Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
Sub-techniques (2)
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation. Modifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include: * modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) * modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) * changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller. * adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023) Adversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
Mitigations |
|
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Audit |
Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses. |
| Privileged Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
| User Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. |
| Group Policy Modification Mitigation |
Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as Bloodhound (version 1.5.1 and later)(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound). Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Filters)(Citation: Microsoft GPO Security Filtering) |
Detection
It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure Sentinel ADFSDomainTrustMods)(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate) This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details.(Citation: Sygnia Golden SAML)(Citation: CISA SolarWinds Cloud Detection)
Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings.(Citation: Microsoft - Update or Repair Federated domain) Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.(Citation: Microsoft 365 Defender Solorigate)
References
- Robbins, A., Vazarkar, R., and Schroeder, W. (2016, April 17). Bloodhound: Six Degrees of Domain Admin. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
- Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved January 6, 2021.
- Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
- Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
- Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
- MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2020, September 14). Update or repair the settings of a federated domain in Office 365, Azure, or Intune. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2020, December). Azure Sentinel Detections. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
- Microsoft 365 Defender Team. (2020, December 28). Using Microsoft 365 Defender to protect against Solorigate. Retrieved January 7, 2021.
- Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
- CISA. (2021, January 8). Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments. Retrieved January 8, 2021.
- Microsoft. (2018, May 30). Filtering the Scope of a GPO. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
- Microsoft. (2008, September 11). Fun with WMI Filters in Group Policy. Retrieved March 13, 2019.
- Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved March 4, 2024.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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