Куда я попал?

SECURITM это SGRC система, автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

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Modify Authentication Process

Sub-techniques (7)

ID	Name
.001	Domain Controller Authentication
.002	Password Filter DLL
.003	Pluggable Authentication Modules
.004	Network Device Authentication
.005	Reversible Encryption
.006	Multi-Factor Authentication
.007	Hybrid Identity

Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts. Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.

ID: T1556

Sub-techniques: .001 .002 .003 .004 .005 .006 .007

Tactic(s): Credential Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence

Platforms: Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows

Data Sources: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, User Account: User Account Authentication, User Account: User Account Modification, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification

Version: 2.2

Created: 11 Feb 2020

Last Modified: 18 Oct 2022

Name	Description
Procedure Examples
Ebury	Ebury can intercept private keys using a trojanized `ssh-add` function.(Citation: ESET Ebury Feb 2014)
SILENTTRINITY	SILENTTRINITY can create a backdoor in KeePass using a malicious config file and in TortoiseSVN using a registry hook.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)
Kessel	Kessel has trojanized the ssh_login and `user-auth_pubkey` functions to steal plaintext credentials.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018)

Mitigation	Description
Mitigations
Multi-factor Authentication	Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator.
Password Policies	Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts.
Restrict File and Directory Permissions	Restrict access by setting directory and file permissions that are not specific to users or privileged accounts.
User Account Management	Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
Privileged Account Management	Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
Privileged Process Integrity	Protect processes with high privileges that can be used to interact with critical system components through use of protected process light, anti-process injection defenses, or other process integrity enforcement measures.
Audit	Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.
Operating System Configuration	Make configuration changes related to the operating system or a common feature of the operating system that result in system hardening against techniques.

Detection

Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe.(Citation: Clymb3r Function Hook Passwords Sept 2013) Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll).(Citation: Dell Skeleton) Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files. Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory.(Citation: Xorrior Authorization Plugins) Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. (Citation: TechNet Audit Policy) Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Monitor property changes in Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. Group Policy Modification). The Store passwords using reversible encryption configuration should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script execution of -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true, Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.(Citation: dump_pwd_dcsync)

References

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