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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Domain Policy Modification
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Domain Policy Modification
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Domain Policy Modification

ID Name
.001 Group Policy Modification
.002 Domain Trust Modification

Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources.(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller. Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.

ID: T1484
Sub-techniques:  .001 .002
Tactic(s): Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation
Platforms: Azure AD, Windows
Permissions Required: Administrator, User
Data Sources: Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Command: Command Execution
Version: 2.0
Created: 07 Mar 2019
Last Modified: 09 Feb 2021

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Audit

Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.
Privileged Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root.
User Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.
Group Policy Modification Mitigation

Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as Bloodhound (version 1.5.1 and later)(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound). Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Filters)(Citation: Microsoft GPO Security Filtering)

Detection

It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection) Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)

References

  1. Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  2. CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
  3. Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
  4. Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
  5. Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  6. MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  7. Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  8. Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  9. Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
  10. Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Filtering the Scope of a GPO. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
  11. Microsoft. (2008, September 11). Fun with WMI Filters in Group Policy. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
  12. Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
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