Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Domain or Tenant Policy Modification:  Trust Modification

Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Federation) These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge SAML Tokens without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.(Citation: AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain) An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant.(Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.(Citation: AWS RE:Inforce Threat Detection 2024)

ID: T1484.002
Sub-technique of:  T1484
Tactic(s): Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Platforms: Identity Provider, Windows
Data Sources: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution
Version: 2.2
Created: 28 Dec 2020
Last Modified: 15 Apr 2025

Procedure Examples

Name Description
UNC2452

UNC2452 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)

Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider adds a federated identity provider to the victim’s SSO tenant and activates automatic account linking.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023)

APT29

APT29 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)(Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile)

AADInternals

AADInternals can create a backdoor by converting a domain to a federated domain which will be able to authenticate any user across the tenant. AADInternals can also modify DesktopSSO information.(Citation: AADInternals Documentation)(Citation: Azure AD Federation Vulnerability)

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.(Citation: Secureworks IRON RITUAL Profile)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Account Permissions and Roles: - Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions. Credential Security: - Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): - Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA. Privileged Access Management (PAM): - Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access. Auditing and Monitoring: - Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage. Just-In-Time Access: - Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions. *Tools for Implementation* Privileged Access Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault. Credential Management: - Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass. Multi-Factor Authentication: - Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator. Linux Privilege Management: - sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor. Just-In-Time Access: - Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Detection

Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain –DomainName: "Federated Domain Name" –supportmultipledomain.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain)

References

  1. Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
  2. Secureworks CTU. (n.d.). IRON RITUAL. Retrieved February 24, 2022.
  3. Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  4. Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
  5. Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  6. Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  7. Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  8. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  9. CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
  10. Ben Fletcher and Steve de Vera. (2024, June). New tactics and techniques for proactive threat detection. Retrieved September 25, 2024.
  11. Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved March 4, 2024.
  12. CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.
  13. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa.. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved February 1, 2022.
  14. Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2018, October 25). AADInternals. Retrieved February 18, 2022.

Связанные риски

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