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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Remote Access Software
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Remote Access Software
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Remote Access Software

An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.(Citation: Symantec Living off the Land)(Citation: CrowdStrike 2015 Global Threat Report)(Citation: CrySyS Blog TeamSpy) Remote access software may be installed and used post-compromise as an alternate communications channel for redundant access or as a way to establish an interactive remote desktop session with the target system. They may also be used as a component of malware to establish a reverse connection or back-connect to a service or adversary-controlled system. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access. Installation of many remote access software may also include persistence (e.g., the software's installation routine creates a Windows Service). Remote access modules/features may also exist as part of otherwise existing software (e.g., Google Chrome’s Remote Desktop).(Citation: Google Chrome Remote Desktop)(Citation: Chrome Remote Desktop)

ID: T1219
Tactic(s): Command and Control
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation
Version: 2.3
Created: 18 Apr 2018
Last Modified: 12 Apr 2024

Procedure Examples
Name Description
TeamTNT

TeamTNT has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group)
Dridex

Dridex contains a module for VNC.(Citation: Dell Dridex Oct 2015)
RTM

RTM has the capability to download a VNC module from command and control (C2).(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)
Evilnum

EVILNUM has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to run a legitimate TeamViewer application to connect to compromrised machines.(Citation: ESET EvilNum July 2020)
Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda has installed TeamViewer on targeted systems.(Citation: Secureworks BRONZE PRESIDENT December 2019)
FIN7

FIN7 has utilized the remote management tool Atera to download malware to a compromised system.(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022)

During C0018, the threat actors used AnyDesk to transfer tools between systems.(Citation: Cisco Talos Avos Jun 2022)(Citation: Costa AvosLocker May 2022)
Kimsuky

Kimsuky has used a modified TeamViewer client as a command and control channel.(Citation: Securelist Kimsuky Sept 2013)(Citation: Crowdstrike GTR2020 Mar 2020)
Thrip

Thrip used a cloud-based remote access software called LogMeIn for their attacks.(Citation: Symantec Thrip June 2018)
GOLD SOUTHFIELD

GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used the cloud-based remote management and monitoring tool "ConnectWise Control" to deploy REvil.(Citation: Tetra Defense Sodinokibi March 2020)
RTM

RTM has used a modified version of TeamViewer and Remote Utilities for remote access.(Citation: Group IB RTM August 2019)
INC Ransom

INC Ransom has used AnyDesk and PuTTY on compromised systems.(Citation: Huntress INC Ransom Group August 2023)(Citation: SOCRadar INC Ransom January 2024)(Citation: Huntress INC Ransomware May 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne INC Ransomware)
Carbanak

Carbanak has a plugin for VNC and Ammyy Admin Tool.(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)
Scattered Spider

During C0027, Scattered Spider directed victims to run remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.(Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022) In addition to directing victims to run remote software, Scattered Spider members themselves also deploy RMM software including AnyDesk, LogMeIn, and ConnectWise Control to establish persistence on the compromised network.(Citation: CISA Scattered Spider Advisory November 2023)(Citation: Trellix Scattered Spider MO August 2023)
DarkVishnya

DarkVishnya used DameWare Mini Remote Control for lateral movement.(Citation: Securelist DarkVishnya Dec 2018)
TrickBot

TrickBot uses vncDll module to remote control the victim machine.(Citation: ESET Trickbot Oct 2020)(Citation: Bitdefender Trickbot March 2020)
Night Dragon

Night Dragon has used several remote administration tools as persistent infiltration channels.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
Hildegard

Hildegard has established tmate sessions for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)

During C0027, Scattered Spider directed victims to run remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools.(Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022)
Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team has used remote administration tools or remote industrial control system client software for execution and to maliciously release electricity breakers.(Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: Microsoft Prestige ransomware October 2022)
Carbanak

Carbanak used legitimate programs such as AmmyyAdmin and Team Viewer for remote interactive C2 to target systems.(Citation: Group-IB Anunak)

During C0015, the threat actors installed the AnyDesk remote desktop application onto the compromised network.(Citation: DFIR Conti Bazar Nov 2021)

During Night Dragon, threat actors used several remote administration tools as persistent infiltration channels.(Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)
Egregor

Egregor has checked for the LogMein event log in an attempt to encrypt files in remote machines.(Citation: Cyble Egregor Oct 2020)
MuddyWater

MuddyWater has used legitimate applications ScreenConnect, AteraAgent and SimpleHelp to manage systems remotely and move laterally.(Citation: Trend Micro Muddy Water March 2021)(Citation: Anomali Static Kitten February 2021)(Citation: Proofpoint TA450 Phishing March 2024)(Citation: group-ib_muddywater_infra)
Akira

Akira uses legitimate utilities such as AnyDesk and PuTTy for maintaining remote access to victim environments.(Citation: Secureworks GOLD SAHARA)(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)
Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group used the Ammyy Admin tool as well as TeamViewer for remote access, including to preserve remote access if a Cobalt Strike module was lost.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Execution Prevention

Block execution of code on a system through application control, and/or script blocking.
Remote Access Tools Mitigation

Properly configure firewalls, application firewalls, and proxies to limit outgoing traffic to sites and services used by remote access tools. Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to these services as well. Use application whitelisting to mitigate use of and installation of unapproved software.
Filter Network Traffic

Use network appliances to filter ingress or egress traffic and perform protocol-based filtering. Configure software on endpoints to filter network traffic.
Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.

