMoth |
LuminousMoth has redirected compromised machines to an actor-controlled webpage through HTML injection.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021) |
Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has compromised websites to redirect traffic and to host exploit kits.(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021) |
CURIUM |
CURIUM used strategic website compromise to fingerprint then target victims.(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023) |
APT32 |
APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate, but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) |
FIN7 |
FIN7 has compromised a digital product website and modified multiple download links to point to trojanized versions of offered digital products.(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022) |
Threat Group-3390 |
Threat Group-3390 has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest.(Citation: Gallagher 2015) |
For C0010, the threat actors compromised the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company and likely established a watering hole that collected visitor information.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022) |
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Mustard Tempest |
Mustard Tempest has injected malicious JavaScript into compromised websites to infect victims via drive-by download.(Citation: SocGholish-update)(Citation: SentinelOne SocGholish Infrastructure November 2022)(Citation: Red Canary SocGholish March 2024)(Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile) |
Контрмеры |
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Контрмера | Описание |
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Pre-compromise |
Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct successful operations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Limit Information Exposure: - Regularly audit and sanitize publicly available data, including job posts, websites, and social media. - Use tools like OSINT monitoring platforms (e.g., SpiderFoot, Recon-ng) to identify leaked information. Protect Domain and DNS Infrastructure: - Enable DNSSEC and use WHOIS privacy protection. - Monitor for domain hijacking or lookalike domains using services like RiskIQ or DomainTools. External Monitoring: - Use tools like Shodan, Censys to monitor your external attack surface. - Deploy external vulnerability scanners to proactively address weaknesses. Threat Intelligence: - Leverage platforms like MISP, Recorded Future, or Anomali to track adversarial infrastructure, tools, and activity. Content and Email Protections: - Use email security solutions like Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, or Mimecast. - Enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC policies to protect against email spoofing. Training and Awareness: - Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, securing their social media, and avoiding information leaks. |
Обнаружение
If infrastructure or patterns in the malicious web content utilized to deliver a Drive-by Compromise have been previously identified, internet scanning may uncover when an adversary has staged web content for use in a strategic web compromise. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as Drive-by Compromise or Exploitation for Client Execution.
Ссылки
- Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.
- Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
- Malhotra, A. et al. (2021, May 13). Transparent Tribe APT expands its Windows malware arsenal. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
- Falcone, R. and Conant S. (2016, March 25). ProjectM: Link Found Between Pakistani Actor and Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
- Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
- Botezatu, B and etl. (2021, July 21). LuminousMoth - PlugX, File Exfiltration and Persistence Revisited. Retrieved October 20, 2022.
- Slowik, J. (2021, October). THE BAFFLING BERSERK BEAR: A DECADE’S ACTIVITY TARGETING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. Retrieved December 6, 2021.
- PwC Threat Intelligence. (2023, October 25). Yellow Liderc ships its scripts and delivers IMAPLoader malware. Retrieved August 14, 2024.
- Adair, S. and Lancaster, T. (2020, November 6). OceanLotus: Extending Cyber Espionage Operations Through Fake Websites. Retrieved November 20, 2020.
- Abdo, B., et al. (2022, April 4). FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7. Retrieved April 5, 2022.
- Mandiant Israel Research Team. (2022, August 17). Suspected Iranian Actor Targeting Israeli Shipping, Healthcare, Government and Energy Sectors. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
- Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.
- Red Canary. (2024, March). Red Canary 2024 Threat Detection Report: SocGholish. Retrieved March 22, 2024.
- Milenkoski, A. (2022, November 7). SocGholish Diversifies and Expands Its Malware Staging Infrastructure to Counter Defenders. Retrieved March 22, 2024.
- Andrew Northern. (2022, November 22). SocGholish, a very real threat from a very fake update. Retrieved February 13, 2024.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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