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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Domain Trust Discovery
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Domain Trust Discovery
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Domain Trust Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain.(Citation: Microsoft Trusts) Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting.(Citation: AdSecurity Forging Trust Tickets)(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.(Citation: Microsoft Operation Wilysupply)

ID: T1482
Tactic(s): Discovery
Platforms: Windows
Data Sources: Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Version: 1.2
Created: 14 Feb 2019
Last Modified: 15 Apr 2025

Procedure Examples
Name Description
TrickBot

TrickBot can gather information about domain trusts by utilizing Nltest.(Citation: Fortinet TrickBot)(Citation: Cyberreason Anchor December 2019)
Pikabot

Pikabot will gather information concerning the Windows Domain the victim machine is a member of during execution.(Citation: Elastic Pikabot 2024)
BloodHound

BloodHound has the ability to map domain trusts and identify misconfigurations for potential abuse.(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)
PowerSploit

PowerSploit has modules such as Get-NetDomainTrust and Get-NetForestTrust to enumerate domain and forest trusts.(Citation: GitHub PowerSploit May 2012)(Citation: PowerSploit Documentation)
DUSTTRAP

DUSTTRAP can identify Active Directory information and related items.(Citation: Google Cloud APT41 2024)
Empire

Empire has modules for enumerating domain trusts.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
BADHATCH

BADHATCH can use `nltest.exe /domain_trusts` to discover domain trust relationships on a compromised machine.(Citation: BitDefender BADHATCH Mar 2021)
dsquery

dsquery can be used to gather information on domain trusts with dsquery * -filter "(objectClass=trustedDomain)" -attr *.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts)
PoshC2

PoshC2 has modules for enumerating domain trusts.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2)
IcedID

IcedID used Nltest during initial discovery.(Citation: DFIR_Sodinokibi_Ransomware)(Citation: DFIR_Quantum_Ransomware)
SocGholish

SocGholish can profile compromised systems to identify domain trust relationships.(Citation: SocGholish-update)(Citation: Red Canary SocGholish March 2024)
Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 can use LDAP queries and `nltest /domain_trusts` for domain trust discovery.(Citation: Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022)(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022)
Latrodectus

Latrodectus can run `C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c nltest /domain_trusts` to discover domain trusts.(Citation: Elastic Latrodectus May 2024)(Citation: Bitsight Latrodectus June 2024)
Nltest

Nltest may be used to enumerate trusted domains by using commands such as nltest /domain_trusts.(Citation: Nltest Manual)(Citation: Fortinet TrickBot)
Bazar

Bazar can use Nltest tools to obtain information about the domain.(Citation: Cybereason Bazar July 2020)(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)
MgBot

MgBot includes modules for collecting information on local domain users and permissions.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2023)
Rubeus

Rubeus can gather information about domain trusts.(Citation: DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020)(Citation: DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020)
QakBot

QakBot can run nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts for domain trust discovery.(Citation: Kaspersky QakBot September 2021)
AdFind

AdFind can gather information about organizational units (OUs) and domain trusts from Active Directory.(Citation: Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)(Citation: Symantec Bumblebee June 2022)
APT29

APT29 used the Get-AcceptedDomain PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate accepted domains through an Exchange Management Shell.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) They also used AdFind to enumerate domains and to discover trust between federated domains.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)(Citation: CrowdStrike StellarParticle January 2022)
BlackByte

BlackByte enumerated Active Directory information and trust relationships during operations.(Citation: FBI BlackByte 2022)(Citation: Microsoft BlackByte 2023)
Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has used AdFind.exe to collect information about Active Directory organizational units and trust objects.(Citation: FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019)
Chimera

Chimera has nltest /domain_trusts to identify domain trust relationships.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used a web shell to execute `nltest /trusted_domains` to identify trust relationships.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)
Storm-1811

Storm-1811 has enumerated domain accounts and access during intrusions.(Citation: Microsoft Storm-1811 2024)
Akira

Akira uses the built-in Nltest utility or tools such as AdFind to enumerate Active Directory trusts in victim environments.(Citation: Arctic Wolf Akira 2023)

Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has used Nltest to obtain information about domain controllers.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)
Lotus Blossom

Lotus Blossom has used tools such as AdFind to make Active Directory queries.(Citation: Symantec Bilbug 2022)
UNC2452

UNC2452 used the Get-AcceptedDomain PowerShell cmdlet to enumerate accepted domains through an Exchange Management Shell.(Citation: Volexity SolarWinds) They also used AdFind to enumerate domains and to discover trust between federated domains.(Citation: Microsoft Deep Dive Solorigate January 2021)
FIN8

FIN8 has retrieved a list of trusted domains by using nltest.exe /domain_trusts.(Citation: Bitdefender FIN8 July 2021)

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures. Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: System Audit: - Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks. Permission Audits: - Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions. Software Audits: - Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives. Configuration Audits: - Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems. Network Audits: - Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.
Network Segmentation

Network segmentation involves dividing a network into smaller, isolated segments to control and limit the flow of traffic between devices, systems, and applications. By segmenting networks, organizations can reduce the attack surface, restrict lateral movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets from compromise. Effective network segmentation leverages a combination of physical boundaries, logical separation through VLANs, and access control policies enforced by network appliances like firewalls, routers, and cloud-based configurations. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Segment Critical Systems: - Identify and group systems based on their function, sensitivity, and risk. Examples include payment systems, HR databases, production systems, and internet-facing servers. - Use VLANs, firewalls, or routers to enforce logical separation. Implement DMZ for Public-Facing Services: - Host web servers, DNS servers, and email servers in a DMZ to limit their access to internal systems. - Apply strict firewall rules to filter traffic between the DMZ and internal networks. Use Cloud-Based Segmentation: - In cloud environments, use VPCs, subnets, and security groups to isolate applications and enforce traffic rules. - Apply AWS Transit Gateway or Azure VNet peering for controlled connectivity between cloud segments. Apply Microsegmentation for Workloads: - Use software-defined networking (SDN) tools to implement workload-level segmentation and prevent lateral movement. Restrict Traffic with ACLs and Firewalls: - Apply Access Control Lists (ACLs) to network devices to enforce "deny by default" policies. - Use firewalls to restrict both north-south (external-internal) and east-west (internal-internal) traffic. Monitor and Audit Segmented Networks: - Regularly review firewall rules, ACLs, and segmentation policies. - Monitor network flows for anomalies to ensure segmentation is effective. Test Segmentation Effectiveness: - Perform periodic penetration tests to verify that unauthorized access is blocked between network segments.
Domain Trust Discovery Mitigation

Map the trusts within existing domains/forests and keep trust relationships to a minimum. Employ network segmentation for sensitive domains.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts)

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information, such as `nltest /domain_trusts`. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Look for the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call to spot activity associated with Domain Trust Discovery.(Citation: Harmj0y Domain Trusts) Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as PowerShell. The .NET method `GetAllTrustRelationships()` can be an indicator of Domain Trust Discovery.(Citation: Microsoft GetAllTrustRelationships)

References

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Связанные риски

КЦД
STRIDE
Иное
Риск Связи
Раскрытие информации об ИТ инфраструктуре из-за возможности обнаружения или добавления доверительных отношений между доменами в доменных службах Active Directory
Конфиденциальность Раскрытие информации
Повышение привилегий в ОС из-за возможности обнаружения или добавления доверительных отношений между доменами microsoft Azure
Повышение привилегий Целостность
Повышение привилегий в ОС из-за возможности обнаружения или добавления доверительных отношений между доменами в доменных службах Active Directory
Повышение привилегий Целостность

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