Data Destruction
Sub-techniques (1)
ID | Name |
---|---|
.001 | Lifecycle-Triggered Deletion |
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018) Common operating system file deletion commands such as del
and rm
often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure.
Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data.(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)
To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018).
In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage objects, machine images, database instances, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.(Citation: Data Destruction - Threat Post)(Citation: DOJ - Cisco Insider) Similarly, they may delete virtual machines from on-prem virtualized environments.
Procedure Examples |
|
Name | Description |
---|---|
Diavol |
Diavol can delete specified files from a targeted system.(Citation: Fortinet Diavol July 2021) |
WhisperGate |
WhisperGate can corrupt files by overwriting the first 1 MB with `0xcc` and appending random extensions.(Citation: Microsoft WhisperGate January 2022)(Citation: Crowdstrike WhisperGate January 2022)(Citation: Cybereason WhisperGate February 2022)(Citation: Unit 42 WhisperGate January 2022)(Citation: Cisco Ukraine Wipers January 2022)(Citation: Medium S2W WhisperGate January 2022) |
Industroyer |
Industroyer’s data wiper module clears registry keys and overwrites both ICS configuration and Windows files.(Citation: Dragos Crashoverride 2017) |
LAPSUS$ |
LAPSUS$ has deleted the target's systems and resources both on-premises and in the cloud.(Citation: MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022)(Citation: NCC Group LAPSUS Apr 2022) |
Xbash |
Xbash has destroyed Linux-based databases as part of its ransomware capabilities.(Citation: Unit42 Xbash Sept 2018) |
Lazarus Group |
Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.(Citation: Novetta Blockbuster) |
AcidRain |
AcidRain performs an in-depth wipe of the target filesystem and various attached storage devices through either a data overwrite or calling various IOCTLS to erase it.(Citation: AcidRain JAGS 2022) |
REvil |
REvil has the capability to destroy files and folders.(Citation: Kaspersky Sodin July 2019)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: Intel 471 REvil March 2020)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019) |
Kazuar |
Kazuar can overwrite files with random data before deleting them.(Citation: Unit 42 Kazuar May 2017) |
HermeticWiper |
HermeticWiper can recursively wipe folders and files in `Windows`, `Program Files`, `Program Files(x86)`, `PerfLogs`, `Boot, System`, `Volume Information`, and `AppData` folders using `FSCTL_MOVE_FILE`. HermeticWiper can also overwrite symbolic links and big files in `My Documents` and on the Desktop with random bytes.(Citation: ESET Hermetic Wizard March 2022) |
DEADWOOD |
DEADWOOD overwrites files on victim systems with random data to effectively destroy them.(Citation: SentinelOne Agrius 2021) |
Shamoon |
Shamoon attempts to overwrite operating system files and disk structures with image files.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016) In a later variant, randomly generated data was used for data overwrites.(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018)(Citation: McAfee Shamoon December 2018) |
PowerDuke |
PowerDuke has a command to write random data across a file and delete it.(Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) |
During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team deployed CaddyWiper on the victim’s IT environment systems to wipe files related to the OT capabilities, along with mapped drives, and physical drive partitions.(Citation: Mandiant-Sandworm-Ukraine-2022) |
|
Olympic Destroyer |
Olympic Destroyer overwrites files locally and on remote shares.(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)(Citation: US District Court Indictment GRU Unit 74455 October 2020) |
APT38 |
APT38 has used a custom secure delete function to make deleted files unrecoverable.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018) |
MultiLayer Wiper |
MultiLayer Wiper deletes files on network drives, but corrupts and overwrites with random data files stored locally.(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) |
CaddyWiper |
CaddyWiper can work alphabetically through drives on a compromised system to take ownership of and overwrite all files.(Citation: ESET CaddyWiper March 2022)(Citation: Cisco CaddyWiper March 2022) |
SDelete |
SDelete deletes data in a way that makes it unrecoverable.(Citation: Microsoft SDelete July 2016) |
BlackEnergy |
BlackEnergy 2 contains a "Destroy" plug-in that destroys data stored on victim hard drives by overwriting file contents.(Citation: Securelist BlackEnergy Feb 2015)(Citation: ESET BlackEnergy Jan 2016) |
RawDisk |
RawDisk was used in Shamoon to write to protected system locations such as the MBR and disk partitions in an effort to destroy data.(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) |
Meteor |
Meteor can fill a victim's files and directories with zero-bytes in replacement of real content before deleting them.(Citation: Check Point Meteor Aug 2021) |
KillDisk |
KillDisk deletes system files to make the OS unbootable. KillDisk also targets and deletes files with 35 different file extensions.(Citation: ESEST Black Energy Jan 2016) |
ShrinkLocker |
ShrinkLocker can initiate a destructive payload depending on the operating system check through resizing and reformatting portions of the victim machine's disk, leading to system instability and potential data corruption.(Citation: Splunk ShrinkLocker 2024) |
Sandworm Team |
Sandworm Team has used CaddyWiper, SDelete, and the BlackEnergy KillDisk component to overwrite files on victim systems. (Citation: US-CERT Ukraine Feb 2016)(Citation: ESET Telebots June 2017)(Citation: Mandiant-Sandworm-Ukraine-2022) Additionally, Sandworm Team has used the JUNKMAIL tool to overwrite files with null bytes.(Citation: mandiant_apt44_unearthing_sandworm) |
Proxysvc |
Proxysvc can overwrite files indicated by the attacker before deleting them.(Citation: McAfee GhostSecret) |
Apostle |
Apostle initially masqueraded as ransomware but actual functionality is a data destruction tool, supported by an internal name linked to an early version, |
AcidPour |
