Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Indicator Removal:  Clear Persistence

Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, Modify Registry, Plist File Modification, or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. Create Account).(Citation: Talos - Cisco Attack 2022) In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

ID: T1070.009
Sub-technique of:  T1070
Tactic(s): Defense Evasion
Platforms: ESXi, Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, User Account: User Account Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification
Version: 1.2
Created: 29 Jul 2022
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2025

Procedure Examples

Name Description
SUNBURST

SUNBURST removed IFEO registry values to clean up traces of persistence.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)

MCMD

MCMD has the ability to remove set Registry Keys, including those used for persistence.(Citation: Secureworks MCMD July 2019)

Bazar

Bazar's loader can delete scheduled tasks created by a previous instance of the malware.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)

IPsec Helper

IPsec Helper can delete various service traces related to persistent execution when commanded.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021)

Pillowmint

Pillowmint can uninstall the malicious service from an infected machine.(Citation: Trustwave Pillowmint June 2020)

Misdat

Misdat is capable of deleting Registry keys used for persistence.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)

Kapeka

Kapeka will clear registry values used for persistent configuration storage when uninstalled.(Citation: WithSecure Kapeka 2024)

S-Type

S-Type has deleted accounts it has created.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)

njRAT

njRAT is capable of manipulating and deleting registry keys, including those used for persistence.(Citation: Trend Micro njRAT 2018)

KOCTOPUS

KOCTOPUS can delete created registry keys used for persistence as part of its cleanup procedure.(Citation: MalwareBytes LazyScripter Feb 2021)

GrimAgent

GrimAgent can delete previously created tasks on a compromised host.(Citation: Group IB GrimAgent July 2021)

Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin uses a RunOnce Registry key for persistence, where the key is removed after its use on reboot then re-added by the malware after it resumes execution.(Citation: Microsoft RaspberryRobin 2022)

RTM

RTM has the ability to remove Registry entries that it created for persistence.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)

Mitigations

Mitigation Description
Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files. Enforce Least Privilege Permissions: - Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles. Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs. Harden File Shares: - Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows. Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access. On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf` File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): - Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions. Audit File System Access: - Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities. Restrict Startup Directories: - Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`. Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`. - On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`.

Remote Data Storage

Remote Data Storage focuses on moving critical data, such as security logs and sensitive files, to secure, off-host locations to minimize unauthorized access, tampering, or destruction by adversaries. By leveraging remote storage solutions, organizations enhance the protection of forensic evidence, sensitive information, and monitoring data. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Centralized Log Management: - Configure endpoints to forward security logs to a centralized log collector or SIEM. - Use tools like Splunk Graylog, or Security Onion to aggregate and store logs. - Example command (Linux): `sudo auditd | tee /var/log/audit/audit.log | nc 514` Remote File Storage Solutions: - Utilize cloud storage solutions like AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, or Azure Blob Storage for sensitive data. - Ensure proper encryption at rest and access control policies (IAM roles, ACLs). Intrusion Detection Log Forwarding: - Forward logs from IDS/IPS systems (e.g., Zeek/Suricata) to a remote security information system. - Example for Suricata log forwarding: `outputs: - type: syslog protocol: tls address: ` Immutable Backup Configurations: - Enable immutable storage settings for backups to prevent adversaries from modifying or deleting data. - Example: AWS S3 Object Lock. Data Encryption: - Ensure encryption for sensitive data using AES-256 at rest and TLS 1.2+ for data in transit. Tools: OpenSSL, BitLocker, LUKS for Linux.

References

  1. Pantazopoulos, N. (2020, June 2). In-depth analysis of the new Team9 malware family. Retrieved December 1, 2020.
  2. Nick Biasini. (2022, August 10). Cisco Talos shares insights related to recent cyber attack on Cisco. Retrieved March 9, 2023.
  3. Gross, J. (2016, February 23). Operation Dust Storm. Retrieved December 22, 2021.
  4. MSTIC, CDOC, 365 Defender Research Team. (2021, January 20). Deep dive into the Solorigate second-stage activation: From SUNBURST to TEARDROP and Raindrop . Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  5. Secureworks. (2019, July 24). MCMD Malware Analysis. Retrieved August 13, 2020.
  6. Amitai Ben & Shushan Ehrlich. (2021, May). From Wiper to Ransomware: The Evolution of Agrius. Retrieved May 21, 2024.
  7. Trustwave SpiderLabs. (2020, June 22). Pillowmint: FIN7’s Monkey Thief . Retrieved July 27, 2020.
  8. Mohammad Kazem Hassan Nejad, WithSecure. (2024, April 17). KAPEKA A novel backdoor spotted in Eastern Europe. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
  9. Pascual, C. (2018, November 27). AutoIt-Compiled Worm Affecting Removable Media Delivers Fileless Version of BLADABINDI/njRAT Backdoor. Retrieved June 4, 2019.
  10. Jazi, H. (2021, February). LazyScripter: From Empire to double RAT. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
  11. Priego, A. (2021, July). THE BROTHERS GRIM: THE REVERSING TALE OF GRIMAGENT MALWARE USED BY RYUK. Retrieved September 19, 2024.
  12. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2022, October 27). Raspberry Robin worm part of larger ecosystem facilitating pre-ransomware activity. Retrieved May 17, 2024.
  13. Faou, M. and Boutin, J. (2017, February). Read The Manual: A Guide to the RTM Banking Trojan. Retrieved March 9, 2017.

Связанные риски

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