Application Layer Protocol
Sub-techniques (4)
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server. Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.
Procedure Examples |
|
| Name | Description |
|---|---|
| Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike conducts peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual) |
| Hildegard |
Hildegard has used an IRC channel for C2 communications.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) |
| Magic Hound |
Magic Hound malware has used IRC for C2.(Citation: Unit 42 Magic Hound Feb 2017) |
| NETEAGLE |
Adversaries can also use NETEAGLE to establish an RDP connection with a controller over TCP/7519. |
| Rocke |
Rocke issued wget requests from infected systems to the C2.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018) |
| Regin |
The Regin malware platform supports many standard protocols, including SMB.(Citation: Kaspersky Regin) |
| Siloscape |
Siloscape connects to an IRC server for C2.(Citation: Unit 42 Siloscape Jun 2021) |
| Dragonfly 2.0 |
Dragonfly 2.0 used SMB for C2.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) |
| Duqu |
Duqu uses a custom command and control protocol that communicates over commonly used ports, and is frequently encapsulated by application layer protocols.(Citation: Symantec W32.Duqu) |
| Clambling |
Clambling has the ability to use Telnet for communication.(Citation: Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020) |
| Dragonfly |
Dragonfly has used SMB for C2.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) |
| Lucifer |
Lucifer can use the Stratum protocol on port 10001 for communication between the cryptojacking bot and the mining server.(Citation: Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020) |
| TeamTNT |
TeamTNT has used an IRC bot for C2 communications.(Citation: Trend Micro TeamTNT) |
| Cobalt Strike |
Cobalt Strike can conduct peer-to-peer communication over Windows named pipes encapsulated in the SMB protocol. All protocols use their standard assigned ports.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Talos Cobalt Strike September 2020) |
Mitigations |
|
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Network Intrusion Prevention |
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries. |
Detection
Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
References
- Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
- US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
- Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.
- Hsu, K. et al. (2020, June 24). Lucifer: New Cryptojacking and DDoS Hybrid Malware Exploiting High and Critical Vulnerabilities to Infect Windows Devices. Retrieved November 16, 2020.
- Liebenberg, D.. (2018, August 30). Rocke: The Champion of Monero Miners. Retrieved May 26, 2020.
- Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
- Prizmant, D. (2021, June 7). Siloscape: First Known Malware Targeting Windows Containers to Compromise Cloud Environments. Retrieved June 9, 2021.
- Symantec Security Response. (2011, November). W32.Duqu: The precursor to the next Stuxnet. Retrieved September 17, 2015.
- Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2014, November 24). THE REGIN PLATFORM NATION-STATE OWNAGE OF GSM NETWORKS. Retrieved December 1, 2014.
- Mavis, N. (2020, September 21). The Art and Science of Detecting Cobalt Strike. Retrieved April 6, 2021.
- Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
- Lee, B. and Falcone, R. (2017, February 15). Magic Hound Campaign Attacks Saudi Targets. Retrieved December 27, 2017.
- Fiser, D. Oliveira, A. (n.d.). Tracking the Activities of TeamTNT A Closer Look at a Cloud-Focused Malicious Actor Group. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
Связанные риски
Каталоги
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