Cервис управления информационной безопасностью
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MITRE ATT&CK - Technique Network Service Discovery
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Network Service Discovery
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Network Service Discovery

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021) Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well. Within macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host’s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as dns-sd -B _ssh._tcp .) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.(Citation: apple doco bonjour description)(Citation: macOS APT Activity Bradley)

ID: T1046
Tactic(s): Discovery
Platforms: Containers, IaaS, Linux, macOS, Network, Windows
Data Sources: Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration, Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow
Version: 3.1
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 11 Aug 2023

Procedure Examples
Name Description
Pupy

Pupy has a built-in module for port scanning.(Citation: GitHub Pupy)
Volt Typhoon

Volt Typhoon has used commercial tools, LOTL utilities, and appliances already present on the system for network service discovery.(Citation: CISA AA24-038A PRC Critical Infrastructure February 2024)
APT39

APT39 has used CrackMapExec and a custom port scanner known as BLUETORCH for network scanning.(Citation: FireEye APT39 Jan 2019)(Citation: BitDefender Chafer May 2020)

During CostaRicto, the threat actors employed nmap and pscan to scan target environments.(Citation: BlackBerry CostaRicto November 2020)

BlackTech

BlackTech has used the SNScan tool to find other potential targets on victim networks.(Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)
menuPass

menuPass has used tcping.exe, similar to Ping, to probe port status on systems of interest.(Citation: PWC Cloud Hopper Technical Annex April 2017)
Backdoor.Oldrea

Backdoor.Oldrea can use a network scanning module to identify ICS-related ports.(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)
Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)
Industroyer

Industroyer uses a custom port scanner to map out a network.(Citation: ESET Industroyer)
Empire

Empire can perform port scans from an infected host.(Citation: Github PowerShell Empire)
Agrius

Agrius used the open-source port scanner WinEggDrop to perform detailed scans of hosts of interest in victim networks.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023)
FIN13

FIN13 has utilized `nmap` for reconnaissance efforts. FIN13 has also scanned for internal MS-SQL servers in a compromised network.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022)
Ramsay

Ramsay can scan for systems that are vulnerable to the EternalBlue exploit.(Citation: Eset Ramsay May 2020)(Citation: Antiy CERT Ramsay April 2020)

Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao has scanned for open ports and used nbtscan to find NETBIOS nameservers.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)

During HomeLand Justice, threat actors executed the Advanced Port Scanner tool on compromised systems.(Citation: CISA Iran Albanian Attacks September 2022)(Citation: Microsoft Albanian Government Attacks September 2022)
DarkVishnya

DarkVishnya performed port scanning to obtain the list of active services.(Citation: Securelist DarkVishnya Dec 2018)
OilRig

OilRig has used the publicly available tool SoftPerfect Network Scanner as well as a custom tool called GOLDIRONY to conduct network scanning.(Citation: FireEye APT34 Webinar Dec 2017)
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.(Citation: Kaspersky ThreatNeedle Feb 2021)
Leafminer

Leafminer scanned network services to search for vulnerabilities in the victim system.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)
Royal

Royal can scan the network interfaces of targeted systems.(Citation: Cybereason Royal December 2022)
SpeakUp

SpeakUp checks for availability of specific ports on servers.(Citation: CheckPoint SpeakUp Feb 2019)
BlackEnergy

BlackEnergy has conducted port scans on a host.(Citation: Securelist BlackEnergy Nov 2014)
Hildegard

Hildegard has used masscan to look for kubelets in the internal Kubernetes network.(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)
Tropic Trooper

Tropic Trooper used pr and an openly available tool to scan for open ports on target systems.(Citation: TrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)
Naikon

Naikon has used the LadonGo scanner to scan target networks.(Citation: Bitdefender Naikon April 2021)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has used KPortScan 3.0 to perform SMB, RDP, and LDAP scanning.(Citation: DFIR Phosphorus November 2021)
Rocke

Rocke conducted scanning for exposed TCP port 7001 as well as SSH and Redis servers.(Citation: Talos Rocke August 2018)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019)

During C0027, used RustScan to scan for open ports on targeted ESXi appliances.(Citation: Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022)
NBTscan

NBTscan can be used to scan IP networks.(Citation: Debian nbtscan Nov 2019)(Citation: SecTools nbtscan June 2003)
APT32

APT32 performed network scanning on the network to search for open ports, services, OS finger-printing, and other vulnerabilities.(Citation: Cybereason Cobalt Kitty 2017)
INC Ransom

INC Ransom has used NETSCAN.EXE for internal reconnaissance.(Citation: SOCRadar INC Ransom January 2024)(Citation: SentinelOne INC Ransomware)
Peirates

Peirates can initiate a port scan against a given IP address.(Citation: Peirates GitHub)
BADHATCH

BADHATCH can check for open ports on a computer by establishing a TCP connection.(Citation: BitDefender BADHATCH Mar 2021)
ZxShell

ZxShell can launch port scans.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)(Citation: Talos ZxShell Oct 2014)

Koadic

Koadic can scan for open TCP ports on the target network.(Citation: Github Koadic)
China Chopper

