Средства развертывания ПО
Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager. Access to network-wide or enterprise-wide endpoint management software may enable an adversary to achieve remote code execution on all connected systems. The access may be used to laterally move to other systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints. SaaS-based configuration management services may allow for broad Cloud Administration Command on cloud-hosted instances, as well as the execution of arbitrary commands on on-premises endpoints. For example, Microsoft Configuration Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to Entra ID.(Citation: SpecterOps Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD 2020) Such services may also utilize Web Protocols to communicate back to adversary owned infrastructure.(Citation: Mitiga Security Advisory: SSM Agent as Remote Access Trojan) Network infrastructure devices may also have configuration management tools that can be similarly abused by adversaries.(Citation: Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation) The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the third-party system, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to access specific functionality.
Примеры процедур |
|
Название | Описание |
---|---|
APT32 |
APT32 compromised McAfee ePO to move laterally by distributing malware as a software deployment task.(Citation: FireEye APT32 May 2017) |
Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has used the commercially available tool RemoteExec for agentless remote code execution.(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022) |
Silence |
Silence has used RAdmin, a remote software tool used to remotely control workstations and ATMs.(Citation: Group IB Silence Sept 2018) |
Wiper |
It is believed that a patch management system for an anti-virus product commonly installed among targeted companies was used to distribute the Wiper malware.(Citation: Dell Wiper) |
Threat Group-1314 |
Threat Group-1314 actors used a victim's endpoint management platform, Altiris, for lateral movement.(Citation: Dell TG-1314) |
During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.(Citation: Cisco Talos Avos Jun 2022) |
Контрмеры |
|
Контрмера | Описание |
---|---|
User Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. |
Active Directory Configuration |
Implement robust Active Directory configurations using group policies to control access and reduce the attack surface. Specific examples include: * Account Configuration: Use provisioned domain accounts rather than local accounts to leverage centralized control and auditing capabilities. * Interactive Logon Restrictions: Enforce group policies that prohibit interactive logons for accounts that should not directly access systems. * Remote Desktop Settings: Limit Remote Desktop logons to authorized accounts to prevent misuse by adversaries. * Dedicated Administrative Accounts: Create specialized domain-wide accounts that are restricted from interactive logons but can perform specific tasks like installations or repository access. * Authentication Silos: Configure Authentication Silos in Active Directory to create access zones with restrictions based on membership in the Protected Users global security group. This setup enhances security by applying additional protections to high-risk accounts, limiting their exposure to potential attacks. |
Update Software |
Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk. |
Privileged Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
Password Policies |
Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts. |
Limit Software Installation |
Block users or groups from installing unapproved software. |
Network Segmentation |
Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems. |
User Training |
Train users to be aware of access or manipulation attempts by an adversary to reduce the risk of successful spearphishing, social engineering, and other techniques that involve user interaction. |
Third-party Software Mitigation |
Evaluate the security of third-party software that could be used in the enterprise environment. Ensure that access to management systems for third-party systems is limited, monitored, and secure. Have a strict approval policy for use of third-party systems. Grant access to Third-party systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. Ensure proper system and access isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls, account privilege separation, group policy, and multi-factor authentication. Verify that account credentials that may be used to access third-party systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. Ensure that any accounts used by third-party providers to access these systems are traceable to the third-party and are not used throughout the network or used by other third-party providers in the same environment. Ensure third-party systems are regularly patched by users or the provider to prevent potential remote access through Exploitation for Privilege Escalation. Ensure there are regular reviews of accounts provisioned to these systems to verify continued business need, and ensure there is governance to trace de-provisioning of access that is no longer required. Where the third-party system is used for deployment services, ensure that it can be configured to deploy only signed binaries, then ensure that the trusted signing certificates are not co-located with the third-party system and are instead located on a system that cannot be accessed remotely or to which remote access is tightly controlled. |
Multi-factor Authentication |
Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. |
Remote Data Storage |
Use remote security log and sensitive file storage where access can be controlled better to prevent exposure of intrusion detection log data or sensitive information. |
Обнаружение
Detection methods will vary depending on the type of third-party software or system and how it is typically used. The same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern. Analyze the process execution trees, historical activities from the third-party application (such as what types of files are usually pushed), and the resulting activities or events from the file/binary/script pushed to systems. Often these third-party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment. Ensure that third-party application logs are on-boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed. Audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity. A system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious. Monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspicious/abnormal usage. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.
Ссылки
- Ariel Szarf, Or Aspir. (n.d.). Mitiga Security Advisory: Abusing the SSM Agent as a Remote Access Trojan. Retrieved January 31, 2024.
- Andy Robbins. (2020, August 17). Death from Above: Lateral Movement from Azure to On-Prem AD. Retrieved March 13, 2023.
- ALEXANDER MARVI, BRAD SLAYBAUGH, DAN EBREO, TUFAIL AHMED, MUHAMMAD UMAIR, TINA JOHNSON. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved May 15, 2023.
- Carr, N.. (2017, May 14). Cyber Espionage is Alive and Well: APT32 and the Threat to Global Corporations. Retrieved June 18, 2017.
- MSTIC. (2022, October 14). New “Prestige” ransomware impacts organizations in Ukraine and Poland. Retrieved January 19, 2023.
- Group-IB. (2018, September). Silence: Moving Into the Darkside. Retrieved May 5, 2020.
- Dell SecureWorks. (2013, March 21). Wiper Malware Analysis Attacking Korean Financial Sector. Retrieved May 13, 2015.
- Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Special Operations Team. (2015, May 28). Living off the Land. Retrieved January 26, 2016.
- Venere, G. Neal, C. (2022, June 21). Avos ransomware group expands with new attack arsenal. Retrieved January 11, 2023.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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