Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
 
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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Archive Collected Data
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MITRE ATT&CK
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Archive Collected Data
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SECURITM это SGRC система, ? автоматизирующая процессы в службах информационной безопасности. SECURITM помогает построить и управлять ИСПДн, КИИ, ГИС, СМИБ/СУИБ, банковскими системами защиты.
А еще SECURITM это место для обмена опытом и наработками для служб безопасности.
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Archive Collected Data

ID Name
.001 Archive via Utility
.002 Archive via Library
.003 Archive via Custom Method

An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.

ID: T1560
Sub-techniques:  .001 .002 .003
Tactic(s): Collection
Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
Data Sources: Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution
Version: 1.0
Created: 20 Feb 2020
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2024

Procedure Examples
Name Description
Dragonfly

Dragonfly has compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltration.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
Chrommme

Chrommme can encrypt and store on disk collected data before exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)
Patchwork

Patchwork encrypted the collected files' path with AES and then encoded them with base64.(Citation: TrendMicro Patchwork Dec 2017)
Emotet

Emotet has been observed encrypting the data it collects before sending it to the C2 server. (Citation: Fortinet Emotet May 2017)
Exaramel for Windows

Exaramel for Windows automatically encrypts files before sending them to the C2 server.(Citation: ESET TeleBots Oct 2018)

Honeybee

Honeybee adds collected files to a temp.zip file saved in the %temp% folder, then base64 encodes it and uploads it to control server.(Citation: McAfee Honeybee)
TAINTEDSCRIBE

TAINTEDSCRIBE has used FileReadZipSend to compress a file and send to C2.(Citation: CISA MAR-10288834-2.v1 TAINTEDSCRIBE MAY 2020)
Axiom

Axiom has compressed and encrypted data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)
LoFiSe

LoFiSe can collect files into password-protected ZIP-archives for exfiltration.(Citation: Kaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023)
BloodHound

BloodHound can compress data collected by its SharpHound ingestor into a ZIP file to be written to disk.(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound)(Citation: Trend Micro Black Basta October 2022)
ADVSTORESHELL

ADVSTORESHELL encrypts with the 3DES algorithm and a hardcoded key prior to exfiltration.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
Ember Bear

Ember Bear has compressed collected data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)
Empire

Empire can ZIP directories on the target system.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
Bumblebee

Bumblebee can compress data stolen from the Registry and volume shadow copies prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason Bumblebee August 2022)
WellMail

WellMail can archive files on the compromised host.(Citation: CISA WellMail July 2020)
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. (Citation: Novetta Blockbuster Loaders)(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster RATs)(Citation: McAfee Lazarus Resurfaces Feb 2018)
Cadelspy

Cadelspy has the ability to compress stolen data into a .cab file.(Citation: Symantec Chafer Dec 2015)
Spica

Spica can archive collected documents for exfiltration.(Citation: Google TAG COLDRIVER January 2024)
LightNeuron

LightNeuron contains a function to encrypt and store emails that it collects.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019)
APT28

APT28 used a publicly available tool to gather and compress multiple documents on the DCCC and DNC networks.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018)
VERMIN

VERMIN encrypts the collected files using 3-DES.(Citation: Unit 42 VERMIN Jan 2018)
Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 compressed data into .zip files prior to exfiltrating it.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
ShimRatReporter

ShimRatReporter used LZ compression to compress initial reconnaissance reports before sending to the C2.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)

APT32

APT32's backdoor has used LZMA compression and RC4 encryption before exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus Mar 2019)
XCSSET

XCSSET will compress entire ~/Desktop folders excluding all .git folders, but only if the total data size is under 200MB.(Citation: trendmicro xcsset xcode project 2020)
Gold Dragon

Gold Dragon encrypts data using Base64 before being sent to the command and control server.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)
KONNI

KONNI has encrypted data and files prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Malwarebytes Konni Aug 2021)
Raccoon Stealer

Raccoon Stealer archives collected system information in a text f ile, `System info.txt`, prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Sekoia Raccoon2 2022)
NETWIRE

NETWIRE has the ability to compress archived screenshots.(Citation: Red Canary NETWIRE January 2020)
PowerLess

PowerLess can encrypt browser database files prior to exfiltration.(Citation: Cybereason PowerLess February 2022)
Epic

Epic encrypts collected data using a public key framework before sending it over the C2 channel.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla) Some variants encrypt the collected data with AES and encode it with base64 before transmitting it to the C2 server.(Citation: Kaspersky Turla Aug 2014)
Kessel

Kessel can RC4-encrypt credentials before sending to the C2.(Citation: ESET ForSSHe December 2018)

Zebrocy

Zebrocy has used a method similar to RC4 as well as AES for encryption and hexadecimal for encoding data before exfiltration. (Citation: Securelist Sofacy Feb 2018)(Citation: ESET Zebrocy Nov 2018)(Citation: CISA Zebrocy Oct 2020)

FIN6

Following data collection, FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)
Lurid

Lurid can compress data before sending it.(Citation: Villeneuve 2011)
AppleSeed

AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration.(Citation: KISA Operation Muzabi)
LuminousMoth

LuminousMoth has manually archived stolen files from victim machines before exfiltration.(Citation: Bitdefender LuminousMoth July 2021)
Backdoor.Oldrea

Backdoor.Oldrea writes collected data to a temporary file in an encrypted form before exfiltration to a C2 server.(Citation: Symantec Dragonfly)
BLUELIGHT

BLUELIGHT can zip files before exfiltration.(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)
FELIXROOT

FELIXROOT encrypts collected data with AES and Base64 and then sends it to the C2 server.(Citation: FireEye FELIXROOT July 2018)
Ke3chang

The Ke3chang group has been known to compress data before exfiltration.(Citation: Mandiant Operation Ke3chang November 2014)
Remexi

Remexi encrypts and adds all gathered browser data into files for upload to C2.(Citation: Securelist Remexi Jan 2019)
RunningRAT

RunningRAT contains code to compress files.(Citation: McAfee Gold Dragon)
Machete

Machete stores zipped files with profile data from installed web browsers.(Citation: ESET Machete July 2019)

Agent Tesla

Agent Tesla can encrypt data with 3DES before sending it over to a C2 server.(Citation: Talos Agent Tesla Oct 2018)
Dtrack

Dtrack packs collected data into a password protected archive.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack)
menuPass

menuPass has encrypted files and information before exfiltration.(Citation: DOJ APT10 Dec 2018)(Citation: District Court of NY APT10 Indictment December 2018)
Daserf

Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives.(Citation: Symantec Tick Apr 2016)
Leviathan

Leviathan has archived victim's data prior to exfiltration.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)
Proton

Proton zips up files before exfiltrating them.(Citation: objsee mac malware 2017)
Pillowmint

Pillowmint has encrypted stolen credit card information with AES and further encoded it with Base64.(Citation: Trustwave Pillowmint June 2020)

Aria-body

Aria-body has used ZIP to compress data gathered on a compromised host.(Citation: CheckPoint Naikon May 2020)
Prikormka

After collecting documents from removable media, Prikormka compresses the collected files, and encrypts it with Blowfish.(Citation: ESET Operation Groundbait)
Lizar

Lizar has encrypted data before sending it to the server.(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Audit

Perform audits or scans of systems, permissions, insecure software, insecure configurations, etc. to identify potential weaknesses.

Detection

Archival software and archived files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)

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