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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique User Activity Based Checks
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MITRE ATT&CK
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User Activity Based Checks
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Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion:  User Activity Based Checks

ID Name
.001 System Checks
.002 User Activity Based Checks
.003 Time Based Evasion

Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.(Citation: Deloitte Environment Awareness) Adversaries may search for user activity on the host based on variables such as the speed/frequency of mouse movements and clicks (Citation: Sans Virtual Jan 2016) , browser history, cache, bookmarks, or number of files in common directories such as home or the desktop. Other methods may rely on specific user interaction with the system before the malicious code is activated, such as waiting for a document to close before activating a macro (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Nov 2018) or waiting for a user to double click on an embedded image to activate.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)

ID: T1497.002
Sub-technique of:  T1497
Tactic(s): Defense Evasion, Discovery
Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Data Sources: Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Version: 1.2
Created: 06 Mar 2020
Last Modified: 15 Apr 2025

Procedure Examples
Name Description
Spark

Spark has used a splash screen to check whether an user actively clicks on the screen before running malicious code.(Citation: Unit42 Molerat Mar 2020)

Okrum

Okrum loader only executes the payload after the left mouse button has been pressed at least three times, in order to avoid being executed within virtualized or emulated environments.(Citation: ESET Okrum July 2019)

Darkhotel

Darkhotel has used malware that repeatedly checks the mouse cursor position to determine if a real user is on the system.(Citation: Lastline DarkHotel Just In Time Decryption Nov 2015)
FIN7

FIN7 used images embedded into document lures that only activate the payload when a user double clicks to avoid sandboxes.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)

Detection

User activity-based checks will likely occur in the first steps of an operation but may also occur throughout as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Detecting actions related to virtualization and sandbox identification may be difficult depending on the adversary's implementation and monitoring required. Monitoring for suspicious processes being spawned that gather a variety of system information or perform other forms of Discovery, especially in a short period of time, may aid in detection.

References

  1. Torello, A. & Guibernau, F. (n.d.). Environment Awareness. Retrieved September 13, 2024.
  2. Falcone, R., Lee, B.. (2018, November 20). Sofacy Continues Global Attacks and Wheels Out New ‘Cannon’ Trojan. Retrieved April 23, 2019.
  3. Falcone, R., et al. (2020, March 3). Molerats Delivers Spark Backdoor to Government and Telecommunications Organizations. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  4. Hromcova, Z. (2019, July). OKRUM AND KETRICAN: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT KE3CHANG GROUP ACTIVITY. Retrieved May 6, 2020.
  5. Keragala, D. (2016, January 16). Detecting Malware and Sandbox Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 17, 2019.
  6. Carr, N., et al. (2017, April 24). FIN7 Evolution and the Phishing LNK. Retrieved April 24, 2017.
  7. Arunpreet Singh, Clemens Kolbitsch. (2015, November 5). Defeating Darkhotel Just-In-Time Decryption. Retrieved April 15, 2021.
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