Data from Removable Media
Adversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.
Procedure Examples |
|
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| USBStealer |
Once a removable media device is inserted back into the first victim, USBStealer collects data from it that was exfiltrated from a second victim.(Citation: ESET Sednit USBStealer 2014)(Citation: Kaspersky Sofacy) |
| InvisiMole |
InvisiMole can collect jpeg files from connected MTP devices.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020) |
| Aria-body |
Aria-body has the ability to collect data from USB devices.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020) |
| Explosive |
Explosive can scan all .exe files located in the USB drive.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015) |
| GravityRAT |
GravityRAT steals files based on an extension list if a USB drive is connected to the system.(Citation: Talos GravityRAT) |
| Rover |
Rover searches for files on attached removable drives based on a predefined list of file extensions every five seconds.(Citation: Palo Alto Rover) |
| Gamaredon Group |
A Gamaredon Group file stealer has the capability to steal data from newly connected logical volumes on a system, including USB drives.(Citation: Palo Alto Gamaredon Feb 2017)(Citation: ESET Gamaredon June 2020) |
| APT28 |
An APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device.(Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 19) |
| Machete |
Machete had a module in its malware to find, encrypt, and upload files from fixed and removable drives.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017) |
| Remsec |
Remsec has a package that collects documents from any inserted USB sticks.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Technical Analysis) |
| BADNEWS |
BADNEWS copies files with certain extensions from USB devices to a predefined directory.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017) |
| Prikormka |
Prikormka contains a module that collects documents with certain extensions from removable media or fixed drives connected via USB.(Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait) |
| Crutch |
Crutch can monitor removable drives and exfiltrate files matching a given extension list.(Citation: ESET Crutch December 2020) |
| Crimson |
Crimson contains a module to collect data from removable drives.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe August 2020) |
| Machete |
Machete can find, encrypt, and upload files from fixed and removable drives.(Citation: Cylance Machete Mar 2017)(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019) |
| ObliqueRAT |
ObliqueRAT has the ability to extract data from removable devices connected to the endpoint.(Citation: Talos Oblique RAT March 2021) |
| Turla |
Turla RPC backdoors can collect files from USB thumb drives.(Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)(Citation: Symantec Waterbug Jun 2019) |
| TajMahal |
TajMahal has the ability to steal written CD images and files of interest from previously connected removable drives when they become available again.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019) |
| FLASHFLOOD |
FLASHFLOOD searches for interesting files (either a default or customized set of file extensions) on removable media and copies them to a staging area. The default file types copied would include data copied to the drive by SPACESHIP.(Citation: FireEye APT30) |
| AppleSeed |
AppleSeed can find and collect data from removable media devices.(Citation: Malwarebytes Kimsuky June 2021)(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi) |
| FunnyDream |
The FunnyDream FilePakMonitor component has the ability to collect files from removable devices.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020) |
| Ramsay |
Ramsay can collect data from removable media and stage it for exfiltration.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020) |
| CosmicDuke |
CosmicDuke steals user files from removable media with file extensions and keywords that match a predefined list.(Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke) |
Mitigations |
|
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Data from Removable Media Mitigation |
Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to collect data from removable media, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP) |
| Data Loss Prevention |
Use a data loss prevention (DLP) strategy to categorize sensitive data, identify data formats indicative of personal identifiable information (PII), and restrict exfiltration of sensitive data.(Citation: PurpleSec Data Loss Prevention) |
Detection
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
References
- The Cylance Threat Research Team. (2017, March 22). El Machete's Malware Attacks Cut Through LATAM. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
- Threat Intelligence and Research. (2015, March 30). VOLATILE CEDAR. Retrieved February 8, 2021.
- Symantec DeepSight Adversary Intelligence Team. (2019, June 20). Waterbug: Espionage Group Rolls Out Brand-New Toolset in Attacks Against Governments. Retrieved July 8, 2019.
- Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.
- ESET. (2019, July). MACHETE JUST GOT SHARPER Venezuelan government institutions under attack. Retrieved September 13, 2019.
- Lunghi, D., et al. (2017, December). Untangling the Patchwork Cyberespionage Group. Retrieved July 10, 2018.
- Mercer, W., Rascagneres, P. (2018, April 26). GravityRAT - The Two-Year Evolution Of An APT Targeting India. Retrieved May 16, 2018.
- Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
- Dedola, G. (2020, August 20). Transparent Tribe: Evolution analysis, part 1. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
- Huss, D. (2016, March 1). Operation Transparent Tribe. Retrieved June 8, 2016.
- CheckPoint. (2020, May 7). Naikon APT: Cyber Espionage Reloaded. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- KISA. (n.d.). Phishing Target Reconnaissance and Attack Resource Analysis Operation Muzabi. Retrieved March 7, 2022.
- Jazi, H. (2021, June 1). Kimsuky APT continues to target South Korean government using AppleSeed backdoor. Retrieved June 10, 2021.
- Sanmillan, I.. (2020, May 13). Ramsay: A cyber‑espionage toolkit tailored for air‑gapped networks. Retrieved May 27, 2020.
- F-Secure Labs. (2014, July). COSMICDUKE Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke. Retrieved July 3, 2014.
- Cherepanov, A.. (2016, May 17). Operation Groundbait: Analysis of a surveillance toolkit. Retrieved May 18, 2016.
- FireEye Labs. (2015, April). APT30 AND THE MECHANICS OF A LONG-RUNNING CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATION. Retrieved May 1, 2015.
- Malhotra, A. (2021, March 2). ObliqueRAT returns with new campaign using hijacked websites. Retrieved September 2, 2021.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2015, December 4). Sofacy APT hits high profile targets with updated toolset. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
- Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
- Ray, V., Hayashi, K. (2016, February 29). New Malware ‘Rover’ Targets Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan. Retrieved February 29, 2016.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
- Boutin, J. (2020, June 11). Gamaredon group grows its game. Retrieved June 16, 2020.
- Kasza, A. and Reichel, D. (2017, February 27). The Gamaredon Group Toolset Evolution. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Hromcova, Z. and Cherpanov, A. (2020, June). INVISIMOLE: THE HIDDEN PART OF THE STORY. Retrieved July 16, 2020.
- Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.
- Faou, M. (2020, December 2). Turla Crutch: Keeping the “back door” open. Retrieved December 4, 2020.
- GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019.
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