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MITRE ATT&CK - Инструмент JHUHUGIT
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JHUHUGIT
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JHUHUGIT

JHUHUGIT is malware used by APT28. It is based on Carberp source code and serves as reconnaissance malware. (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015) (Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1) (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
ID: S0044
Associated Software: Trojan.Sofacy Seduploader JKEYSKW Sednit GAMEFISH SofacyCarberp
Type: MALWARE
Platforms: Windows
Version: 2.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 30 Mar 2020

Associated Software Descriptions
Name Description
Trojan.Sofacy This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group (Skeleton Key) and its associated malware.(Citation: Symantec APT28 Oct 2018)
Seduploader (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
JKEYSKW (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
Sednit This designation has been used in reporting both to refer to the threat group (APT28) and its associated malware.(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
GAMEFISH (Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017)
SofacyCarberp (Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)

Techniques Used
Domain ID Name Use
Enterprise T1071 .001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

JHUHUGIT variants have communicated with C2 servers over HTTP and HTTPS.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)
Enterprise T1547 .001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)
Enterprise T1037 .001 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Logon Script (Windows)

JHUHUGIT has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
Enterprise T1059 .003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

JHUHUGIT uses a .bat file to execute a .dll.(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
Enterprise T1543 .003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a service to establish persistence.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)
Enterprise T1132 .001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding

A JHUHUGIT variant encodes C2 POST data base64.(Citation: Unit 42 Playbook Dec 2017)
Enterprise T1546 .015 Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking

JHUHUGIT has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}).(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)
Enterprise T1070 .004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion

The JHUHUGIT dropper can delete itself from the victim. Another JHUHUGIT variant has the capability to delete specified files.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: Unit 42 Sofacy Feb 2018)
Enterprise T1053 .005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 1)(Citation: ESET Sednit July 2015)
Enterprise T1218 .011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

JHUHUGIT is executed using rundll32.exe.(Citation: F-Secure Sofacy 2015)(Citation: Talos Seduploader Oct 2017)

Groups That Use This Software
ID Name References
G0007 APT28

(Citation: FireEye APT28 January 2017) (Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) (Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018) (Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Oct 2018) (Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)

References

  1. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  2. F-Secure. (2015, September 8). Sofacy Recycles Carberp and Metasploit Code. Retrieved August 3, 2016.
  3. ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 1: Approaching the Target. Retrieved November 8, 2016.
  4. FireEye iSIGHT Intelligence. (2017, January 11). APT28: At the Center of the Storm. Retrieved January 11, 2017.
  5. Symantec Security Response. (2018, October 04). APT28: New Espionage Operations Target Military and Government Organizations. Retrieved November 14, 2018.
  6. Mercer, W., et al. (2017, October 22). "Cyber Conflict" Decoy Document Used in Real Cyber Conflict. Retrieved November 2, 2018.
  7. Lee, B, et al. (2018, February 28). Sofacy Attacks Multiple Government Entities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
  8. Unit 42. (2017, December 15). Unit 42 Playbook Viewer. Retrieved December 20, 2017.
  9. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2018, February 20). A Slice of 2017 Sofacy Activity. Retrieved November 27, 2018.
  10. Brady, S . (2018, October 3). Indictment - United States vs Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, et al.. Retrieved October 1, 2020.
  11. Secureworks CTU. (2017, March 30). IRON TWILIGHT Supports Active Measures. Retrieved February 28, 2022.
  12. ESET Research. (2015, July 10). Sednit APT Group Meets Hacking Team. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
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