Куда я попал?
SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.

Financial Theft

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware,(Citation: FBI-ransomware) business email compromise (BEC) and fraud,(Citation: FBI-BEC) "pig butchering,"(Citation: wired-pig butchering) bank hacking,(Citation: DOJ-DPRK Heist) and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.(Citation: BBC-Ronin) Adversaries may Compromise Accounts to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds.(Citation: Internet crime report 2022) In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize Impersonation of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary.(Citation: FBI-BEC) This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft.(Citation: VEC) Extortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after Data Encrypted for Impact (Citation: NYT-Colonial) and Exfiltration of data, followed by threatening to leak sensitive data to the public unless payment is made to the adversary.(Citation: Mandiant-leaks) Adversaries may use dedicated leak sites to distribute victim data.(Citation: Crowdstrike-leaks) Due to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as Data Destruction and business disruption.(Citation: AP-NotPetya)

ID: T1657
Тактика(-и): Impact
Платформы: Linux, macOS, Office Suite, SaaS, Windows
Источники данных: Application Log: Application Log Content
Тип влияния: Availability
Версия: 1.2
Дата создания: 18 Aug 2023
Последнее изменение: 15 Apr 2025

Примеры процедур

Название Описание
INC Ransom

INC Ransom has stolen and encrypted victim's data in order to extort payment for keeping it private or decrypting it.(Citation: Cybereason INC Ransomware November 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer INC Ransomware March 2024)(Citation: Secureworks GOLD IONIC April 2024)(Citation: SOCRadar INC Ransom January 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne INC Ransomware)

Cinnamon Tempest

Cinnamon Tempest has maintained leak sites for exfiltrated data in attempt to extort victims into paying a ransom.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)

Malteiro

Malteiro targets organizations in a wide variety of sectors via the use of Mispadu banking trojan with the goal of financial theft.(Citation: SCILabs Malteiro 2021)

Kimsuky

Kimsuky has stolen and laundered cryptocurrency to self-fund operations including the acquisition of infrastructure.(Citation: Mandiant APT43 March 2024)(Citation: Mandiant APT43 Full PDF Report)

FIN13

FIN13 has observed the victim's software and infrastructure over several months to understand the technical process of legitimate financial transactions, prior to attempting to conduct fraudulent transactions.(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022)

Akira

Akira engages in double-extortion ransomware, exfiltrating files then encrypting them, in order to prompt victims to pay a ransom.(Citation: BushidoToken Akira 2023)(Citation: CISA Akira Ransomware APR 2024)

Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider has deployed ransomware on compromised hosts for financial gain.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023)(Citation: Trellix Scattered Spider MO August 2023)

DarkGate

DarkGate can deploy payloads capable of capturing credentials related to cryptocurrency wallets.(Citation: Ensilo Darkgate 2018)

SilverTerrier

SilverTerrier targets organizations in high technology, higher education, and manufacturing for business email compromise (BEC) campaigns with the goal of financial theft.(Citation: Unit42 SilverTerrier 2018)(Citation: Unit42 SilverTerrier 2016)

Play

Play demands ransom payments from victims to unencrypt filesystems and to not publish sensitive data exfiltrated from victim networks.(Citation: CISA Play Ransomware Advisory December 2023)

Контрмеры

Контрмера Описание
User Training

User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques. Comprehensive training programs create a human firewall by empowering users to be an active component of the organization's cybersecurity defenses. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Create Comprehensive Training Programs: - Design training modules tailored to the organization's risk profile, covering topics such as phishing, password management, and incident reporting. - Provide role-specific training for high-risk employees, such as helpdesk staff or executives. Use Simulated Exercises: - Conduct phishing simulations to measure user susceptibility and provide targeted follow-up training. - Run social engineering drills to evaluate employee responses and reinforce protocols. Leverage Gamification and Engagement: - Introduce interactive learning methods such as quizzes, gamified challenges, and rewards for successful detection and reporting of threats. Incorporate Security Policies into Onboarding: - Include cybersecurity training as part of the onboarding process for new employees. - Provide easy-to-understand materials outlining acceptable use policies and reporting procedures. Regular Refresher Courses: - Update training materials to include emerging threats and techniques used by adversaries. - Ensure all employees complete periodic refresher courses to stay informed. Emphasize Real-World Scenarios: - Use case studies of recent attacks to demonstrate the consequences of successful phishing or social engineering. - Discuss how specific employee actions can prevent or mitigate such attacks.

