Plist File Modification
Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. Hidden Window) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: Launch Agent/Launch Daemon or Re-opened Applications).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the `~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist` file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via Dynamic Linker Hijacking.(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)
Procedure Examples |
|
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Cuckoo Stealer |
Cuckoo Stealer can create and populate property list (plist) files to enable execution.(Citation: Kandji Cuckoo April 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne Cuckoo Stealer May 2024) |
| XCSSET |
XCSSET uses the |
Mitigations |
|
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Application Developer Guidance |
This mitigation describes any guidance or training given to developers of applications to avoid introducing security weaknesses that an adversary may be able to take advantage of. |
Detection
Monitor for common command-line editors used to modify plist files located in auto-run locations, such as \~/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Application Support/com.apple.backgroundtaskmanagementagent/backgrounditems.btm, and an application's Info.plist.
Monitor for plist file modification immediately followed by code execution from \~/Library/Scripts and ~/Library/Preferences. Also, monitor for significant changes to any path pointers in a modified plist.
Identify new services executed from plist modified in the previous user's session.
References
- Patrick Wardle. (2022, January 1). The Art of Mac Malware Volume 0x1:Analysis. Retrieved April 19, 2022.
- FileInfo.com team. (2019, November 26). .PLIST File Extension. Retrieved October 12, 2021.
- ESET. (2012, January 1). OSX/Flashback. Retrieved April 19, 2022.
- Stokes, P. (2024, May 9). macOS Cuckoo Stealer | Ensuring Detection and Defense as New Samples Rapidly Emerge. Retrieved August 20, 2024.
- Kohler, A. and Lopez, C. (2024, April 30). Malware: Cuckoo Behaves Like Cross Between Infostealer and Spyware. Retrieved August 20, 2024.
- Apple Inc.. (2021, January 1). Hardened Runtime: Manage security protections and resource access for your macOS apps.. Retrieved March 24, 2021.
- Mac Threat Response, Mobile Research Team. (2020, August 13). The XCSSET Malware: Inserts Malicious Code Into Xcode Projects, Performs UXSS Backdoor Planting in Safari, and Leverages Two Zero-day Exploits. Retrieved October 5, 2021.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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