China Chopper's server component can spider authentication portals.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)

During C0018, the threat actors used the SoftPerfect Network Scanner for network scanning.(Citation: Cisco Talos Avos Jun 2022)
FRP

As part of load balancing FRP can set `healthCheck.type = "tcp"` or `healthCheck.type = "http"` to check service status on specific hosts with TCPing or an HTTP request.(Citation: FRP GitHub)
Chimera

Chimera has used the get -b -e -p command for network scanning as well as a custom Python tool packed into a Windows executable named Get.exe to scan IP ranges for HTTP.(Citation: NCC Group Chimera January 2021)
SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY can scan for open ports on a compromised machine.(Citation: GitHub SILENTTRINITY Modules July 2019)
APT41

APT41 used a malware variant called WIDETONE to conduct port scans on specified subnets.(Citation: FireEye APT41 Aug 2019)
Xbash

Xbash can perform port scanning of TCP and UDP ports.(Citation: Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can perform port scans from an infected host.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)(Citation: Talos Cobalt Strike September 2020)(Citation: Cobalt Strike Manual 4.3 November 2020)
Suckfly

Suckfly the victim's internal network for hosts with ports 8080, 5900, and 40 open.(Citation: Symantec Suckfly May 2016)
Brute Ratel C4

Brute Ratel C4 can conduct port scanning against targeted systems.(Citation: Palo Alto Brute Ratel July 2022)
P.A.S. Webshell

P.A.S. Webshell can scan networks for open ports and listening services.(Citation: ANSSI Sandworm January 2021)
XTunnel

XTunnel is capable of probing the network for open ports.(Citation: Invincea XTunnel)
HermeticWizard

HermeticWizard has the ability to scan ports on a compromised network.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022)
FIN6

FIN6 used publicly available tools (including Microsoft's built-in SQL querying tool, osql.exe) to map the internal network and conduct reconnaissance against Active Directory, Structured Query Language (SQL) servers, and NetBIOS.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)
TeamTNT

TeamTNT has used masscan to search for open Docker API ports and Kubernetes clusters.(Citation: Cado Security TeamTNT Worm August 2020)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)(Citation: Cisco Talos Intelligence Group) TeamTNT has also used malware that utilizes zmap and zgrab to search for vulnerable services in cloud environments.(Citation: Palo Alto Black-T October 2020)
MgBot

MgBot includes modules for performing HTTP and server service scans.(Citation: Symantec Daggerfly 2023)

During Operation Wocao, threat actors scanned for open ports and used nbtscan to find NETBIOS nameservers.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)
BackdoorDiplomacy

BackdoorDiplomacy has used SMBTouch, a vulnerability scanner, to determine whether a target is vulnerable to EternalBlue malware.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Conficker

Conficker scans for other machines to infect.(Citation: SANS Conficker)
HDoor

HDoor scans to identify open ports on the victim.(Citation: Baumgartner Naikon 2015)
MURKYTOP

MURKYTOP has the capability to scan for open ports on hosts in a connected network.(Citation: FireEye Periscope March 2018)
Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten has used tools including NMAP to conduct broad scanning to identify open ports.(Citation: CISA AA20-259A Iran-Based Actor September 2020)(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)
InvisiMole

InvisiMole can scan the network for open ports and vulnerable instances of RDP and SMB protocols.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can perform port scans from an infected host.(Citation: cobaltstrike manual)
PoshC2

PoshC2 can perform port scans from an infected host.(Citation: GitHub PoshC2)
Remsec

Remsec has a plugin that can perform ARP scanning as well as port scanning.(Citation: Kaspersky ProjectSauron Technical Analysis)
Lucifer

Lucifer can scan for open ports including TCP ports 135 and 1433.(Citation: Unit 42 Lucifer June 2020)
Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group leveraged an open-source tool called SoftPerfect Network Scanner to perform network scanning.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Group Aug 2017)(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016)(Citation: Group IB Cobalt Aug 2017)
Caterpillar WebShell

Caterpillar WebShell has a module to use a port scanner on a system.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)

RedCurl

RedCurl has used netstat to check if port 4119 is open.(Citation: trendmicro_redcurl)

Pysa

Pysa can perform network reconnaissance using the Advanced Port Scanner tool.(Citation: CERT-FR PYSA April 2020)
Ember Bear

Ember Bear has used tools such as NMAP for remote system discovery and enumeration in victim environments.(Citation: CISA GRU29155 2024)

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Remove or deny access to unnecessary and potentially vulnerable software to prevent abuse by adversaries.
Network Service Scanning Mitigation

Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed and proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices. Identify unnecessary system utilities or potentially malicious software that may be used to acquire information about services running on remote systems, and audit and/or block them by using whitelisting (Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker, (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) (Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies (Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate. (Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP)
Network Intrusion Prevention

Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
Network Segmentation

Architect sections of the network to isolate critical systems, functions, or resources. Use physical and logical segmentation to prevent access to potentially sensitive systems and information. Use a DMZ to contain any internet-facing services that should not be exposed from the internal network. Configure separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances to isolate critical cloud systems.

Detection

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.

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