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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique System Location Discovery
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MITRE ATT&CK
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System Location Discovery
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System Location Discovery

ID Name
.001 System Language Discovery

Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)(Citation: Bleepingcomputer RAT malware 2020) Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Identity Documents)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Instance Metadata 2021) Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.(Citation: Securelist Trasparent Tribe 2020)(Citation: Sophos Geolocation 2016)

ID: T1614
Sub-techniques:  .001
Tactic(s): Discovery
Platforms: IaaS, Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation
Version: 1.1
Created: 01 Apr 2021
Last Modified: 15 Oct 2024

Procedure Examples
Name Description
DarkWatchman

DarkWatchman can identity the OS locale of a compromised host.(Citation: Prevailion DarkWatchman 2021)
Gootloader

Gootloader can use IP geolocation to determine if the person browsing to a compromised site is within a targeted territory such as the US, Canada, Germany, and South Korea.(Citation: SentinelOne Gootloader June 2021)
SideCopy

SideCopy has identified the country location of a compromised host.(Citation: MalwareBytes SideCopy Dec 2021)
Cuckoo Stealer

Cuckoo Stealer can determine the geographical location of a victim host by checking the language.(Citation: Kandji Cuckoo April 2024)

DarkGate

DarkGate queries system locale information during execution.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018) Later versions of DarkGate query GetSystemDefaultLCID for locale information to determine if the malware is executing in Russian-speaking countries.(Citation: Trellix Darkgate 2023)
SocGholish

SocGholish can use IP-based geolocation to limit infections to victims in North America, Europe, and a small number of Asian-Pacific nations.(Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)
QuasarRAT

QuasarRAT can determine the country a victim host is located in.(Citation: CISA AR18-352A Quasar RAT December 2018)
SDBbot

SDBbot can collected the country code of a compromised machine.(Citation: Korean FSI TA505 2020)
Ragnar Locker

Before executing malicious code, Ragnar Locker checks the Windows API GetLocaleInfoW and doesn't encrypt files if it finds a former Soviet country.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020)
Raccoon Stealer

Raccoon Stealer collects the `Locale Name` of the infected device via `GetUserDefaultLocaleName` to determine whether the string `ru` is included, but in analyzed samples no action is taken if present.(Citation: S2W Racoon 2022)
Crimson

Crimson can identify the geographical location of a victim host.(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020)

Saint Bot

Saint Bot has conducted system locale checks to see if the compromised host is in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, or Moldova.(Citation: Malwarebytes Saint Bot April 2021)(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 OutSteel SaintBot February 2022 )
GrimAgent

GrimAgent can identify the country code on a compromised host.(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)
Amadey

Amadey does not run any tasks or install additional malware if the victim machine is based in Russia.(Citation: BlackBerry Amadey 2020)
Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has obtained the victim's system current location.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling GetLocaleInfoW to gather information.(Citation: FBI Ragnar Locker 2020) Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.

References

  1. Wisniewski, C. (2016, May 3). Location-based threats: How cybercriminals target you based on where you live. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
  2. Microsoft. (2021, February 21). Azure Instance Metadata Service (Windows). Retrieved April 2, 2021.
  3. FBI. (2020, November 19). Indicators of Compromise Associated with Ragnar Locker Ransomware. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
  4. Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
  5. Amazon. (n.d.). Instance identity documents. Retrieved April 2, 2021.
  6. Abrams, L. (2020, October 23). New RAT malware gets commands via Discord, has ransomware feature. Retrieved April 1, 2021.
  7. Smith, S., Stafford, M. (2021, December 14). DarkWatchman: A new evolution in fileless techniques. Retrieved January 10, 2022.
  8. Pirozzi, A. (2021, June 16). Gootloader: ‘Initial Access as a Service’ Platform Expands Its Search for High Value Targets. Retrieved May 28, 2024.
  9. Threat Intelligence Team. (2021, December 2). SideCopy APT: Connecting lures victims, payloads to infrastructure. Retrieved June 13, 2022.
  10. Kohler, A. and Lopez, C. (2024, April 30). Malware: Cuckoo Behaves Like Cross Between Infostealer and Spyware. Retrieved August 20, 2024.
  11. Ernesto Fernández Provecho, Pham Duy Phuc, Ciana Driscoll & Vinoo Thomas. (2023, November 21). The Continued Evolution of the DarkGate Malware-as-a-Service. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  12. Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  13. Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD PRELUDE . Retrieved March 22, 2024.
  14. CISA. (2018, December 18). Analysis Report (AR18-352A) Quasar Open-Source Remote Administration Tool. Retrieved August 1, 2022.
  15. Financial Security Institute. (2020, February 28). Profiling of TA505 Threat Group That Continues to Attack the Financial Sector. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
  16. S2W TALON. (2022, June 16). Raccoon Stealer is Back with a New Version. Retrieved August 1, 2024.
  17. Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
  18. Unit 42. (2022, February 25). Spear Phishing Attacks Target Organizations in Ukraine, Payloads Include the Document Stealer OutSteel and the Downloader SaintBot. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
  19. Hasherezade. (2021, April 6). A deep dive into Saint Bot, a new downloader. Retrieved June 9, 2022.
  20. Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
  21. Kasuya, M. (2020, January 8). Threat Spotlight: Amadey Bot Targets Non-Russian Users. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
  22. CISA et al.. (2024, February 7). PRC State-Sponsored Actors Compromise and Maintain Persistent Access to U.S. Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved May 15, 2024.
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