Permission Groups Discovery
Sub-techniques (3)
ID | Name |
---|---|
.001 | Local Groups |
.002 | Domain Groups |
.003 | Cloud Groups |
Adversaries may attempt to find group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions.
Procedure Examples |
|
Name | Description |
---|---|
IcedID |
IcedID has the ability to identify Workgroup membership.(Citation: IBM IcedID November 2017) |
Carbon |
Carbon uses the |
APT29 |
APT29 used the |
UNC2452 |
UNC2452 used the |
TrickBot |
TrickBot can identify the groups the user on a compromised host belongs to.(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019) |
MURKYTOP |
MURKYTOP has the capability to retrieve information about groups.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018) |
TA505 |
TA505 has used TinyMet to enumerate members of privileged groups.(Citation: IBM TA505 April 2020) TA505 has also run |
ShimRatReporter |
ShimRatReporter gathered the local privileges for the infected host.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang) |
APT3 |
APT3 has a tool that can enumerate the permissions associated with Windows groups.(Citation: Symantec Buckeye) |
Siloscape |
Siloscape checks for Kubernetes node permissions.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021) |
Mitigations |
|
Mitigation | Description |
---|---|
Permission Groups Discovery Mitigation |
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about groups and permissions, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP) |
Detection
System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i
.(Citation: K8s Authorization Overview)
References
- Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021.
- Symantec Security Response. (2016, September 6). Buckeye cyberespionage group shifts gaze from US to Hong Kong. Retrieved September 26, 2016.
- Prizmant, D. (2021, June 7). Siloscape: First Known Malware Targeting Windows Containers to Compromise Cloud Environments. Retrieved June 9, 2021.
- Kessem, L., et al. (2017, November 13). New Banking Trojan IcedID Discovered by IBM X-Force Research. Retrieved July 14, 2020.
- Cash, D. et al. (2020, December 14). Dark Halo Leverages SolarWinds Compromise to Breach Organizations. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
- Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.
- GovCERT. (2016, May 23). Technical Report about the Espionage Case at RUAG. Retrieved November 7, 2018.
- Yonathan Klijnsma. (2016, May 17). Mofang: A politically motivated information stealing adversary. Retrieved May 12, 2020.
- Hiroaki, H. and Lu, L. (2019, June 12). Shifting Tactics: Breaking Down TA505 Group’s Use of HTML, RATs and Other Techniques in Latest Campaigns. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
- Frydrych, M. (2020, April 14). TA505 Continues to Infect Networks With SDBbot RAT. Retrieved May 29, 2020.
- FireEye. (2018, March 16). Suspected Chinese Cyber Espionage Group (TEMP.Periscope) Targeting U.S. Engineering and Maritime Industries. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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