AcidPour can perform an in-depth wipe of victim filesystems and attached storage devices through either data overwrite or calling various IOCTLS to erase them, similar to AcidRain.(Citation: SentinelOne AcidPour 2024) |
StoneDrill |
StoneDrill has a disk wiper module that targets files other than those in the Windows directory.(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) |
Mitigations |
|
Mitigation | Description |
---|---|
Data Destruction Mitigation |
Consider implementing IT disaster recovery plans that contain procedures for taking regular data backups that can be used to restore organizational data.(Citation: Ready.gov IT DRP) Ensure backups are stored off system and is protected from common methods adversaries may use to gain access and destroy the backups to prevent recovery. Identify potentially malicious software and audit and/or block it by using whitelisting(Citation: Beechey 2010) tools, like AppLocker,(Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT)(Citation: NSA MS AppLocker) or Software Restriction Policies(Citation: Corio 2008) where appropriate.(Citation: TechNet Applocker vs SRP) |
Multi-factor Authentication |
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) enhances security by requiring users to provide at least two forms of verification to prove their identity before granting access. These factors typically include: - *Something you know*: Passwords, PINs. - *Something you have*: Physical tokens, smartphone authenticator apps. - *Something you are*: Biometric data such as fingerprints, facial recognition, or retinal scans. Implementing MFA across all critical systems and services ensures robust protection against account takeover and unauthorized access. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Identity and Access Management (IAM): - Use IAM solutions like Azure Active Directory, Okta, or AWS IAM to enforce MFA policies for all user logins, especially for privileged roles. - Enable conditional access policies to enforce MFA for risky sign-ins (e.g., unfamiliar devices, geolocations). Authentication Tools and Methods: - Use authenticator applications such as Google Authenticator, Microsoft Authenticator, or Authy for time-based one-time passwords (TOTP). - Deploy hardware-based tokens like YubiKey, RSA SecurID, or smart cards for additional security. - Enforce biometric authentication for compatible devices and applications. Secure Legacy Systems: - Integrate MFA solutions with older systems using third-party tools like Duo Security or Thales SafeNet. - Enable RADIUS/NPS servers to facilitate MFA for VPNs, RDP, and other network logins. Monitoring and Alerting: - Use SIEM tools to monitor failed MFA attempts, login anomalies, or brute-force attempts against MFA systems. - Implement alerts for suspicious MFA activities, such as repeated failed codes or new device registrations. Training and Policy Enforcement: - Educate employees on the importance of MFA and secure authenticator usage. - Enforce policies that require MFA on all critical systems, especially for remote access, privileged accounts, and cloud applications. |
Data Backup |
Data Backup involves taking and securely storing backups of data from end-user systems and critical servers. It ensures that data remains available in the event of system compromise, ransomware attacks, or other disruptions. Backup processes should include hardening backup systems, implementing secure storage solutions, and keeping backups isolated from the corporate network to prevent compromise during active incidents. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Regular Backup Scheduling: - Use Case: Ensure timely and consistent backups of critical data. - Implementation: Schedule daily incremental backups and weekly full backups for all critical servers and systems. Immutable Backups: - Use Case: Protect backups from modification or deletion, even by attackers. - Implementation: Use write-once-read-many (WORM) storage for backups, preventing ransomware from encrypting or deleting backup files. Backup Encryption: - Use Case: Protect data integrity and confidentiality during transit and storage. - Implementation: Encrypt backups using strong encryption protocols (e.g., AES-256) before storing them in local, cloud, or remote locations. Offsite Backup Storage: - Use Case: Ensure data availability during physical disasters or onsite breaches. - Implementation: Use cloud-based solutions like AWS S3, Azure Backup, or physical offsite storage to maintain a copy of critical data. Backup Testing: - Use Case: Validate backup integrity and ensure recoverability. - Implementation: Regularly test data restoration processes to ensure that backups are not corrupted and can be recovered quickly. |
User Account Management |
User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures: Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege - Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions. Implementing Strong Password Policies - Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks. Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts - Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers. Account Lockout Policies - Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts - Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen. Restricting Interactive Logins - Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation. *Tools for Implementation* Built-in Tools: - Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies. Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools: - Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies. Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access. |
Detection
Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\Windows\System32\
.
In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster
and DeleteGlobalCluster
events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket
, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.
References
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Связанные риски
Риск | Связи | |
---|---|---|
Потеря (уничтожение) данных
из-за
возможности физической поломки
в компьютере
Доступность
Отказ в обслуживании
|
2
|
|
Потеря (уничтожение) данных
из-за
возможности удаления данных и файлов
в облачном хранилище
Доступность
Отказ в обслуживании
|
|
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