Detection

Monitor for applications and processes related to remote admin tools. Correlate activity with other suspicious behavior that may reduce false positives if these tools are used by legitimate users and administrators. Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. Domain Fronting may be used in conjunction to avoid defenses. Adversaries will likely need to deploy and/or install these remote tools to compromised systems. It may be possible to detect or prevent the installation of these tools with host-based solutions.

References

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  3. Huntress. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.
  4. Google. (n.d.). Retrieved March 14, 2024.
  5. CrySyS Lab. (2013, March 20). TeamSpy – Obshie manevri. Ispolzovat’ tolko s razreshenija S-a. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  6. CrowdStrike Intelligence. (2016). 2015 Global Threat Report. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  7. Darin Smith. (2022, April 21). TeamTNT targeting AWS, Alibaba. Retrieved August 4, 2022.
  8. Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
  9. Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, October 13). Dridex (Bugat v5) Botnet Takeover Operation. Retrieved May 31, 2019.
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  11. Porolli, M. (2020, July 9). More evil: A deep look at Evilnum and its toolset. Retrieved January 22, 2021.
  12. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2019, December 29). BRONZE PRESIDENT Targets NGOs. Retrieved April 13, 2021.
  13. Abdo, B., et al. (2022, April 4). FIN7 Power Hour: Adversary Archaeology and the Evolution of FIN7. Retrieved April 5, 2022.
  14. Venere, G. Neal, C. (2022, June 21). Avos ransomware group expands with new attack arsenal. Retrieved January 11, 2023.
  15. Costa, F. (2022, May 1). RaaS AvosLocker Incident Response Analysis. Retrieved January 11, 2023.
  16. Crowdstrike. (2020, March 2). 2020 Global Threat Report. Retrieved December 11, 2020.
  17. Tarakanov , D.. (2013, September 11). The “Kimsuky” Operation: A North Korean APT?. Retrieved August 13, 2019.
  18. Security Response Attack Investigation Team. (2018, June 19). Thrip: Espionage Group Hits Satellite, Telecoms, and Defense Companies. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
  19. Tetra Defense. (2020, March). CAUSE AND EFFECT: SODINOKIBI RANSOMWARE ANALYSIS. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
  20. Skulkin, O. (2019, August 5). Following the RTM Forensic examination of a computer infected with a banking trojan. Retrieved May 11, 2020.
  21. Team Huntress. (2023, August 11). Investigating New INC Ransom Group Activity. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
  22. SOCRadar. (2024, January 24). Dark Web Profile: INC Ransom. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
  23. SentinelOne. (n.d.). What Is Inc. Ransomware?. Retrieved June 5, 2024.
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  28. CISA. (2023, November 16). Cybersecurity Advisory: Scattered Spider (AA23-320A). Retrieved March 18, 2024.
  29. Golovanov, S. (2018, December 6). DarkVishnya: Banks attacked through direct connection to local network. Retrieved May 15, 2020.
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  32. US-CERT. (2016, February 25). ICS Alert (IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01) Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure. Retrieved June 10, 2020.
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  34. Group-IB and Fox-IT. (2014, December). Anunak: APT against financial institutions. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
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  37. Cybleinc. (2020, October 31). Egregor Ransomware – A Deep Dive Into Its Activities and Techniques. Retrieved December 29, 2020.
  38. Rostovcev, N. (2023, April 18). SimpleHarm: Tracking MuddyWater’s infrastructure. Retrieved July 11, 2024.
  39. Peretz, A. and Theck, E. (2021, March 5). Earth Vetala – MuddyWater Continues to Target Organizations in the Middle East. Retrieved March 18, 2021.
  40. Miller, J. et al. (2024, March 21). Security Brief: TA450 Uses Embedded Links in PDF Attachments in Latest Campaign. Retrieved March 27, 2024.
  41. Mele, G. et al. (2021, February 10). Probable Iranian Cyber Actors, Static Kitten, Conducting Cyberespionage Campaign Targeting UAE and Kuwait Government Agencies. Retrieved March 17, 2021.
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  43. Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SAHARA. Retrieved February 20, 2024.
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  46. Positive Technologies. (2017, August 16). Cobalt Strikes Back: An Evolving Multinational Threat to Finance. Retrieved September 5, 2018.
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