Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging
Other sub-techniques of Impair Defenses (11)
Adversaries may impair command history logging to hide commands they run on a compromised system. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.
On Linux and macOS, command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable HISTFILE
. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called ~/.bash_history
. The HISTCONTROL
environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the history
command and eventually into the ~/.bash_history
file when a user logs out. HISTCONTROL
does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. The `HISTFILE` environment variable is also used in some ESXi systems.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022)
Adversaries may clear the history environment variable (unset HISTFILE
) or set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0
) to prevent logging of commands. Additionally, HISTCONTROL
can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". HISTCONTROL
can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. Adversaries can abuse this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
On Windows systems, the PSReadLine
module tracks commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file ($env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
by default). Adversaries may change where these logs are saved using Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}
. This will cause ConsoleHost_history.txt
to stop receiving logs. Additionally, it is possible to turn off logging to this file using the PowerShell command Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing
.(Citation: Microsoft PowerShell Command History)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell command audit)(Citation: Sophos PowerShell Command History Forensics)
Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to disable historical command logging (e.g. no logging
).
Procedure Examples |
|
Name | Description |
---|---|
Line Dancer |
Line Dancer can disable syslog on compromised devices.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024) |
Sea Turtle |
Sea Turtle unset the Bash and MySQL history files on victim systems.(Citation: Hunt Sea Turtle 2024) |
BPFDoor |
BPFDoor sets the `MYSQL_HISTFILE` and `HISTFILE` to `/dev/null` preventing the shell and MySQL from logging history in `/proc/ |
ArcaneDoor included disabling logging on targeted Cisco ASA appliances.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)(Citation: CCCS ArcaneDoor 2024) |
|
APT38 |
APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020) |
SILENTTRINITY |
SILENTTRINITY can bypass ScriptBlock logging to execute unmanaged PowerShell code from memory.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019) |
Mitigations |
|
Mitigation | Description |
---|---|
Operating System Configuration |
Operating System Configuration involves adjusting system settings and hardening the default configurations of an operating system (OS) to mitigate adversary exploitation and prevent abuse of system functionality. Proper OS configurations address security vulnerabilities, limit attack surfaces, and ensure robust defense against a wide range of techniques. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Disable Unused Features: - Turn off SMBv1, LLMNR, and NetBIOS where not needed. - Disable remote registry and unnecessary services. Enforce OS-level Protections: - Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), and Control Flow Guard (CFG) on Windows. - Use AppArmor or SELinux on Linux for mandatory access controls. Secure Access Settings: - Enable User Account Control (UAC) for Windows. - Restrict root/sudo access on Linux/macOS and enforce strong permissions using sudoers files. File System Hardening: - Implement least-privilege access for critical files and system directories. - Audit permissions regularly using tools like icacls (Windows) or getfacl/chmod (Linux/macOS). Secure Remote Access: - Restrict RDP, SSH, and VNC to authorized IPs using firewall rules. - Enable NLA for RDP and enforce strong password/lockout policies. Harden Boot Configurations: - Enable Secure Boot and enforce UEFI/BIOS password protection. - Use BitLocker or LUKS to encrypt boot drives. Regular Audits: - Periodically audit OS configurations using tools like CIS Benchmarks or SCAP tools. *Tools for Implementation* Windows: - Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO): Centrally enforce OS security settings. - Windows Defender Exploit Guard: Built-in OS protection against exploits. - CIS-CAT Pro: Audit Windows security configurations based on CIS Benchmarks. Linux/macOS: - AppArmor/SELinux: Enforce mandatory access controls. - Lynis: Perform comprehensive security audits. - SCAP Security Guide: Automate configuration hardening using Security Content Automation Protocol. Cross-Platform: - Ansible or Chef/Puppet: Automate configuration hardening at scale. - OpenSCAP: Perform compliance and configuration checks. |
Environment Variable Permissions |
Restrict the modification of environment variables to authorized users and processes by enforcing strict permissions and policies. This ensures the integrity of environment variables, preventing adversaries from abusing or altering them for malicious purposes. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Restrict Write Access: - Use Case: Set file system-level permissions to restrict access to environment variable configuration files (e.g., `.bashrc`, `.bash_profile`, `.zshrc`, `systemd` service files). - Implementation: Configure `/etc/environment` or `/etc/profile` on Linux systems to only allow root or administrators to modify the file. Secure Access Controls: - Use Case: Limit access to environment variable settings in application deployment tools or CI/CD pipelines to authorized personnel. - Implementation: Use role-based access control (RBAC) in tools like Jenkins or GitLab to ensure only specific users can modify environment variables. Restrict Process Scope: - Use Case: Configure policies to ensure environment variables are only accessible to the processes they are explicitly intended for. - Implementation: Use containerized environments like Docker to isolate environment variables to specific containers and ensure they are not inherited by other processes. Audit Environment Variable Changes: - Use Case: Enable logging for changes to critical environment variables. - Implementation: Use `auditd` on Linux to monitor changes to files like `/etc/environment` or application-specific environment files. |
Detection
Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their .bash_history
can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their HISTCONTROL
, HISTFILE
, or HISTFILESIZE
environment variables may be suspicious.
Monitor for modification of PowerShell command history settings through processes being created with -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing
command-line arguments and use of the PowerShell commands Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing
and Set-PSReadLineOption -HistorySavePath {File Path}
. Further, Network Device CLI commands may also be used to clear or disable historical log data with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor such command activity for unexpected or unauthorized use of commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations.
References
- Vikas, S. (2020, August 26). PowerShell Command History Forensics. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Microsoft. (2020, May 13). About History. Retrieved September 4, 2020.
- jak. (2020, June 27). Live Discover - PowerShell command audit. Retrieved August 21, 2020.
- Alexander Marvi, Jeremy Koppen, Tufail Ahmed, and Jonathan Lepore. (2022, September 29). Bad VIB(E)s Part One: Investigating Novel Malware Persistence Within ESXi Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
- Cisco Talos. (2024, April 24). ArcaneDoor - New espionage-focused campaign found targeting perimeter network devices. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
- Hunt & Hackett Research Team. (2024, January 5). Turkish espionage campaigns in the Netherlands. Retrieved November 20, 2024.
- The Sandfly Security Team. (2022, May 11). BPFDoor - An Evasive Linux Backdoor Technical Analysis. Retrieved September 29, 2023.
- Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. (2024, April 24). Cyber Activity Impacting CISCO ASA VPNs. Retrieved January 6, 2025.
- DHS/CISA. (2020, August 26). FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks. Retrieved September 29, 2021.
- Mathew Branwell. (2012, March 21). Securing .bash_history file. Retrieved July 8, 2017.
- Salvati, M. (2019, August 6). SILENTTRINITY Modules. Retrieved March 24, 2022.
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