Account Manipulation: Добавление роли глобального администратора Office 365
Other sub-techniques of Account Manipulation (5)
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments.(Citation: AWS IAM Policies and Permissions)(Citation: Google Cloud IAM Policies)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles) With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins).(Citation: Expel AWS Attacker)
(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)
This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts.
For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add Additional Cloud Credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to gain the service principal’s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator.(Citation: SpecterOps Azure Privilege Escalation) Similarly, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.(Citation: Rhino Security Labs AWS Privilege Escalation)
Similarly, an adversary with the Azure AD Global Administrator role can toggle the “Access management for Azure resources” option to gain the ability to assign privileged access to Azure subscriptions and virtual machines to Azure AD users, including themselves.(Citation: Azure AD to AD)
Примеры процедур |
|
| Название | Описание |
|---|---|
| LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has added the global admin role to accounts they have created in the targeted organization's cloud instances.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022) |
| APT29 |
APT29 has granted `company administrator` privileges to a newly created service principal.(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022) |
Контрмеры |
|
| Контрмера | Описание |
|---|---|
| Privileged Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
| Multi-factor Authentication |
Use two or more pieces of evidence to authenticate to a system; such as username and password in addition to a token from a physical smart card or token generator. |
| User Account Management |
Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts. |
Обнаружение
Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.
Ссылки
- Spencer Gietzen. (n.d.). AWS IAM Privilege Escalation – Methods and Mitigation. Retrieved May 27, 2022.
- Sean Metcalf. (2020, May 27). From Azure AD to Active Directory (via Azure) – An Unanticipated Attack Path. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
- Google Cloud. (2022, March 31). Understanding policies. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
- AWS. (n.d.). Policies and permissions in IAM. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
- Andy Robbins. (2021, October 12). Azure Privilege Escalation via Service Principal Abuse. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
- Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
- Brian Bahtiarian, David Blanton, Britton Manahan and Kyle Pellett. (2022, April 5). Incident report: From CLI to console, chasing an attacker in AWS. Retrieved April 7, 2022.
- MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.
- CrowdStrike. (2022, January 27). Early Bird Catches the Wormhole: Observations from the StellarParticle Campaign. Retrieved February 7, 2022.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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