Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Data Obfuscation
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Data Obfuscation
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Data Obfuscation

ID Name
.001 Junk Data
.002 Steganography
.003 Protocol Impersonation

Adversaries may obfuscate command and control traffic to make it more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) communications are hidden (but not necessarily encrypted) in an attempt to make the content more difficult to discover or decipher and to make the communication less conspicuous and hide commands from being seen. This encompasses many methods, such as adding junk data to protocol traffic, using steganography, or impersonating legitimate protocols.

ID: T1001
Sub-techniques:  .001 .002 .003
Tactic(s): Command and Control
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content
Version: 1.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 15 Mar 2020

Procedure Examples
Name Description
Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has encrypted IP addresses used for "Agent" proxy hops with RC4.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
SLOTHFULMEDIA

SLOTHFULMEDIA has hashed a string containing system information prior to exfiltration via POST requests.(Citation: CISA MAR SLOTHFULMEDIA October 2020)
TrailBlazer

TrailBlazer can masquerade its C2 traffic as legitimate Google Notifications HTTP requests.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors encrypted IP addresses used for "Agent" proxy hops with RC4.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
FunnyDream

FunnyDream can send compressed and obfuscated packets to C2.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)
RDAT

RDAT has used encoded data within subdomains as AES ciphertext to communicate from the host to the C2.(Citation: Unit42 RDAT July 2020)
FlawedAmmyy

FlawedAmmyy may obfuscate portions of the initial C2 handshake.(Citation: Proofpoint TA505 Mar 2018)
SideTwist

SideTwist can embed C2 responses in the source code of a fake Flickr webpage.(Citation: Check Point APT34 April 2021)
Axiom

The Axiom group has used other forms of obfuscation, include commingling legitimate traffic with communications traffic so that network streams appear legitimate.

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Data Obfuscation Mitigation

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.

Detection

Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)

References

  1. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  2. Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
  3. Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.
  4. Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.
  5. CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
  6. Check Point. (2021, April 8). Iran’s APT34 Returns with an Updated Arsenal. Retrieved May 5, 2021.
  7. DHS/CISA, Cyber National Mission Force. (2020, October 1). Malware Analysis Report (MAR) MAR-10303705-1.v1 – Remote Access Trojan: SLOTHFULMEDIA. Retrieved October 2, 2020.
  8. Falcone, R. (2020, July 22). OilRig Targets Middle Eastern Telecommunications Organization and Adds Novel C2 Channel with Steganography to Its Inventory. Retrieved July 28, 2020.
  9. Proofpoint Staff. (2018, March 7). Leaked Ammyy Admin Source Code Turned into Malware. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
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