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SECURITM это SGRC система, автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

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Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server

Other sub-techniques of Acquire Infrastructure (8)

ID	Name
.001	Domains
.002	DNS Server
.003	Virtual Private Server
.004	Server
.005	Botnet
.006	Web Services
.007	Serverless
.008	Malvertising

Adversaries may rent Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) that can be used during targeting. There exist a variety of cloud service providers that will sell virtual machines/containers as a service. By utilizing a VPS, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them. The use of cloud infrastructure can also make it easier for adversaries to rapidly provision, modify, and shut down their infrastructure. Acquiring a VPS for use in later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as Command and Control, can allow adversaries to benefit from the ubiquity and trust associated with higher reputation cloud service providers. Adversaries may also acquire infrastructure from VPS service providers that are known for renting VPSs with minimal registration information, allowing for more anonymous acquisitions of infrastructure.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease)

ID: T1583.003

Sub-technique of: T1583

Tactic(s): Resource Development

Platforms: PRE

Data Sources: Internet Scan: Response Content, Internet Scan: Response Metadata

Version: 1.1

Created: 01 Oct 2020

Last Modified: 15 Apr 2025

Name	Description
Procedure Examples
Gamaredon Group	Gamaredon Group has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure outside of Russia.(Citation: unit42_gamaredon_dec2022)
APT28	APT28 hosted phishing domains on free services for brief periods of time during campaigns.(Citation: Leonard TAG 2023)
	FLORAHOX Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for the ORB network.(Citation: ORB Mandiant)
	During the J-magic Campaign, threat actors acquired VPS for use in C2.(Citation: Lumen J-Magic JAN 2025)
	During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)
Ember Bear	Ember Bear has used virtual private servers (VPSs) to host tools, perform reconnaissance, exploit victim infrastructure, and as a destination for data exfiltration.(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)
	ArcaneDoor included the use of dedicated, adversary-controlled virtual private servers for command and control.(Citation: Cisco ArcaneDoor 2024)
LAPSUS$	LAPSUS$ has used VPS hosting providers for infrastructure.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)
Sea Turtle	Sea Turtle created adversary-in-the-middle servers to impersonate legitimate services and enable credential capture.(Citation: Talos Sea Turtle 2019)
Winter Vivern	Winter Vivern used adversary-owned and -controlled servers to host web vulnerability scanning applications.(Citation: SentinelOne WinterVivern 2023)
CURIUM	CURIUM created virtual private server instances to facilitate use of malicious domains and other items.(Citation: PWC Yellow Liderc 2023)
BlackByte	BlackByte staged encryption keys on virtual private servers operated by the adversary.(Citation: FBI BlackByte 2022)
	KV Botnet Activity used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices infected with KV Botnet malware.(Citation: Lumen KVBotnet 2023)
Axiom	Axiom has used VPS hosting providers in targeting of intended victims.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)
Moonstone Sleet	Moonstone Sleet registered virtual private servers to host payloads for download.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sleet 2024)
Dragonfly	Dragonfly has acquired VPS infrastructure for use in malicious campaigns.(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)
TEMP.Veles	TEMP.Veles has used Virtual Private Server (VPS) infrastructure.(Citation: FireEye TRITON 2019)
APT42	APT42 has used anonymized infrastructure and Virtual Private Servers (VPSs) to interact with the victim’s environment.(Citation: Mandiant APT42-charms)(Citation: Mandiant APT42-untangling)
	SPACEHOP Activity has used acquired Virtual Private Servers as control systems for devices within the ORB network.(Citation: ORB Mandiant)
HAFNIUM	HAFNIUM has operated from leased virtual private servers (VPS) in the United States.(Citation: Microsoft HAFNIUM March 2020)

Mitigation	Description
Mitigations
Pre-compromise	Pre-compromise mitigations involve proactive measures and defenses implemented to prevent adversaries from successfully identifying and exploiting weaknesses during the Reconnaissance and Resource Development phases of an attack. These activities focus on reducing an organization's attack surface, identify adversarial preparation efforts, and increase the difficulty for attackers to conduct successful operations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Limit Information Exposure: - Regularly audit and sanitize publicly available data, including job posts, websites, and social media. - Use tools like OSINT monitoring platforms (e.g., SpiderFoot, Recon-ng) to identify leaked information. Protect Domain and DNS Infrastructure: - Enable DNSSEC and use WHOIS privacy protection. - Monitor for domain hijacking or lookalike domains using services like RiskIQ or DomainTools. External Monitoring: - Use tools like Shodan, Censys to monitor your external attack surface. - Deploy external vulnerability scanners to proactively address weaknesses. Threat Intelligence: - Leverage platforms like MISP, Recorded Future, or Anomali to track adversarial infrastructure, tools, and activity. Content and Email Protections: - Use email security solutions like Proofpoint, Microsoft Defender for Office 365, or Mimecast. - Enforce SPF/DKIM/DMARC policies to protect against email spoofing. Training and Awareness: - Educate employees on identifying phishing attempts, securing their social media, and avoiding information leaks.

Detection

Once adversaries have provisioned a VPS (ex: for use as a command and control server), internet scans may reveal servers that adversaries have acquired. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021) Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.

References

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