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Drive-by Compromise
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Drive-by Compromise

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring Application Access Token. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist, including: * A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting. * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers. * Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content). Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-by compromise process: 1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. * The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. * In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered. Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to Steal Application Access Tokens, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.(Citation: Volexity OceanLotus Nov 2017)

ID: T1189
Tactic(s): Initial Access
Platforms: Linux, macOS, SaaS, Windows
Permissions Required: User
Data Sources: Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation
Version: 1.4
Created: 18 Apr 2018
Last Modified: 08 Mar 2022

Procedure Examples
Name Description
Transparent Tribe

Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.(Citation: Proofpoint Operation Transparent Tribe March 2016)(Citation: Unit 42 ProjectM March 2016)(Citation: Talos Transparent Tribe May 2021)
RTM

RTM has distributed its malware via the RIG and SUNDOWN exploit kits, as well as online advertising network Yandex.Direct.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb 2017)(Citation: ESET Buhtrap and Buran April 2019)
PLATINUM

PLATINUM has sometimes used drive-by attacks against vulnerable browser plugins.(Citation: Microsoft PLATINUM April 2016)
Windshift

Windshift has used compromised websites to register custom URL schemes on a remote system.(Citation: objective-see windtail1 dec 2018)
KARAE

KARAE was distributed through torrent file-sharing websites to South Korean victims, using a YouTube video downloader application as a lure.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Earth Lusca

Earth Lusca has performed watering hole attacks.(Citation: TrendMicro EarthLusca 2022)
APT38

APT38 has conducted watering holes schemes to gain initial access to victims.(Citation: FireEye APT38 Oct 2018)(Citation: CISA AA20-239A BeagleBoyz August 2020)
Bundlore

Bundlore has been spread through malicious advertisements on websites.(Citation: MacKeeper Bundlore Apr 2019)
Axiom

Axiom has used watering hole attacks to gain access.(Citation: Cisco Group 72)
APT19

APT19 performed a watering hole attack on forbes.com in 2014 to compromise targets.(Citation: Unit 42 C0d0so0 Jan 2016)
Darkhotel

Darkhotel used embedded iframes on hotel login portals to redirect selected victims to download malware.(Citation: Kaspersky Darkhotel)
Andariel

Andariel has used watering hole attacks, often with zero-day exploits, to gain initial access to victims within a specific IP range.(Citation: AhnLab Andariel Subgroup of Lazarus June 2018)(Citation: TrendMicro New Andariel Tactics July 2018)
APT28

APT28 has compromised targets via strategic web compromise utilizing custom exploit kits.(Citation: Secureworks IRON TWILIGHT Active Measures March 2017)
Dragonfly

Dragonfly has compromised targets via strategic web compromise (SWC) utilizing a custom exploit kit.(Citation: Secureworks IRON LIBERTY July 2019)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)(Citation: Gigamon Berserk Bear October 2021)
Bad Rabbit

Bad Rabbit spread through watering holes on popular sites by injecting JavaScript into the HTML body or a .js file.(Citation: ESET Bad Rabbit)(Citation: Secure List Bad Rabbit)
Dark Caracal

Dark Caracal leveraged a watering hole to serve up malicious code.(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)
Turla

Turla has infected victims using watering holes.(Citation: ESET ComRAT May 2020)(Citation: Secureworks IRON HUNTER Profile)
Patchwork

Patchwork has used watering holes to deliver files with exploits to initial victims.(Citation: Symantec Patchwork)(Citation: Volexity Patchwork June 2018)
Leviathan

Leviathan has infected victims using watering holes.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 2021)
APT32

APT32 has infected victims by tricking them into visiting compromised watering hole websites.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus)(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)
BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER compromised three Japanese websites using a Flash exploit to perform watering hole attacks.(Citation: Symantec Tick Apr 2016)

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used a watering hole attack on a popular software reseller to exploit the then-zero-day Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-0322.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm)
Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.(Citation: RATANKBA)(Citation: Google TAG Lazarus Jan 2021)
Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 has extensively used strategic web compromises to target victims.(Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)

During C0010, UNC3890 actors likely established a watering hole that was hosted on a login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company that was active until at least November 2021.(Citation: Mandiant UNC3890 Aug 2022)
LoudMiner

LoudMiner is typically bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.(Citation: ESET LoudMiner June 2019)
Elderwood

Elderwood has delivered zero-day exploits and malware to victims by injecting malicious code into specific public Web pages visited by targets within a particular sector.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: CSM Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Security Affairs Elderwood Sept 2012)
REvil

REvil has infected victim machines through compromised websites and exploit kits.(Citation: Secureworks REvil September 2019)(Citation: McAfee Sodinokibi October 2019)(Citation: Picus Sodinokibi January 2020)(Citation: Secureworks GandCrab and REvil September 2019)
APT37

APT37 has used strategic web compromises, particularly of South Korean websites, to distribute malware. The group has also used torrent file-sharing sites to more indiscriminately disseminate malware to victims. As part of their compromises, the group has used a Javascript based profiler called RICECURRY to profile a victim's web browser and deliver malicious code accordingly.(Citation: Securelist ScarCruft Jun 2016)(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)(Citation: Volexity InkySquid BLUELIGHT August 2021)
Leafminer

Leafminer has infected victims using watering holes.(Citation: Symantec Leafminer July 2018)
Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro has used compromised websites and Google Ads to bait victims into downloading its installer.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July 2020)(Citation: IBM Grandoreiro April 2020)
Machete

Machete has distributed Machete through a fake blog website.(Citation: Securelist Machete Aug 2014)
PROMETHIUM

PROMETHIUM has used watering hole attacks to deliver malicious versions of legitimate installers.(Citation: Bitdefender StrongPity June 2020)
POORAIM

POORAIM has been delivered through compromised sites acting as watering holes.(Citation: FireEye APT37 Feb 2018)
Windigo

Windigo has distributed Windows malware via drive-by downloads.(Citation: ESET Windigo Mar 2014)
Dragonfly 2.0

Dragonfly 2.0 compromised legitimate organizations' websites to create watering holes to compromise victims.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A)
Magic Hound

Magic Hound has conducted watering-hole attacks through media and magazine websites.(Citation: ClearSky Kittens Back 3 August 2020)

Mitigations
Mitigation Description
Exploit Protection

Use capabilities to detect and block conditions that may lead to or be indicative of a software exploit occurring.
Update Software

Perform regular software updates to mitigate exploitation risk.
Application Isolation and Sandboxing

Restrict execution of code to a virtual environment on or in transit to an endpoint system.
Restrict Web-Based Content

Restrict use of certain websites, block downloads/attachments, block Javascript, restrict browser extensions, etc.
Drive-by Compromise Mitigation

Drive-by compromise relies on there being a vulnerable piece of software on the client end systems. Use modern browsers with security features turned on. Ensure all browsers and plugins kept updated can help prevent the exploit phase of this technique. For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing in the first place. Script blocking extensions can help prevent the execution of JavaScript that may commonly be used during the exploitation process. Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist. (Citation: Windows Blogs Microsoft Edge Sandbox) (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape) Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. The risks of additional exploits and weaknesses in implementation may still exist. (Citation: Ars Technica Pwn2Own 2017 VM Escape) Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. (Citation: TechNet Moving Beyond EMET) Control flow integrity checking is another way to potentially identify and stop a software exploit from occurring. (Citation: Wikipedia Control Flow Integrity) Many of these protections depend on the architecture and target application binary for compatibility.

Detection

Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.

References

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