Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Network Devices
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Network Devices
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Compromise Infrastructure:  Network Devices

ID Name
.001 Domains
.002 DNS Server
.003 Virtual Private Server
.004 Server
.005 Botnet
.006 Web Services
.007 Serverless
.008 Network Devices

Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting. Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for Phishing campaigns (i.e., Link Target) or enabling the required access to execute Content Injection operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., Valid Accounts) from compromised network devices. Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent Command and Control activity, such as Hide Infrastructure through an established Proxy and/or Botnet network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024)

ID: T1584.008
Sub-technique of:  T1584
Tactic(s): Resource Development
Platforms: PRE
Data Sources: Internet Scan: Response Content
Created: 28 Mar 2024
Last Modified: 15 Oct 2024

Procedure Examples
Name Description
Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic.(Citation: Microsoft Volt Typhoon May 2023)(Citation: Joint Cybersecurity Advisory Volt Typhoon June 2023)
APT28

APT28 compromised Ubiquiti network devices to act as collection devices for credentials compromised via phishing webpages.(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)
ZIRCONIUM

ZIRCONIUM has compromised network devices such as small office and home office (SOHO) routers and IoT devices for ORB (operational relay box) Proxy networks.(Citation: ORB APT31)(Citation: ORB Mandiant)

KV Botnet Activity focuses on compromise of small office-home office (SOHO) network devices to build the subsequent botnet.(Citation: Lumen KVBotnet 2023)

Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation used compromised small office/home office (SOHO) devices to interact with vulnerable Versa Director servers.(Citation: Lumen Versa 2024)

During Cutting Edge, threat actors used compromised and out-of-support Cyberoam VPN appliances for C2.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)(Citation: Volexity Ivanti Global Exploitation January 2024)

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Pre-compromise

This category is used for any applicable mitigation activities that apply to techniques occurring before an adversary gains Initial Access, such as Reconnaissance and Resource Development techniques.

References

  1. Office of Public Affairs. (2024, February 15). Justice Department Conducts Court-Authorized Disruption of Botnet Controlled by the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). Retrieved March 28, 2024.
  2. Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023.
  3. Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia’s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023.
  4. NSA et al. (2023, May 24). People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection. Retrieved July 27, 2023.
  5. Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, May 24). Volt Typhoon targets US critical infrastructure with living-off-the-land techniques. Retrieved July 27, 2023.
  6. Billy Leonard. (2023, April 19). Ukraine remains Russia’s biggest cyber focus in 2023. Retrieved March 1, 2024.
  7. Raggi, Michael. (2024, May 22). IOC Extinction? China-Nexus Cyber Espionage Actors Use ORB Networks to Raise Cost on Defenders. Retrieved July 8, 2024.
  8. Cimpanu, Catalin. (2021, July 20). Chinese hacking group APT31 uses mesh of home routers to disguise attacks. Retrieved July 8, 2024.
  9. ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
  10. Black Lotus Labs. (2023, December 13). Routers Roasting On An Open Firewall: The KV-Botnet Investigation. Retrieved June 10, 2024.
  11. Black Lotus Labs. (2024, August 27). Taking The Crossroads: The Versa Director Zero-Day Exploitaiton. Retrieved August 27, 2024.
  12. McLellan, T. et al. (2024, January 12). Cutting Edge: Suspected APT Targets Ivanti Connect Secure VPN in New Zero-Day Exploitation. Retrieved February 27, 2024.
  13. Gurkok, C. et al. (2024, January 15). Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Exploitation Goes Global. Retrieved February 27, 2024.
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