Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Compromise Infrastructure
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Compromise Infrastructure
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Compromise Infrastructure

ID Name
.001 Domains
.002 DNS Server
.003 Virtual Private Server
.004 Server
.005 Botnet
.006 Web Services
.007 Serverless

Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web and DNS services. Instead of buying, leasing, or renting infrastructure an adversary may compromise infrastructure and use it during other phases of the adversary lifecycle.(Citation: Mandiant APT1)(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking)(Citation: Talos DNSpionage Nov 2018)(Citation: FireEye EPS Awakens Part 2) Additionally, adversaries may compromise numerous machines to form a botnet they can leverage. Use of compromised infrastructure allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. Compromised infrastructure can help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contact with high reputation or trusted sites. For example, adversaries may leverage compromised infrastructure (potentially also in conjunction with Digital Certificates) to further blend in and support staged information gathering and/or Phishing campaigns.(Citation: FireEye DNS Hijack 2019) By using compromised infrastructure, adversaries may make it difficult to tie their actions back to them. Prior to targeting, adversaries may compromise the infrastructure of other adversaries.(Citation: NSA NCSC Turla OilRig)

ID: T1584
Sub-techniques:  .001 .002 .003 .004 .005 .006 .007
Tactic(s): Resource Development
Platforms: PRE
Data Sources: Domain Name: Active DNS, Domain Name: Domain Registration, Domain Name: Passive DNS, Internet Scan: Response Content, Internet Scan: Response Metadata
Version: 1.2
Created: 01 Oct 2020
Last Modified: 26 Jul 2022

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Pre-compromise

This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques.

Detection

Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Once adversaries have provisioned compromised infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover compromised infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.

References

  1. Winters, R. (2015, December 20). The EPS Awakens - Part 2. Retrieved January 22, 2016.
  2. ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
  3. Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.
  4. NSA/NCSC. (2019, October 21). Cybersecurity Advisory: Turla Group Exploits Iranian APT To Expand Coverage Of Victims. Retrieved October 16, 2020.
  5. Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, November 27). DNSpionage Campaign Targets Middle East. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
  6. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  7. Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
  8. ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee. (2005, July 12). Domain Name Hijacking: Incidents, Threats, Risks and Remediation. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
  9. Hirani, M., Jones, S., Read, B. (2019, January 10). Global DNS Hijacking Campaign: DNS Record Manipulation at Scale. Retrieved October 9, 2020.
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