User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Ссылки

  1. Nicole Perlroth. (2021, May 13). Colonial Pipeline paid 75 Bitcoin, or roughly $5 million, to hackers.. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  2. Lily Hay Newman. (n.d.). ‘Pig Butchering’ Scams Are Now a $3 Billion Threat. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  3. Joe Tidy. (2022, March 30). Ronin Network: What a $600m hack says about the state of crypto. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  4. IC3. (2022). 2022 Internet Crime Report. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  5. FRANK BAJAK AND RAPHAEL SATTER. (2017, June 30). Companies still hobbled from fearsome cyberattack. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  6. FBI. (n.d.). Ransomware. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  7. FBI. (2022). FBI 2022 Congressional Report on BEC and Real Estate Wire Fraud. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  8. Department of Justice. (2021). 3 North Korean Military Hackers Indicted in Wide-Ranging Scheme to Commit Cyber-attacks and Financial Crimes Across the Globe. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  9. DANIEL KAPELLMANN ZAFRA, COREY HIDELBRANDT, NATHAN BRUBAKER, KEITH LUNDEN. (2022, January 31). 1 in 7 OT Ransomware Extortion Attacks Leak Critical Operational Technology Information. Retrieved August 18, 2023.
  10. Crowdstrike. (2020, September 24). Double Trouble: Ransomware with Data Leak Extortion, Part 1. Retrieved December 6, 2023.
  11. CloudFlare. (n.d.). What is vendor email compromise (VEC)?. Retrieved September 12, 2023.
  12. Toulas, B. (2024, March 27). INC Ransom threatens to leak 3TB of NHS Scotland stolen data. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
  13. SOCRadar. (2024, January 24). Dark Web Profile: INC Ransom. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
  14. SentinelOne. (n.d.). What Is Inc. Ransomware?. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
  15. Cybereason Security Research Team. (2023, November 20). Threat Alert: INC Ransomware. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
  16. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2024, April 15). GOLD IONIC DEPLOYS INC RANSOMWARE. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
  17. Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.
  18. SCILabs. (2021, December 23). Cyber Threat Profile Malteiro. Retrieved March 13, 2024.
  19. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved October 14, 2024.
  20. Mandiant. (2024, March 14). APT43: North Korean Group Uses Cybercrime to Fund Espionage Operations. Retrieved May 3, 2024.
  21. Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
  22. Will Thomas. (2023, September 15). Tracking Adversaries: Akira, another descendent of Conti. Retrieved February 21, 2024.
  23. CISA et al. (2024, April 18). #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware. Retrieved December 10, 2024.
  24. Trellix et. al.. (2023, August 17). Scattered Spider: The Modus Operandi. Retrieved March 18, 2024.
  25. CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.
  26. Giles, Bruce. (2024, January 4). Hackers threaten to send SWAT teams to Fred Hutch patients' homes. Retrieved January 5, 2024.
  27. CISA. (2023, August). Cyber Safety Review Board: Lapsus. Retrieved January 5, 2024.
  28. Adi Zeligson & Rotem Kerner. (2018, November 13). Enter The DarkGate - New Cryptocurrency Mining and Ransomware Campaign. Retrieved February 9, 2024.
  29. Unit42. (2016). SILVERTERRIER: THE RISE OF NIGERIAN BUSINESS EMAIL COMPROMISE. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
  30. Renals, P., Conant, S. (2016). SILVERTERRIER: The Next Evolution in Nigerian Cybercrime. Retrieved November 13, 2018.
  31. CISA. (2023, December 18). #StopRansomware: Play Ransomware AA23-352A. Retrieved September 24, 2024.

Связанные риски

Ничего не найдено

Каталоги

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